Electronic warfare now grips one of the most important shipping corridors on Earth. Satellite navigation systems guiding commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz have begun producing false positions or failing. The disruption follows the Feb. 28, 2026, strikes that the U.S. and Israel carried out against a military target. Over 1,000 ships experienced GPS interference within days of those strikes, leaving captains staring at navigation screens that placed their vessels at airports, inside nuclear plants, or miles inland.
Experts say this deficiency explains why, since the start of US-Israeli strikes, the jamming of satellite navigation signals has left about 1,000 ships in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman unable to determine their location, either momentarily or continuously.
Dimitris Ampatzidis, a senior risk and compliance analyst for the energy market intelligence firm Kpler, told AFP the number represents about half of the vessels in the area.
Modern shipping depends on satellite navigation for routing, collision avoidance, and fuel efficiency. When signals fail, vessels operating in narrow waterways face immediate danger. Roughly 20% of global oil and gas shipments pass through the Straits each day in a waterway measuring only about 21 miles across at its narrowest point, forcing outbound and inbound traffic into tightly controlled lanes. False navigation signals in such conditions increase the risk of collision or grounding.
Ami Daniel serves as CEO of maritime intelligence firm Windward, which tracks the behavior of commercial vessels worldwide using satellite data and AI tools.
Windward identified at least 21 new clusters where ships’ AIS are being jammed. Tugs and offshore vessels are among a dozen ships that were shown to be at Al Hamra airport and surrounding fields earlier today.
While not the main airport for the emirate of Ras Al Khaimah, ships’ signals in the area underscore aviation dangers and disruptions that have shut down airspace across one of the world’s busiest zones, stranding tens of thousands of passengers worldwide.
AIS signals have also been diverted to the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant and nearby waters, while hundreds of other vessels are creating circle-like patterns off UAE, Qatari, and Omani waters.
Winward analysts detected a sharp surge in GPS interference across the Persian Gulf immediately after military strikes began. Daniel described widespread spoofing incidents in which Automatic Identification System transponders broadcast impossible locations. Ships appeared hundreds of miles away from their real position. Some vessels appeared to be moored to land facilities rather than in open water.
Todd Humphreys teaches engineering at the University of Texas at Austin and directs the Radionavigation Laboratory. Humphreys studies vulnerabilities in satellite navigation systems used by aircraft, ships, and military platforms. Humphreys explained that jamming overwhelms satellite signals while spoofing replaces legitimate signals with false ones.
Receivers then compute incorrect positions while crews believe navigation systems remain functional. Humphreys stated that recent disruptions in the Gulf carry hallmarks of deliberate state-level electronic warfare.
Electronic interference now coincides with kinetic attacks. Maritime security reports logged 13 separate security incidents between February 28 and March 8 involving drones, missiles, and other threats to commercial shipping. Insurance rates for vessels entering the Gulf have surged while many ships remain anchored outside the strait. Some operators have chosen to disable AIS tracking systems entirely to reduce visibility while transiting the regions.
Naval forces operating in the region face a difficult decision. Escort operations require stable navigation systems for both military ships and the commercial vessels under protection. Internal discussions within the U.S. Navy describe conditions in the strait as too dangerous for routine escort missions under current circumstances. Military planners must weigh the risk of collision, electronic deception, and missile attack while shipping lanes remain electronically compromised.
Organizations monitoring maritime threats continue to warn shipping companies about the danger. The Joint Maritime Information Center and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations both maintain alert levels for vessels operating near the Strait of Hormuz.
Hundreds of GNSS disruptions have appeared across the region within short time windows. Navigation receivers aboard commercial ships frequently lose lock on satellites or receive manipulated coordinates.
Electronic warfare has transformed modern naval conflict. Missiles and drones still dominate headlines, yet invisible signal warfare now shapes maritime operations just as strongly. Ships once trusted satellite navigation as a permanent utility similar to electricity or radio. Recent events in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that those signals can disappear or lie without warning.
Captains crossing the Strait of Hormuz now face a navigation environment that resembles the early 12th century more than the digital age. Radar, charts, and visual navigation regain importance when satellites fail. Global energy markets are closely watching because disruptions within that narrow channel can ripple through oil prices, shipping schedules, and supply chains.
Conflict in the Gulf now unfolds not only through weapons and warships but also through the invisible manipulation of the signals that guide global commerce. Electronic warfare has entered the shipping lanes, and every vessel crossing the Strait of Hormuz must navigate through that new battlefield.
