Stalingrad on the Tigris?
September 26th, 2002 - 12:29 am
If any Iraqi units put up a fight, it will be Saddam’s personal bodyguard, also known as the Special Republican Guards Baghdad Division. (In Third World nations, long unit names usually means short troop quality. Anyway.)
The problem with city fighting is that too many people die. Too many civilians — either too stupid or scared to leave, or used as human shields by their leaders — too many of your own soldiers, and it’s too hard to surround the bad guys so that you don’t have to kill them.
But we’re working on it.
NOTE: Did I say “bad guys?” Sorry if I offended any tender sensibilities.
Or not.
You know, I’m getting awfully tired of the folks who keep invoking Stalingrad.
Yes, MOUT (military operations in urban terrain) can eat up units and inflict massive casualties. But, uh, folks? Those casualties come from BOTH sides. And we’re not just talking civilians here.
Somebody should actually go and read General Chuikov’s memoirs. Who’s Chuikov? Simply the commander of the Soviet 62nd Army, while it was defending Stalingrad. The Soviets lost ENORMOUS numbers of people, in order to hold Stalingrad. Entire divisions went from some 8-10,000 men to handfuls in days.
Why is this relevant? Because, for the Iraqis to inflict the massive casualties we’re talking about, they need troops who are prepared to hold out to the death in the rubble of Baghdad. City-fighting without dedicated troops is no more likely to be prolonged or extremely bloody (although still costly) than open field fighting with prepared positions.
Yes, one sniper can hold up a company, and even take down a dozen people. But how many snipers do the Iraqis think they can field? ‘Cuz snipers need to be pretty independent minded troops, w/ a fair bit of training. Someone who’s trained that way could, on a good day, ALSO shoot a certain mustachioed leader or his kids. Think Saddam would bet that he WOULDN’T?
Long unit names also mean short combat life.
What’s in it for the die-hards?
First, I agree 100% with everything Dean said, but let’s put that aside for a minute, rather than Dean being right, let’s assume, strictly for the sake of argument, that all the Chamberlain impersonators (who suspiciously sound like the same naysayers on the first Gulf war and who were using the “Q” word days before Mazar-i-Sharif) are right. If Saddam desides to pull his best troops into a tight circle in Baghdad, let’s let him.
If he takes all his elites within to protect his own skin, that’s going to leave the rest of the country pretty open, we seize the rest of the country, blockade Baghdad so he can’t get out even if he changes his mind, then wait for his food supplies to run out. Meanwhile, we turn the rest of the country upside down, dismantle the scuds and the WMDs (and the terrorist camps, if present), and set up a new capital in some other city, where a new democracy flousishes as it opens up the oil spigots. Let Saddam be President of Baghdad, he’ll be feeling as comfortable as Yassir.
Ridiculous comparison. It will not snow down in Bagdad.