Commentary, both good and awful

By Noah Pollak
“Robert Satloff”:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC10.php?CID=11 is the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and yesterday he gave a talk about Hamas and Gaza. It has been “posted on the Institute’s website”:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2623, and it is sweeping, nuanced, and sober. It would be pointless to try and excerpt it here, so, as they say, read the whole thing — satisfaction guaranteed.
There are a few other pieces worth checking out as well, by “Fouad Ajami”:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/19/opinion/19ajami.html, “Dennis Ross”:http://docs.google.com/View?docid=ah6sxjndq9qq_328ghfvsp, and a truly “jaw-dropping op-ed”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/18/AR2007061801365_pf.html in the Washington Post by Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller. They argue the following:

As the United States and others seek to empower [Abbas], they should push for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire in Gaza and the West Bank, which will require dealing — indirectly at least — with elements of Hamas. They should resist the temptation to isolate Gaza and should tend to its population’s needs. And should a national unity government be established, this time they should welcome the outcome and take steps to shore it up. Only then will efforts to broker credible political negotiations between Abbas and his Israeli counterpart on a two-state solution have a chance to succeed.

This is a train wreck comprised of international relations jargon, wishful thinking, and reality-denial. Their prescription, with all the pretentious diction chipped away, is: 1) make diplomatic overtures to Hamas, 2) push for an Israel-Hamas cease-fire, regardless of Hamas’ flawless track record of immediately breaking every such agreement, 3) deliver aid to Gaza such that its residents will scarcely have an occasion to question their new Islamist despotism and Hamas will be freed from the need to engage in any kind of pothole-fixing governance, and then, 4) endorse a “national unity” government inclusive of Hamas and “take steps to shore it up” (however many op-ed columns it takes, one presumes).
But we’ve already seen this movie. The Saudis tried the national-unity gambit a couple of months ago, and quite predictably the Hamas leadership showed up in Mecca for the photo op and then quickly set about destroying Fatah back in Gaza. If anyone hasn’t gotten the memo, Hamas is working with Iran these days, not with the Saudis, the Americans, or the Israelis — and Malley and Miller’s big idea is to do a repeat of that sideshow, with the U.S. standing in for the Saudis. Finally, with the national unity government “shored up,” 5) the Israelis would at last have a partner with whom to negotiate a two-state solution.
But Messrs. Malley and Miller, in this dreamscape, what about the half of the unity government named Hamas? You know, the organization whose purpose is to wage jihad and destroy Israel (and Fatah)? What acts of sorcery will be required to induce Hamas’ hard-core jihadists to not just faithfully join a unity government, but then to renounce the very purpose of their existence and consent to a two-state peace with Israel? And how do Malley and Miller think that Hamas’ paymasters and strategic mentors in Tehran and Damascus are going to react to the idea of peace with Israel?
How is all of this supposed to work, you know, in reality?
These ideas have no chance of being either adopted or of working (other than on newsprint), but it’s worth looking at the common premise of the authors’ proposals: It is the idea that the United States and Israel should do nothing to make Hamas and its constituents pay, in any way, for their behavior. There should be no pushback whatsoever; and not only should America and Israel not push back, they should actually reward Hamas by begging for cease-fires and offering aid money, diplomatic overtures, and unity-government proposals.
One thing I’d like to know from the authors of this op-ed is the following: At what point do you stop trying to placate a group like Hamas? I wonder if the authors themselves even know.