It opens like this: a federal district judge decided he could micromanage deportation flights in real time—then the appellate court yanked the reins and reminded everyone that courts are not mini State Departments. On August 8, 2025, a divided D.C. Circuit panel vacated Judge James Boasberg’s criminal-contempt gambit against Trump officials over the Venezuela-to-El-Salvador deportation flights, a clean 2–1 win for the administration and a sharp curb on trial-court overreach into executive foreign-affairs turf. Read about it here from Reuters and the AP.
Start with the players. In the district court, Chief Judge James E. Boasberg (D-D.C.) presided over J.G.G. v. Trump (No. 25-766), a class action/habeas mash-up brought by Venezuelan detainees swept up under the administration’s invocation of the Alien Enemies Act. Boasberg’s own words are here: his April 16 memorandum finding “probable cause” to pursue criminal contempt against the government for defying his March 15 orders. That document lays out his theory that the executive “willfully disregarded” a TRO and even “boasted” about it. It’s the core of the contempt story, and it’s public.
The appellate panel was Judges Gregory Katsas and Neomi Rao in the majority, with Judge Cornelia Pillard dissenting. The majority’s bottom line: no criminal-contempt case here. The order’s contours weren’t “clear and unambiguous” enough to support criminal punishment; the facts were fluid; and the kind of micromanagement Boasberg attempted risked trenching on executive control of international removals and diplomatic coordination. The press read it the same way: Reuters, AP, Axios, and a clear write-up at Courthouse News confirming the 2–1 split and remand mechanics.
Here’s the blow-by-blow.
In the early hours of March 15, plaintiffs (five Venezuelan men) sued and sought a TRO while the White House finalized a proclamation invoking the Alien Enemies Act for Tren de Aragua (TdA), a Venezuelan gang the State Department had tied to terrorism. Boasberg held a same-day hearing, orally directed the government not to remove class members under the proclamation, and issued a written minute order that evening. And yet two ICE-contract flights took off from Texas during a mid-hearing recess and, in the early hours of March 16, passengers were transferred to El Salvador’s CECOT megaprison. That factual narrative—timelines, aircraft, transfers, even the “too late 😂😂” social-media taunt from President Bukele—comes right out of Boasberg’s opinion.
The government’s posture was consistent: the planes departed before any written order; once outside U.S. airspace, the D.C. court’s grip was murky; and in any event, the Supreme Court would soon vacate Boasberg’s TRO. On April 7, the Supreme Court did just that—per curiam, 5–4—vacating Boasberg’s temporary restraints and funneling any challenges into habeas in the proper venue. That short order is the critical backdrop to the contempt fight: Trump v. J.G.G. (per curiam); quick digests here at SCOTUSblog and FindLaw.
Boasberg’s rejoinder (again, in his April 16 memo) was the classic Walker v. City of Birmingham principle: court orders must be obeyed even if later found erroneous—you comply first, appeal second. He catalogued what he viewed as willful defiance, invoked Supreme Court authority supporting contempt even when jurisdiction is later questioned, and formally found probable cause to proceed criminally. That’s all in the four corners of his opinion and the string-cites he deploys.
The government sprinted to the D.C. Circuit. In April, a divided panel stayed the contempt track—an omen that Boasberg might not survive appellate review. Coverage at ABC News and others captured the pause.
On June 4, in a separate merits order, Boasberg also ruled that the administration’s use of the AEA to deposit detainees in CECOT trampled due-process rights (he stopped short of ordering mass retrieval). That parallel ruling frames the larger litigation landscape and shows how far apart the branches were on first principles. POLITICO; see summaries at The Independent and Truthout.
Then came the appellate decision. The majority’s move accomplishes three things. First, it says criminal contempt—which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of willful violation of a clear and unambiguous command—doesn’t fit this record. The minute-order/bench-order sequence was too muddy; the planes’ status was time-sensitive; and the government’s interpretation wasn’t facially lawless. Second, it signals that judges can’t run deportation play-by-play from chambers when operations implicate foreign policy, custody transfers abroad, and real-time diplomatic coordination. Third, it avoids turning contempt into a de facto policy veto. You can see that framing across Reuters, AP, Axios, and the Courthouse News dispatch.
What about the dissent? Judge Pillard warned that soft-pedaling contempt here undercuts judicial authority to ensure compliance with court orders, especially where the executive seems to be gaming the clock. That’s why this was always a clash of institutional visions: obey-first vs. act-first. AP lays out her posture crisply.
Key legal standards in human language. Criminal contempt is not a vibe; it’s a crime. You need (1) a clear, unambiguous order; (2) actual knowledge; and (3) willful disobedience beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial judges get leeway, but when orders are issued on a weekend from the bench, memorialized by minute orders as facts change by the hour, it’s risky to slap handcuffs on executive officials—especially when the Supreme Court later vacates the very TRO you’re using as the compliance yardstick. See the per curiam in Trump v. J.G.G.
How does the AEA fit in? The Alien Enemies Act (1798; now 50 U.S.C. § 21 et seq.) lets a president act against “natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects” of a hostile nation in circumstances akin to invasion or predatory incursion. The administration said TdA’s transnational violence plus Venezuela’s posture satisfied that trigger and used contractor flights to transfer detainees to El Salvador’s CECOT under a bilateral arrangement. Whatever you think of that policy, the legal question here wasn’t “is the AEA wise?” It was “Can a district judge use criminal contempt to punish executive officials when an emergency order’s scope is disputed, the facts are moving, and foreign affairs are in the mix?” Today’s answer: No.
Procedural footnote that matters: the D.C. Circuit earlier stayed the contempt push in April—first bread-crumb that Boasberg’s approach was in trouble—before today’s full slap-down. Coverage here: ABC News and Courthouse News.
Where this leaves the district court. The panel’s decision vacates the contempt track and narrows Boasberg’s leverage. The broader litigation about due-process rights, custody, and any remedy for those already transferred continues on the merits, but the nuclear option—criminal contempt—has been disarmed. Courthouse News.
The bottom line—and say it loud: judges are not kings. They don’t call audibles on foreign policy from the bench and then jail officials when planes don’t boomerang on command. The D.C. Circuit just put a stake in the ground: contempt is for clear, willful defiance of a crystal-clear order, not a policy veto with handcuffs.
In a government of coequal branches, that matters. Today, the message is simple enough for every American to understand: you can dislike the administration’s deportation policy and still insist that courts follow the rules for criminal punishment. That’s not “soft on the rule of law”—that is the rule of law. And for an executive branch that actually answers to voters, this is a long-overdue reminder to the black-robe set: the Constitution outranks your outrage.
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