It’s almost a month since the Iran nuclear talks brought forth the July 14th deal in Vienna — a.k.a. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Since then a multitude of articles and congressional hearings have exposed major fatal flaws in this deal. Yet, so bad is this agreement that you can flip almost randomly to any page, and find yet more problems. It’s a multi-dimensional catastrophe. The more you examine it, the worse it gets.
For instance, you probably haven’t heard much about Annex III, Section D, which carries the benign-sounding heading of “Nuclear Safety, Safeguards and Security,” and elaborates in item 8 on how America and its partners will tutor Iran in “nuclear safety culture and best practices.” Why, what could be wrong with that?
Plenty, and I’ll get to it shortly. But for background, let us first home in on the inconvenient fact that Iran is still the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism — from its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, to its help and cover for al Qaeda, to its global networks with their long bloody trails through such places as Argentina and Bulgaria, to the thwarted plot in 2011 to blow up the Saudi ambassador to Washington in a popular Georgetown restaurant — collateral damage no object. During the nuclear talks last year, Israeli commandos boarded a freighter in the Red Sea, the Klos C, and seized an illicit cargo of weapons that had been loaded in the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, and then hidden under bags of cement. For a further sampling of Iran’s enterprising support of terrorist networks and activities, here’s a link to the State Department’s latest report, finally released this June, after a record-setting delay.
One of the much-discussed failings of the Iran nuclear deal is that it translates into a gusher of oil revenues for the Tehran regime, ergo a lot more money that can be lavished on Iran’s terror networks, terror mascots and terror reach. Iran gets the initial windfall of unfrozen oil revenues — anywhere from $50 billion to $100 billion or more, depending on whose arithmetic you prefer — followed by billions more at the margin as sanctions are lifted and Iran, freed of the inconvenience of having to smuggle and operate global webs of illicit front companies, enjoys access to world markets. Even before the arms embargo is lifted in five years under this deal, and the missile embargo is lifted in eight, Iran should have an easier time funding terror and smuggling weapons, as the sanctions come off its shipping fleets, air transport, banking and so forth.
Obama administration officials have been justifying these arrangements on grounds that their first priority — the blinkered aim of this deal — is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is “exclusively peaceful.” On that premise, in this Iran deal, they propose to endow Iran with training in running a modern “exclusively peaceful” nuclear infrastructure.
Now let us return to the substance of the JCPOA — a.k.a. the Iran nuclear deal — Annex III, Section D, item 8, pages 4-5 of this annex.
There you will find that under the heading “Nuclear safety,” this deal sets out that the E3/EU+3 (America, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China) “and possibly other states as appropriate” are prepared to help Iran with training and workshops in nuclear safety. As part of this plan — with a focus, mind you, on teaching the Iranians “best practices for safe operation” — America and its cohorts will — boldface mine — “facilitate exchanges and visits to nuclear power plants outside of Iran.”
Think about that for a moment. Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. Now, in the name of a benevolent international community promoting safety at nuclear plants in Iran, Iranian officials are to be hosted at nuclear power plants abroad, with special attention to their safety procedures.
The Iran deal does not say exactly which nuclear plants among the world powers will host these nuclear tours for Iran. Like many aspects of this deal, the nitty gritty will likely be handled by U.S. officials in secret councils, under captions such as “Nuclear safety.” Whose safety, exactly? Let’s spell this out: If you happen to live downwind of a nuclear power plant, do you really want officials from Iran — world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism — casing the joint?