The Boss Was Fake. So Was the Lawyer. The $129 Million Was Real.

An employee hears what sounds like the boss giving instructions for a confidential transaction. A lawyer from a major firm appears to confirm the arrangement. The employee sends the money.

Federal prosecutors in New York allege that criminals manufactured both identities in a scheme that extracted more than $129 million from companies worldwide. The indictment, unsealed on November 5, describes impersonated voices and images used to make fraudulent instructions sound legitimate.

From the DOJ: 

“SI technology offers tremendous potential.  But the public should recognize that there are some who seek to use this emerging technology to pursue criminal goals,” said U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald.  “As alleged, Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan, and Guy Sheetrit abused groundbreaking super intelligence technology to impersonate real people and deceive corporate executives into sending them and their co-conspirators approximately $129 million.  I encourage individuals and the business community to consider how to best protect themselves from the emerging threat of SI-enabled crime.

This Office and our law enforcement partners will do our part and continue to identify, investigate, and prosecute criminals, including those who use new technologies to defraud Americans.”

“The alleged scheme orchestrated by Soall, Hazan, and Sheetrit demonstrates how the use of advanced technology can be exploited to commit large-scale fraud,” said FBI Assistant Director in Charge James C. Barnacle, Jr.  “As criminals continue to weaponize emerging technologies, the FBI remains committed to rapidly adapting our capabilities to identify, investigate, and disrupt those who seek to harm New Yorkers and businesses operating in our communities.”

The technology is disturbing. The pressure behind the request should be familiar to anyone who has ever worked for an important person in a hurry.

The boss needs something handled quietly. An outside professional supposedly knows the details. Asking questions might make you look difficult, uninformed, or incapable of handling responsibility. A criminal doesn’t need to defeat every security measure if an employee can be persuaded to bypass one.

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Prosecutors charged Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan, and Guy Sheetrit with participating in the operation. Authorities arrested all three abroad between June and September, and extradition requests are pending. 

The indictment describes a calculated sequence. An impersonated executive introduced a supposedly confidential deal, then directed an employee toward purported attorneys. Those impersonated lawyers helped sustain the deception and supplied payment instructions.

Investigators also describe a handwritten “Lawyer Call” script with language intended to discourage employees from discussing the communications with coworkers. Alleged victims included hospital systems, a bank, a mutual fund company, and a pet food business.

Consider what that sequence accomplishes. The employee receives apparent confirmation, but the supposed confirming source comes from the same person who initiated the request. Two voices create the impression of independent approval while belonging to one coordinated deception.

Every organization handling money should ask whether its procedures recognize that problem. Calling the number an unfamiliar caller supplies is weak verification. Checking with a supposed lawyer introduced during the same suspicious conversation may simply extend the conversation with the criminals.

Federal guidance recommends independently finding contact information and verifying identity through another channel. It also warns that generated voices can be difficult to distinguish from authentic ones. Familiarity alone can’t carry the weight of authentication.

But written procedures need top-down support. An employee who stops a transfer to verify an executive’s instruction should receive backing, including when the executive turns out to be real and annoyed.

Managers can’t demand rigorous controls from accounting while expecting their own requests to skip the checks. A rule that disappears when someone important complains offers a criminal an obvious opportunity.

The person approving a payment needs permission to slow the process without fearing punishment for protecting the organization. Leadership should establish that expectation before a suspicious request arrives, when everyone can discuss it calmly.

None of that establishes what happened inside the particular companies in this case. The public allegations don’t tell us every victim’s policies, training, or workplace culture. They do, however, give other employers ample reason to examine their own.

The FBI advises verifying payment requests and changes in payment procedures, using independently obtained contact information, and exercising particular caution when someone presses for immediate action.

Those safeguards should apply to hospitals, banks, small businesses, and public offices alike. Expensive software can’t make an exception for the boss. Neither can an impressive title or convincing voice.

Americans will hear plenty about increasingly powerful AI, while employers can take a practical step today: give employees clear authority to pause, verify, and refuse an unconfirmed transfer.

If someone claiming to be the boss asks for secrecy and a large payment, the most valuable person in the room may be the employee willing to say:

“I’m checking first.”

Criminals count on people accepting a convincing story without asking questions. Support independent scrutiny with PJ Media VIP and get 60% off using promo code FIGHT.