Conventional Wisdom: The Iranian regime is teetering and ready to fall.
That CW has been "true" since the 2009 "Green Movement." Every time there are mass demonstrations in the street with protesters shouting "Down with Khamenei!" some observers will predict the certain end of the Iranian theocracy.
That 2009 uprising was over an almost amateurish attempt to rig the presidential election for the regime's chosen candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. "Where's my vote?" was their battle cry, and millions of citizens poured into the streets. The regime killed about 100 and detained another 3,000.
In 2017, rising food prices sent people into the streets again, as authorities killed about 22 and arrested 5,000. Another round of protests over rising fuel prices in 2019 led to 300 dead and at least 7,000 detained.
In January 2020, Iranians took to the streets following the regime's admission that the Revolutionary Guards shot down a Ukrainian airliner, killing all 176 aboard, including dozens of Iranian citizens. Once again, dozens were killed and thousands arrested.
The 2022 anti-hijab protests rattled the regime to its core, as women and girls led the movement following the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while she was in the custody of the morality police, who arrested her for wearing her hijab improperly. More than 500 Iranians were killed this time, and 20,000 were arrested. Seven demonstrators were executed.
During each uprising, there were confident predictions that the regime would fall. Every prediction proved to be wrong.
It should be obvious to even the most hardened, skeptical Iran watcher that today's protests are different. The body count is higher by several orders of magnitude, for one thing. Another is that people are fighting back, killing dozens (perhaps hundreds) of police and national auxiliaries.
The biggest difference between the protests in 2026 and previous uprisings is that the economy has collapsed. These protests are not about the culture, the oppression, the mandatory hijab, or corruption. They're about all of those things — and a system that can't deliver the basic necessities of life. The government has failed the people, and no amount of propaganda or appeals to religion will alter that perception.
However, the regime still has a near-monopoly on firearms, which has, for the moment, been the difference. How can we assess whether the regime is about to fall, either through overthrow or collapse?
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has developed some indicators that measure the health and stability of Iran's regime. These are indicators that have either already been "tripped," "partially tripped," or "unobserved."
Some indicators that have already been tripped:
- Security personnel defecting or refusing to repress protests—indicates that the regime has lost control of some security forces
- Security forces withdrawing or retreating from protest scenes—indicates that security forces lack the will or ability to control certain protests
- Deployment of IRGC conventional units for repression—indicates that the LEC and Basij have failed to control the protests or are not available in sufficient numbers to do so
- Deployment of foreign militias for repression—indicates that the regime seeks to free bandwidth for security forces or is concerned about security personnel defections
- Simultaneous protests in major cities and rural areas—indicates that protests could strain the bandwidth of security forces
- Unusually high rate of security force casualties—indicates that protesters are increasingly violent or capable
"The regime reportedly arrested 'dozens' of security forces in Kermanshah who refused to fire at protesters," ISW reports. The IRGC Intelligence Organization separately stated that it is “dealing with possible acts of abandonment,” which suggests that at least some Iranian security personnel may have defected or that the regime is concerned about this possibility.
There is also evidence that "Security Forces have retreated from protests in Bushehr City, Bushehr Province, and Eslamabad-e Gharb, Kermanshah Province, due to the size and intensity of protests," ISW reports.
Also, Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) units have been observed engaging protesters in Kurdish provinces and have probably deployed to other non-Persian provinces where police can't be trusted to put down the protests.
As I reported previously, the regime has imported militias from Iraq and Lebanon to stiffen the spines of its police who may be reluctant to open fire.
Related: 'Rats Fleeing the Ship': Tens of Millions of Dollars Being Wired Out of Iran by Leadership
Some of the indicators that have been partially tripped include:
Expanding insurgent operations in border regions—indicates that security forces are degraded under mounting strain
Deployment of the Artesh to guard key locations—indicates that the regime seeks to free bandwidth for security forces.
Reuters is reporting armed Kurdish groups from Iraq have crossed the border into Iran to help their brethren in what for the Kurds is a full-blown insurgency.
The Artesh, a 350,000-strong group of poorly-trained but fanatically loyal thugs, have been deployed in Karaj, Alborz Province. They are useful largely because their deployment relieves more trained personnel to address more pressing problems.
We have yet to see large-scale deployments of the IRGC or the Basij, and the protesters have yet to occupy and hold any critical or strategic locations. Nor are there any solid indications that there are divisions in the leadership, although some shockingly high death tolls have been leaked from regime sources. That could indicate opposition to the brutality of the crackdown.
Unless something extraordinary happens in the next few days, the Iranian regime appears just strong enough and just stable enough to hang on to power. It almost certainly won't last. Hungry, desperate people rioting in the streets could lead to some kind of military coup, which would then lead to civil war.
Iran's struggle for freedom and justice is just beginning.
