When faced with a particularly hard problem it is sometimes easier to imagine a solution and work your way backwards, traveling the goal back to the starting point. Imagine that that the US wanted to mount a “Surge” in the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater, who would the Surge be built around? If walking the cat back from that solution sounds too hard; let’s try something easier. Imagine that the US expanded the war in Afghanistan to include Pakistan — who would be there to greet US troops in the same way they were greeted upon entering Baghdad — who would our allies be? Maybe the problem begins with terminology itself. Christopher Hitchens notes that “The very name Pakistan inscribes the nature of the problem. It is not a real country or nation but an acronym devised in the 1930s by a Muslim propagandist for partition named Chaudhary Rahmat Ali. It stands for Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, and Indus-Sind. The stan suffix merely means ‘land.'”
So which geopolitical Pakistan does Hitchens refer to when he argues that a forceful intervention is now inevitable? “Sen. Barack Obama has, if anything, been the more militant of the two presidential candidates in stressing the danger here and the need to act without too much sentiment about our so-called Islamabad ally. He began using this rhetoric when it was much simpler to counterpose the ‘good’ war in Afghanistan with the ‘bad’ one in Iraq. Never mind that now; he is committed in advance to a serious projection of American power into the heartland of our deadliest enemy. And that, I think, is another reason why so many people are reluctant to employ truthful descriptions for the emerging Afghan-Pakistan confrontation: American liberals can’t quite face the fact that if their man does win in November, and if he has meant a single serious word he’s ever said, it means more war, and more bitter and protracted war at that—not less.” But if forceful intervention is now in the cards, then for what purpose, and against whom?
Tx Hammes in the Small Wars Journal puts the question succinctly: what strategic framework will guide any American intervention in Pakistan? Who will be cheering the US going in? What groups can US forces build a “surge” around in a country which Hitchens describes as a list of place names unified by a suffix for “land”? Hammes described the dangers of going in without a clear goal:
In the last month, both presidential candidates have stated they wish to send more troops to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, neither candidate has stated what he sees as the United States’ strategic interests in Afghanistan. Even more dangerous, neither candidate has expressed a strategic framework for the region. … Even worse, to date, the candidates are discussing only Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan or India. Yet both these Southwest Asian nations are much more critical to the United States future than Afghanistan. Neither candidate has questioned the wisdom of bombing, and likely destabilizing Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of almost 170 million people, in order to help our security efforts in Afghanistan. …
And then there’s the question of opium. If there’s any place on earth where the War on Terror intersects with the War on Drugs (with the possible exception of FARC in Latin America) it is Afghanistan. Opium is one of the largest sources of income of the Taliban. Douglas Farah at the Counterterrorism Blog writes: “Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, has sounded the alarm on Afghanistan, correctly pointing out that the danger of losing there is real and the hour is late. … What is striking about the published reports of Mullen and Defense Secretary Gates is the absence of any discussion of one of the driving forces of the Taliban’s mounting success: its access to tens of millions of dollars in opium and poppy money. The UN conservatively estimates the Taliban makes between $50 million and $70 million a year from the drug trade. Talk about ignoring the elephant in the room! Here is the prototype of future terrorist and insurgent movements deriving its income from non-state sources, and combating that figures into the policy at best in a marginal way.” Ever since 1979, opium has been the treasury of Afghanistan’s periphery in its revolt against central government. “Drug traffickers have a symbiotic relationship with insurgents and terrorist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Instability makes opium cultivation possible; opium buys protection and pays for weapons and foot soldiers, and these in turn create an environment in which drug lords, insurgents and terrorists can operate with impunity.” The only alternative to the opium trade is the economic development of Afghanistan. That will take decades and depends in part on normalizing relationships with Iran, which provides the only other road, besides Pakistan, to the sea.
Part of the problem with crafting a strategy in Afghanistan is envisioning what the solution looks like. Too many variables are still in play to predict what the final configuration of the region will look like. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are on a long an uncertain road to stability with no guarantee that they will reach their destinations. For the moment both Afghanistan and Pakistan will be dominated by factions and gangs. About all America can attempt in the short run is to remain the “strongest gang”. While cross-border operations and UAV strikes cannot bring stability in themselves they can deny the Taliban and al-Qaeda the power to establish a mini-state in the border areas. The Daily News reports that President Bush has authorized a more aggressive campaign across the border into Pakistan.
To beat back Al Qaeda and an resurgent Taliban, the CIA has unleashed a series of missile strikes by unmanned drones in Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt. Cross-border missions by special operations forces based in Afghanistan are also increasing, officials told The News. “There has been a big push,” said a U.S. intelligence official. “As targets become available, there’s a lot less hesitation now. When they’re in our sights, we pull the trigger.” President Bush secretly authorized the offensive.
Until Afghanistan and Pakistan settle down, winning means not losing. But it doesn’t imply the absence of strategy. When a fluid situation can only be addressed opportunistically a clear strategic vision is at its most important. The area has to be calmed down piece by piece guided not so much by a final plan, but by a set of principles which lead to improved solutions.
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