Jan. 1, 1781, fell smack in the middle of one of the coldest winters of the Revolutionary War, and it was on this day that 1,500 soldiers of The Pennsylvania Line rose in open mutiny against their own command. They were armed and organized, and they had the will to change their situation. They left their winter encampment near Morristown. They killed one officer and wounded others. Then they marched south toward Philadelphia with their demands.
It was the most serious break in the ranks for the Continental Army during the war, and it was successful.
This wasn’t just a breakdown of discipline. The Pennsylvania Line Mutiny exposed the fragile foundations of the American war effort. It tested the financial solvency of Congress. It put the spotlight on the ambiguity of contracts with enlisted men. And as all mutinies do, it laid bare the delicate balance between authority and consent in an army during wartime.
What was The Pennsylvania Line?
The Pennsylvania Line was formed in 1775. It consisted of 13 regiments and a few independent companies. The name "Pennsylvania Line" referenced the quota of numbered infantry regiments assigned to Pennsylvania at various times by the Continental Congress.
These units were among the most heavily engaged in the war effort. They fought at Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth, and they had endured a brutal winter at Valley Forge. As battle-hardened as they were, they felt entitled to better treatment than they were getting.
Many hadn’t been paid in months or years. Congress promised them enlistment bounties and never paid those. They didn’t get their promised clothing allowances. Some marched barefoot in winter. For protection against the elements, they wrapped themselves in rags. Food was scarce, shelter was poor, and the spread of disease was common.
While all of these hardships were common throughout the army, the Pennsylvania troops, specifically, faced an additional grievance that sparked the mutiny, which was confusion and conflict over enlistment terms.
“Three Years or the War”
Many Pennsylvania men enlisted under contracts which stated that they would serve “for three years or the duration of the war.”
When Jan. 1, 1781, came, thousands of men thought their three-year commitment to the war effort was complete. Their army officers and Congress, however, saw it differently. They latched onto the “duration of the war” clause, which they felt bound the men to the army indefinitely.
To the men, this wasn’t just legalese. They had already endured the horrors of war, the hardships of 18th-century warfare, and the broken promises of Congress. They felt betrayed.
Winter at Morristown Was a Breaking Point
The winter of 1780/1781 around Morristown, N.J, was particularly harsh. Snowdrifts buried roads. Supply wagons froze in place. Desertion was on the rise.
On the night of Jan. 1, 1781, soldiers of the Pennsylvania Line — armed and organized — assembled, ignoring commands to return to quarters. Officers could not restore order. Mutinous troops had killed Captain Adam Bitting, and they wounded several other officers.
The mutineers had leadership, structure, and purpose. Still, through it all, the men made it clear that they were not rebelling against the American cause but against perceived injustices against them. The rogue force had elected representatives, it maintained order within its ranks, and it made plans to march to Philadelphia to have its grievances heard and met.
About 1,500 men left Morristown and marched south. They carried weapons, artillery, and ammunition. They were amazingly disciplined, which unsettled the military command, including Gen. George Washington.
He knew that if he ordered a violent crackdown, he risked destroying morale across the entire Continental Army. He also knew that he could not let armed soldiers dictate the terms. This, he understood, represented a likely breakdown in military authority.
He decided to err on the side of restraint. Washington dispatched Anthony Wayne, commander of the Pennsylvania Line and known for both toughness and having a strong rapport with his men. Washington told Wayne to open negotiations.
British Meddling
None of this escaped notice from the British army’s leadership, specifically, Gen. Henry Clinton, commander of British forces in North America. He saw the mutiny as an opportunity to undermine the Continental Army from within its own ranks.
British emissaries approached the Pennsylvania soldiers and offered full pay, pardon, and safe passage if they defected.
The mutineers rejected the offer outright, arrested the British agents, and turned them over to American authorities. Two of those emissaries were later executed as spies.
The disgruntled soldiers wanted to make it clear that they were not traitors. They still saw themselves as loyal patriots who simply had righteous demands.
As the 1,500 men approached Philadelphia, negotiations started near Princeton, but this did not halt the march.
The Pennsylvania government at once feared bloodshed while recognizing the legitimacy of many grievances. By mid-January, the two sides reached an agreement that included: soldiers whose enlistments were determined to have legitimately expired were discharged; others were granted furloughs, new clothing, food, and supplies; the army’s leadership reviewed and clarified enlistment records of the men; and some soldiers received bonuses if they decided to reenlist voluntarily, which some did.
The mutiny ended without mass executions or court-martial proceedings, and order was restored. The Pennsylvania Line was reorganized and returned to the field.
Also for our VIPs: ‘America 250’ Tuesday: Washington Defeats a Deadly Winter at Valley Forge
The Pennsylvania Line Did Not Set Precedent
Inspired by the example of the Pennsylvania line, troops of The New Jersey Line mutinied later in January over similar grievances.
This time, Washington wasn’t about to allow things to get out of control. His response was swift and decisive. He authorized force, he suppressed the mutiny, and he authorized that two soldiers be executed by firing squad. There were no other mutinies after that.
In Pennsylvania, Washington knew he could not execute hundreds of suffering soldiers who by then had already made tremendous personal sacrifices for the war effort. At the same time, he knew he had to send a message that mutiny, if left unchecked, would destroy the army from within.
