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Wars for oil rarely go well for the aggressor trying to take it. Wars against oil, on the other hand... that's a different story. It's also today's story.
The most famous war for oil isn't often appreciated as one, but oil is exactly what prompted Imperial Japan to attack the U.S. at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. Let me give you the VodkaPundit Cliff's Notes for Dummies version.
Imperial Japan was hellbent — I mean crazy-stupid hellbent — on conquering East Asia (and maybe India and some other bits) and as much of the Pacific as they deemed necessary to secure their new Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The “Co” in “Co-Prosperity” was ironic, in the same way jackboots are for dancing.
But Japan needed American oil (and scrap metal) to keep its war machine going, and as it turned out, we weren't exactly fond of little unpleasantries like the Rape of Nanking. Much go-nowhere diplomacy followed, culminating in FDR (not entirely intentionally — there was a White House miscommunication) setting a deadline to cut off all U.S. oil sales to Japan.
Tokyo figured: "Hey, no problem. We'll just take the Dutch oil fields in the East Indies. The U.S.-controlled Philippines are in the way, but that's no problem, either. We'll take the Philippines, too, sink the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, and FDR will come begging for peace."
Things didn't quite work out as planned.
Instead of suing for peace, we raised the mightiest navy the world had ever seen, built a couple of atomic bombs from scratch, and demanded an unconditional surrender — and we got one.
And Another Thing: Year Two of Hitler's war against the Soviet Union was a war for oil wrapped up inside his war for Lebensraum. After failing to knock the Soviets out in six weeks as promised in 1941, Hitler needed oil for a protracted campaign. "Hey, no problem. We'll just take Stalin's oil fields around Baku waaaay down in the Caucasus." The lynchpin of 1942's Operation Edelweiss (really!) was taking and holding Stalingrad. Talk about things not quite working out as planned...
The only other war for oil that comes to mind was Saddam Hussein's Aug. 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait.
Saddam owed the Kuwaitis oodles of money for their financial support during the Iran-Iraq War. But Saddam figured that if he annexed Kuwait, he'd erase his debts and score all its oil on top of his own. His veteran army would dig in, and the world would accept Saddam's rapid conquest as a fait accompli.
Things didn't quite work out as planned.
A U.S.-led Coalition put more than half a million men on Saddam's doorstep, and they soon did the exact opposite of accepting a fait accompli.
Wars against oil usually go much better. Today, Ukraine shows us how to wage an oil war in the Drone Age.
First, though, let's briefly look at why they often work.
Oil fields can't hide. Refineries burn. Pipelines rupture. Trucks blow up and trains derail. It’s almost as though oil wants to be bombed.
The model for Ukraine's oil war might be the Allied air campaign against German production. When the Allies finally decided to bomb the bejeebus out of Hitler's oil in May 1944, the results were almost as immediate as they were effective.
This is from Jay In Kyiv on X this week:
- Within two months, synthetic fuel output drops by half; by autumn, aviation fuel is almost gone.
- Late 1944: Immediate, devastating effects
- Luftwaffe grounded for lack of fuel; many pilots can’t train.
- Panzer divisions become immobile, trapped at key battles (e.g., Ardennes Offensive).
- German fuel crisis is catastrophic within 6–8 months of sustained bombing.
- 1945: Collapse
- By spring, the Wehrmacht is effectively paralyzed; fuel is so scarce that some divisions abandon tanks.
The Allied bombing campaign "took 6–8 months of systematic strikes to ground Germany’s air force and paralyze its mechanized units."
Still, let's be realistic: No drone campaign will shut down Russian oil drilling. With apologies to Mr. Miyagi, that would be like trying to kill every hornet in their nest with a pair of chopsticks. But that doesn't mean that Russian energy production doesn't have vulnerabilities that can't be exploited.
Back in January, Ukraine began what looked like a tentative campaign against Russian oil refining, transport, and storage. But the effort accelerated through the summer, especially in the last two weeks.
Of particular interest was the attack on Ust-Luga, near St. Petersburg, detailed here:
About 10 Ukrainian drones hit Russia’s Ust-Luga port & Novatek terminal near St. Petersburg (Leningrad).
— Clash Report (@clashreport) August 24, 2025
Fires broke out, smoke seen for miles.
Ust-Luga port, located on Russia’s Baltic coast & about 100 km southwest of St. Petersburg, is key for energy exports and sanctions… pic.twitter.com/lXym3g55xN
"Ust-Luga port, located on Russia’s Baltic coast & about 100 km southwest of St. Petersburg, is key for energy exports and sanctions evasion, processing up to 13 million tons of LNG yearly."
This hit just happened yesterday, and it's another big'un:
🔥🛢️/1. Tonight there is a very large attack on the Russian Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery with a capacity of 7.9 million tons per year, Samara region of Russia.
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) August 28, 2025
According to eyewitnesses, at least dozens of drones hit the refinery. The entire territory of the Novokuybyshevsk… pic.twitter.com/p2Od01TFHL
The Novoshakhtinsk refinery burned for five days following last week's strike.
After 5 days of burning, it appears that the fire at the Novoshakhtinsk refinery has been contained. The damage, however, is already done. The storage facility in the northwestern part of the refinery has been destroyed. It is likely that the heat destroyed far more of the… pic.twitter.com/qEcYie8K5m
— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) August 26, 2025
Novoshakhtinsk wasn't a huge facility, refining only about 1.7% of Russia's gas and diesel. But it isn't the only facility hit hard in recent weeks.
I still have at least half a dozen browser tabs with videos of burning oil trucks, trains, refineries, and storage facilities, but I think you get the point.
Energy infrastructure can be rebuilt, but Western sanctions and Russian labor shortages make rebuilding efforts slower and more expensive. In some cases, rebuilding in a timely manner might be impossible.
The overall energy situation is complicated, almost a game of whack-a-mole. Russian refining is in a world of hurt, but that means they have more crude oil to sell: "Russia has revised up its crude oil export plan from western ports by 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) in August from the initial schedule after Ukrainian drone attacks disrupted refinery operations and freed up more crude for shipment," three people "familiar with the matter" told the Wall Street Journal.
Yes, they need the gas and diesel, but cold, hard cash keeps the regime afloat.
There's more:
Export planning remains uncertain, however, due to ongoing strikes and shifting repair schedules, so delays and volume revisions are likely, they said.
“Attacks are ongoing and repair deadlines change daily. It’s unclear how much Russia can load this month or next,” one person said.
Russian oil sellers were yet to receive final loading plans for September, though normally they have the full plan a week before the loading month.
So, Moscow has more crude to sell, but it might not be able to load it onto the ships — as I said, it's complicated.
That's gotta hurt, yet isn't enough pain to shut down the Russian military. How long Russian civilians are willing to put up with high prices, shortages, and rationing is another question. Wartime rationing seems to be drilled into the Russian soul, so don't count on "The gas price is too high!" to force regime change.
I should also mention that Ukraine's Oil War might be part of a broader operation to starve out Russian forces. Judging by the open-source intel accounts I follow on X, strikes like these escalated, too.
❗️This is how a 🇷🇺Russian fuel train burned today in Zaporizhia pic.twitter.com/IRomqrHyEy
— 🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 (@front_ukrainian) August 19, 2025
Various reports indicate it took a week or longer to clear the tracks. Local Russian troops didn't just lose the fuel on that train; troops in that sector lost all train deliveries — and Russian logistics lean hard on the railroads.
‼️🇺🇦✈️🔥 BREAKING — At this moment, the Ukrainian Air Force and rocket artillery are carrying out massive strikes using guided aerial bombs and GMLRS rockets in the occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. Russian army positions, temporary deployment bases, field headquarters,… pic.twitter.com/CrKccscDSo
— The War Action (@TheWarAction) August 28, 2025
"The gut feeling of something big is coming from Ukraine just hits you," military analyst Trent Telenko replied.
All this comes after Ukraine spent a year systematically thinning out Russian air defense units. I'd say they likely had an oil war in mind all along.
We'll see how it plays out, but Telenko's gut feeling ought to hit you, too, because so far neither the Ukrainian nor Russian air forces have performed to much effect — anti-air missile systems these days are just that good. Without stealth, the modern battlespace dictates that jets and bombers stay as far back as possible, lobbing glide bombs and missiles from relative safety.
And Another Thing: If you'd like to take a few minutes on a deep X dive into Russia's wider infrastructure troubles, including what looks like an impending collapse of their rail system, check out this thread from Artur Rehi. He opens with "The fuel crisis in Russia will most likely only get worse," and then makes a strong case.
So keep Russia's thinned-out air defenses in mind when I share this next item that I swear to God is true:
Satellite images show at least 12 air defense units — mostly Pantsir-S1 systems — positioned near Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Valdai, in the Novgorod region, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported.
On August 12, an X user said they had spotted several previously unreported air defense systems in Valdai on Yandex Maps. RFE/RL journalist Mark Krutov confirmed the findings and published all of the systems in the area on an interactive map.
It's good to be the czar.
Click through for the satellite photos if you like, but keep in mind that when Ukraine drones set Russia's massive Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery ablaze, nearly destroying the entire complex, Putin sat pretty at his luxury compound behind a dozen increasingly scarce air defense systems.
I'd be remiss if I didn't also mention Putin's targeting priority: Ukrainian civilians.
Last night Russia launched the second largest aerial attack of the war with 600 drones and 31 missiles. The targets? Not soldiers and weapons but residential areas in Kyiv—blasting civilian trains, the EU & British mission council offices, and innocent civilians.
— Keith Kellogg (@generalkellogg) August 28, 2025
These egregious… pic.twitter.com/qulsiPlTy1
Even after 30-plus months of attritional warfare, Russia has yet to take any sort of systematic action against Ukraine's military infrastructure. Instead, the Russian military prefers to attack cities, particularly Kyiv.
But why?
Maybe the Russians lack the intel required to make precision strikes on Ukraine's drone factories and the like. Maybe they have the intel, but lack the precision. Maybe they believe killing civilians and destroying cities will wear down Ukraine's will to resist. Maybe they're just murderous psychopaths.
If there's a fifth possibility, I don't know what it might be.
Militarily, Russia's targeting seems foolish to me. But I'm no fly on the wall at Russian military intelligence, so maybe they know something I don't.
Coming online soon is Ukraine's FP-5 Flamingo (really!) jet-powered cruise missile, with a 1,850-mile range and a hefty 2,200-pound warhead. By comparison, the latest version of the vaunted American Tomahawk cruise missile has a 1,000-1,500-mile range and a 1,000-pound warhead. Grok tells me that a 1,850-mile range puts 90% of Russia's military and energy infrastructure at risk. Kyiv claims they'll be able to produce up to 600 Flamingos a month.
The Flamingo is homegrown gear and won't come with any of Washington's targeting restrictions. Could be a game-changer, we'll see, even if I still can’t believe they named it after a lawn ornament.
I should also mention that Russia's big Summer 2025 offensive has been a big bust. While the summer fighting season isn't quite over, Ukraine's lines held. Open sources indicate Russia lost somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 killed in action just this summer, with perhaps another 100,000 to 150,000 wounded.
Gains have been minimal. The July breakthrough near Pokrovsk quickly fizzled out. Partly because Ukraine quickly redeployed some of its best forces to counter it, including the battle-hardened Azov Brigade, but mostly because Russian troops lacked the mobility to exploit their success.
"No one needs to explain the direct connection between strikes on oil refineries, fuel railway trains, transport hubs (especially railway ones), and the capabilities of Russian troops to carry out operational and strategic maneuvers," Russian military blogger Svyatoslav Golikov bitterly noted last week.
And Ukraine is systematically attacking the lifeblood of mobility: fuel.
I wish it luck.
And Another Thing: Longtime Sharp VodkaPundit Readers™ know I've shouted from the rooftops for more than a year that it's time for both sides to sit down and hammer out a peace. But recent statements from Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other Russian officials indicate the Kremlin isn't interested, even after Putin's recent meeting with Trump. If it's war they want, it's war I hope Kyiv gives them, good and hard.
Ukraine can't muster anything like the air power available to the combined U.S./UK/U.S.S.R. forces of 1944-45, but that doesn't mean we can grade them on a curve. There's no "A for Effort" in war — just losing, winning, or keeping enough of your country to fight another day. Ukraine might be considered lucky to do the "keep enough" thing.
What matters in the Oil War is this: Can Kyiv cripple Russian energy production enough to either force a decision on the battlefield or bring Putin to the negotiating table in earnest?
I don't know. But I do know that summer will soon give way to fall and then to the infamous Russian winter — and Russian energy production is already uncomfortably low.
When Vladimir Putin first invaded Ukraine in 2014, President Barack Obama sent blankets instead of bullets. Who knows, maybe he should have sent them to Russia.
Last Thursday: We’re Losing the Race for the Ultimate High Ground
