A Chilling Look at a 1965 Meeting Between LBJ and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

To better grasp the boneheadedness and spleen of LBJ and Robert McNamara read this chilling account of a 1965 meeting between the President and his Joint Chiefs of Staff published by George Mason University’s History News Network under the title The Day It Became the Longest War. Here’s a sample:

Despite the lack of a clear-cut intelligence estimate, Admiral McDonald and the other Joint Chiefs did what they were paid to do and reached a conclusion. They decided unanimously that the risk of the Chinese or Soviets reacting to massive US measures taken in North Vietnam was acceptably low, but only if we acted without delay. Unfortunately, the Secretary of Defense and his coterie of civilian “whiz kids” did not agree with the Joint Chiefs, and McNamara and his people were the ones who were actually steering military strategy. In the view of the Joint Chiefs, the United States was piling on forces in Vietnam without understanding the consequences. In the view of McNamara and his civilian team, we were doing the right thing. This was the fundamental dispute that had caused the Chiefs to request the seldom-used private audience with the Commander in Chief in order to present their military recommendations directly to him. McNamara had finally granted their request.

Does the stubborn refusal to acknowledge reality seem familiar?
h/t:rse