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"Two Soviet Army generals sit in a café on the Champs-Élysées in Paris after World War III, sipping champagne and watching their tanks roll triumphantly down the boulevard. One general turns to the other and asks: 'Ivan, tell me… who won the air war?'" —Cold War humor beloved by Army officers
"Some Iraqi generals don't think that's funny." —a slightly post-Cold War Air Force rejoinder
At lunchtime 10 days ago in sunny Voronezh, Russia, a U.K.-sourced Storm Shadow cruise missile buzzed through the sky, unchallenged by any local air defenses, before making a sudden nosedive into the VZPP-Mikron semiconductor plant. Its 990-pound penetration warhead detonated inside the facility, along with much of the fuel still in its tank.
Ukraine struck VZPP-Mikron with a total of six Storm Shadows — of the hundred or so believed to have been gifted by His Majesty's Government. The actual number is of course classified.
Why so many relatively scarce missiles on one target?
"This isn't just any regular factory; it’s a critical bottleneck in the Russian military-industrial complex," analyst Jarl Finland explained. "This specific plant manufactures the vital microcircuits, diodes, and transistor arrays needed for the onboard computers of Russia’s air-defense systems, Pantsir-S1, and cruise missiles like the Iskander-K and Kh-101."
VZPP-Mikron produced the brains inside the missiles Russia uses to attack Ukraine's military, civilian energy infrastructure, and the occasional church. Also, for the air-defense missiles Russia uses to protect its own assets from Ukraine's attacks.
"Basically, the only high-tech stuff Russia actually manages to produce domestically these days" comes from VZPP-Mikron, Finland added. Or rather, it used to come from VZPP-Mikron.
Until VZPP-Mikron can be rebuilt or replaced, Moscow will have to source more chips from overseas which, due to sanctions, takes longer and costs more. What I suspect might happen is that Moscow will find willing Chinese suppliers, making Russia even more dependent on the tender mercies of Xi Jinping.
The Kremlin admits to five deaths in the Voronezh strike, but there's online chatter of 100 or more. Russia might have lost considerable technical talent along with whatever damage the plant sustained — it certainly appears serious — but always take the online chatter with a grain of salt.
Four days later, Kyiv attacked Russia's Titan-Barrikady missile facility in Volgograd — "one of the key plants of the Russian military-industrial complex," as UNN put it — with a total of four long-range FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. Open-source reports indicate that three of the Flamingos hit the heavily-protected plant, which produces launchers, artillery systems, and components for various weapons systems, including Russia's strategic nuclear missile forces.
Two of the hits were recorded by locals, and the clips are something to see.
A straight-on panoramic view of two FP-5 Flamingo missiles striking the Russian military-industrial complex ‘Titan-Barricades’ in Volgograd. pic.twitter.com/bYKARN2ocH
— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) June 30, 2026
Titan-Barrikady specializes in complex, low-rate, difficult-to-replace systems, like launchers and transporter-loader vehicles for the Iskander-M mobile nuclear missile. Those are aimed at us, so let me say: Thank you, Ukraine.
Nobody outside of the plant (or the Kremlin) knows just how bad the damage is, but imagine that your air defenses are so worn down that you can't defend a primary strategic weapons facility from home-brew cruise missiles. Seriously, Ukraine revealed the Flamingo last August, promising to produce 600 per month by the end of the year. While it doesn't appear like they've managed to scale up to anything like those numbers, the Flamingo's 1,860-mile range and 2,540-pound warhead put our fearsome Tomahawk missiles to shame.
The targeting doesn't look too shabby, either, does it?
And Another Thing: The Tomahawk still enjoys certain advantages, but it's a decades-old platform that's seen constant improvements, and enjoying the full backing of America's military-industrial complex. The Flamingo — that name! — is a brand-new piece of kit designed and assembled on the quick with the same mindset as a startup in somebody's Silicon Valley garage.
Back in January, I wrote a Thursday Essay headlined, "So How's That Russo-Ukraine Oil War Going?" I won't drag you through the whole thing, but my conclusion back then could be fairly summed up as, "Not very well because Kyiv remains too obsessed with Crimea to wage an effective, systematic campaign on Russia's energy infrastructure."
Well, times change.
On June 16, a wave of drones struck the Moscow Oil Refinery, focusing on the facility's CDU-6 crude distillation unit that accounts for more than half its capacity. The strike caused a major fire that either halted or sharply reduced the refinery's output. Before repairs could hardly begin, Ukraine struck the facility again on June 18. The second attack damaged the refinery’s newer Euro+ complex representing the remainder of the plant's capacity.
Repairs are expected to take at least six months, meaning the refinery won't resume normal operations until sometime in 2027. Prior to the June drone strikes, the refinery supplied approximately 40% of Moscow’s gasoline and about half of its diesel.
These attacks struck Moscow, the Russian capital and home to one of the densest air-defense networks in the world.
The strikes also produced a video that must be seen to be believed — the top literally blowing off one of the oil storage units.
You thought tank turret tosses were good?
— Euan MacDonald (@Euan_MacDonald) June 18, 2026
How about oil tank top tosses?
During another big drone attack on Moscow this morning, a drone hit an oil refinery storage tank, sending its top into the air like a flying saucer.
Huge smoke plumes now over fascist Russia’s capital. pic.twitter.com/vjptX4z5wt
For perspective, that lid is roughly 150 feet in diameter and probably weighs 200,000 pounds or more.
As it turns out, that amazing pop top wasn't due to the fire started by the initial drone strike, or even by a follow-up hit. Some Russian air defense unit fired a heat-seeking missile at another drone, but the missile's seeker locked onto a slightly warmer target — the burning oil tank.
War is weird.
But is Kyiv's oil war finally producing real results?
And Another Thing: I came across a couple of X posts from folks impressed by how well the roof held together — and that's no accident. As ChatGPT explained it to me, the roof-to-shell weld is intentionally the weakest part of the structure, so if pressure rises catastrophically, the roof separates cleanly and vents the explosion upward instead of turning the tank into a gigantic fragmentation bomb.
Visegrád 24 reported on Sunday that "Apart from hitting the Slavyansk-on-Kuban Oil Refinery in the Krasnodar Region early this morning, Ukraine also struck the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, setting it on fire."
But Kyiv's newly systematic and increasingly effective oil war isn't about producing spectacular videos — it's about putting the pinch on the Kremlin's income, and making ordinary Russians feel the pain of Putin's war.
"Gasoline prices have doubled over the past three months in Russia," the outlet also reported.
The proof is in the pricing, as they say — or at least they ought to.
Ukrainian energy analyst Mykhailo Honchar claimed this week that half of Russia's "primary oil refining capacity is now offline," as Euromaidan Press put it, even if "the International Energy Agency and Reuters-cited industry sources" put it lower "at roughly 33-40% through June."
Even the lower figure affirmatively answers my question from last year, whether Kyiv could put the hurt on Russian energy production faster than Moscow could restore it.
Military analyst Trent Telenko called it "a supply and corruption driven fuel shock to its economy that is bigger than the USA's twin energy shocks of the 1973 oil embargo and the 1979 fall of Shah in Iran."
Even Putin had to admit that all is not quite well. "President Vladimir Putin acknowledged for the first time on Sunday that the country was facing a ;certain deficit' of fuel and vowed to strengthen protection of oil facilities and boost fuel output," PBS reported on Sunday.
Putin added during his address that "strikes on our infrastructure, wherever they are directed, have absolutely no effect on the situation at the front, on the line of contact."
Yeah, stick a pin in that claim because I'll come back to it shortly.
Meanwhile, Russians — even in the more pampered Moscow region — spend hours lined up to purchase rationed gasoline.
More long fuel lines in Moscow, Russia.
— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) June 27, 2026
People say that the maximum purchase amount of fuel is 30 liters (less than 8 gallons). Not enough fuel to make one trip from Moscow to Saint Petersburg. Golden opportunities for the blackmarket and the criminal gangs behind it. pic.twitter.com/y5GbrLofHC
In certain less-pampered regions, Russians are allowed less than four gallons per so-called fill-up.
Gas rationing in Russia is a bit like running low on corn in Iowa.
Where, one might ask — and believe me, Russians ask this all the time on Telegram, even though the encrypted social media platform was officially banned this year by the Kremlin — are Russia's air defenses?
And Another Thing: Operation Epic Fury elevated oil prices enough to cover for Russia's reduced output. With the fighting (mostly) on hold and prices almost back down to pre-campaign normal, Moscow can either get production restored or take a huge financial hit. Unless, that is, Kyiv's oil drone strikes slack off again.
The answer isn’t that Russia suddenly forgot how to defend its skies. It’s that Ukraine spent the better part of a year methodically attacking Russia’s integrated air-defense systems faster than Moscow could repair or replace them. "Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces say their operators have struck 194 elements of Russia’s integrated air defense network since the start of 2026, including 31 targets in June alone," United24 reported on Tuesday. June is actually down slightly from May, but to be fair, Kyiv could be running short of targets.
Now Kyiv reaps the rewards of a long and surprisingly patient campaign.
I singled out these three attacks because each represents a different aspect of Kyiv's current air campaign. Hitting VZPP-Mikron potentially puts a crimp in Russia's offensive and defensive missile forces. Damaging Titan-Barrikady doesn't materially affect Russia's ability to fight Ukraine (unless I've missed something), but hitting such a sensitive target forces Moscow to make painful decisions about where to allocate increasingly scarce resources. Hitting it with seeming impunity, that's just humiliating.
And striking Russia's energy production and distribution infrastructure strikes at the Kremlin's finances.
Then there's the interdiction campaign in the "gray zone" around the frontlines. Without going into too many details — because the land war remains a World War I-style slog — Kyiv has grown remarkably effective at stopping Russian advances. Figures for June aren't fully tabulated, but according to ISW, Russia gained just 41 square kilometers of territory in the first five months of 2026, compared to 516 in the first five months of last year. That's net of territory Russia lost this year, mostly in the south. If you go by ISW's stricter standard of territory actually controlled, rather than merely infiltrated, Russia has actually lost ground so far this year.
An estimated 80,000 or more Russians paid with their lives (and another 50,000 or so wounded) for those meager results.
Kyiv basically halted Russia's 2026 spring-summer offensive before it could get underway, mostly by using drones to kill Russian soldiers before they could even assemble at the front. Putin's claim that Ukraine's strikes "have absolutely no effect on the situation at the front" is a blood-soaked lie.
It's fair to say that, looking at those four aspects, Ukraine is winning the air war so far in 2026.
But there's a fifth.
While Kyiv's airstrikes on Russia's military and energy infrastructure are no doubt impressive, the country's drone and missile production has ramped up to the point that the jewel of Putin's eye — Crimea — is now under virtual siege.
Crimea, occupied by Russia since the 2014 "little green men" invasion, serves as the logistical hub for Russia's forces in the south, particularly now that the east-west highways along Russia's "land bridge" to Crimea fall well within drone range.
"With the Kerch bridge operating at less than 25% capacity," retired SEAL and Kyiv Post reporter Chuck Farrer wrote, "Russia is forced to use a 400-mile detour to supply occupied Crimea and Kherson. This exposes their logistics to the non-stop predation of UKR drones."
It's working.
As of last week, state of emergency has officially been in effect in Crimea, due entirely to drone and missile strikes on the peninsula's infrastructure — vital railroads and bridges are out of action, and local air defenses are a shambles. "Gas is nowhere to be found," the NYT reported last week, "People are fleeing. And now the electricity is flickering out."
Locals report a 20-mile-long traffic jam of vehicles attempting to leave Russian-occupied Crimea over the Kerch Bridge today.
— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 26, 2026
Follows major fuel, power, and goods shortages caused by Ukraine's drone campaign. pic.twitter.com/LnzmB55SAi
For what it's worth, most of those people might have just been hoping to get gas in Krasnodar, where it's still available in less limited quantities.
Civilians aren't the target, however. The real target is Russia's ability to maintain lines of communication to its forces in the entire Zaporizhzhia region in Ukraine's south.
What looked like a needless distraction in 2023-2025, now looks like the centerpiece of a slow-moving southern counteroffensive completely unlike Kyiv's failed effort to do the same thing in 2023.
The plan in '23 was to drive south, to the Sea of Azov, severing Russia’s land bridge to Crimea. Instead, Ukrainian forces ran into the heavily fortified Surovikin Line, consisting of multiple belts of minefields, dragon’s teeth, trenches, artillery, and attack helicopters. After months of fighting, the front had barely budged.
Ukraine wasted some 50,000 dead and wounded in that failed operation — and that was pretty much the end of my hopes that Kyiv could force the Russians out of any territory they'd had enough time to fortify. Three years and countless drones and missiles later, that might be starting to change.
Maybe we're about to find out which general was correct about air power. Is it the fictional Soviet one sipping champagne in that Paris café, or the real-world American general grimly eyeing Saddam Hussein's shattered divisions?
Last Thursday: The Burning Questions Europeans Will Bring Home With Their Ranch Dressing
