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New 9/11 Evidence Points to the Saudi Government's Deep Complicity in the Attack

AP Photo/Richard Drew, File

According to new evidence that documents relating to the lawsuit that families of 9/11 filed against the Saudi Arabian government victims recently revealed, the involvement of the highest levels of the Saudi government is far larger than previously thought.

It was previously suspected that anti-American elements in the Saudi royal family, military, and diplomatic corps aided Osama bin Laden in planning and executing the attack. But documents from the discovery phase of the lawsuit paint a different picture.

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, writing in The Atlantic, examined the new evidence and reached a startling conclusion: "The Global War on Terror was based on a mistake."

A new filing in a lawsuit brought by the families of 9/11 victims against the government of Saudi Arabia alleges that al-Qaeda had significant, indeed decisive, state support for its attacks. Officials of the Saudi government, the plaintiffs’ attorneys contend, formed and operated a network inside the United States that provided crucial assistance to the first cohort of 9/11 hijackers to enter the country.

The error was in basing U.S. foreign policy for two decades on what amounted to a lie. The government of Saudi Arabia gave immense support to al-Qaeda in the 16 months prior to the attacks. Two individuals in the United States — long suspected of assisting Osama bin Laden in carrying out the 9/11 terrorist attacks — were thought to be "rogue operators" who used their own resources to fund and support the al-Qaeda cell operating in the U.S.

As it turns out, the new documents show that both men were part of a much broader effort in the United States. They were "the front end of a conspiracy that included the Saudi embassy in Washington and senior government officials in Riyadh."

The plaintiffs argue that Thumairy and Bayoumi organized safe reception, transportation, and housing for hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, beginning upon their arrival in California on January 15, 2000. (Both Thumairy and Bayoumi have denied aiding the plot. Bayoumi, along with Saudi Arabia, has also denied that he had any involvement with its intelligence operations.) The filing further argues that Thumairy and Bayoumi introduced the pair to local sympathizers in Los Angeles and San Diego who catered to their day-to-day needs, including help with immigration matters, digital and phone communications, and receiving funds from al-Qaeda by wire transfer. Saudi officials also helped the two al-Qaeda operatives—both Saudi nationals with little education or command of English, whose experience abroad consisted mostly of training and fighting for jihadist causes—to procure a car as well as driver’s licenses. This support network was crucial.

While the 9/11 Commission was able to ferret out a lot of circumstantial evidence linking the two men to the hijackers, these most recent filings show that they both were operating under orders from the Saudi embassy in Washington and Riyadh. The actions Thumairy and Bayoumi took to support the al-Qaeda terrorists in the U.S. "were actually deliberate, sustained, and carefully coordinated with other Saudi officials."

This is a lot more than just pie-in-the-sky accusations in a lawsuit. Most of the new evidence is based on intelligence reports and FBI investigations — most of which will be released in the next few weeks.

The article details a raid by British law enforcement of Bayoumi's properties in London where several videotapes were seized.

Another seized video contains footage of Bayoumi in Washington, D.C., where he met with Saudi religious officials posted as diplomats at the embassy and visited the U.S. Capitol. In the video, according to the filing, Bayoumi “carefully films and notes the Capitol’s structural features, entrances, and security posts,” addressing his narration to his “esteemed brothers.” The Capitol was the likely fourth target of the 9/11 attacks, the one that was spared when passengers aboard United Flight 93 wrestled with the hijackers and the plane crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

Where the U.S. erred was in believing that we had entered a new era of "super terrorists" who had access to unlimited funds, brilliant planners, and dedicated foot soldiers to execute extraordinarily detailed plans. Instead, the "super terrorists" were a creation of Saudi Arabia who did have unlimited wealth but little else. Al-Qaeda's best planners were caught and either killed or jailed by the United States. And if there ever was a threat of a large-scale terrorist attack again, it was snuffed out by many of the reforms instituted following 9/11.

The fanatical jihadists in Saudi Arabia didn't control the government in 2001 but frightened the upper echelons of the royal family where much of the wealth of the kingdom was concentrated. At that time, bin Laden sympathizers heavily influenced policy and led to the creation of networks of support for terrorists around the world.

When Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) took control of The Kingdom in 2015, he cleaned house. He sidelined the religious radicals and appointed a new counterterrorism chief who has worked closely with the U.S. His rule has transformed Saudi Arabia. There is still fanaticism there, but it's relegated to the sidelines of Saudi life. MBS is cautiously, slowly, trying to open Saudi life for women and bring new energy to the government. 

If we had known in 2001 what we know now, what would we have done differently?

We would, at a minimum, have immediately compelled Riyadh to dismantle the jihadi infrastructure within its institutions and to liquidate what was left of it on our soil and in countries around the world. We likely would still have toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and tried to destroy what was left of al-Qaeda there. But if we had understood that the attacks of 9/11 had depended on state support—and if we had eliminated that state support—we might well have had the confidence to leave Afghanistan quickly, instead of lingering for 20 years. As additional attacks failed to materialize, we would also have been more prepared to rely on strong border controls and intelligence to keep us safe.

The 9/11 attacks are hardly behind us. They are still, in some ways, an open wound that led to questionable policies and a questionable war. 

And for the families of the victims, their suffering continues as the truth about the attacks continues to be suppressed.

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