The New York Times touts the “changed way of war” by setting up this dramatic narrative. An American infantry unit is in an Afghan canyon in the probable presence of the enemy. The call goes out for air support, resulting in the launch of 3 F/A-18s. Here’s what happens next.
Now a ground controller wanted the three strike fighters circling overhead to send a sign — both to the grunts and to any Taliban fighters shadowing them as they walked.
Commander McDowell banked and aligned his jet’s nose with the canyon’s northeastern end. Then he followed his wingmen’s lead. He dived, pulled level at 5,000 feet and accelerated down the canyon’s axis at 620 miles per hour, broadcasting his proximity with an extended engine roar.
AdvertisementIn the lexicon of close air support, his maneuver was a “show of presence” — a mid-altitude, nonlethal display intended to reassure ground troops and signal to the Taliban that the soldiers were not alone. It reflected a sharp shift in the application of American air power, de-emphasizing overpowering violence in favor of sorties that often end without munitions being dropped.
The NYT says “the use of air power has changed markedly during the long Afghan conflict, reflecting the political costs and sensitivities of civilian casualties caused by errant or indiscriminate strikes and the increasing use of aerial drones, which can watch over potential targets for extended periods with no risk to pilots or more expensive aircraft.”
As ever, the quest for greater political control over “kinetic military events” goes on unabated. To many politicians and diplomats, military action is all about sending a message, ‘a sign’, a ‘show of presence’. To people actually walking around in the canyon, it might be about staying alive.
The question of who gets to call the shots manifests itself in the inner war; about who gets to control assets and take command over the means to defeat the enemy. Historically, inter-service rivalry and bureaucratic infighting was often as fierce, though usually less bloody, than contact with the enemy.
For example, the Strategy Page says that UAVs have sparked an unnoticed revolution in airpower. These small, slow and aerodynamically unimpressive aircraft have the operational capabilities of the Spads and Sopwith Camels of World War 1.
But they have two attributes that manned airplanes lack. They are so cheap as to be ubiquitous and control over them is often exercised at the field level. There are now 6,000 UAVs in use by the US military. One of them is the Raven, of which 5,000 are operational with the Army. Many of the 20,000 units produced have been lost, either due to loss of communcation, accident or enemy actions. But they are considered expendable. The Army likes them because they are controlled by the troops on the ground.
If they represent a gain to the ground troops they also constitute a loss of control to the people on top. It is not as if the ground troops when left to themselves go on a rampage. They too decide whether to use the Raven to control strikes or simply keep an eye on things.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy did not want to confront U.S. troops directly (this tends to get you killed). So there was an unceasing effort to set up ambushes, plant mines and roadside bombs, and fire rockets or mortars at American bases. All of these activities can be messed with by using Raven. U.S. troops know to think like the enemy, and quickly figured out the best ambush positions, or places to plant mines or fire rockets. By sending Ravens over these spots periodically the enemy is put in danger of being spotted. The enemy knows that usually leads to a prompt attack from American mortars or helicopter gunships. These mind games, of sneaking around trying to get a shot off at the Americans, is more stressful and dangerous if the U.S. troops have Ravens. And most of them do …
Combat troops use it for finding and tracking the enemy, while non-combat troops use it for security (guarding bases or convoys). In both cases, troops have come to use the Raven for more than just getting a look over the hill or around the corner. The distinctive noise of Raven overhead is very unpopular with the enemy below and is often used to scare the enemy away, or make him move to where he can be spotted.
But the message sent by little UAVs is drafted at a far more subsidiary level than the messages dispatched by high performance strike aircraft launched from carriers. During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson often bragged, ‘those boys can’t hit an outhouse without my permission.’
That was because he, as President, believed that military operations were in part about sending a message to Hanoi about American resolve. But that message had to be very carefully modulated so that it was neither too strident nor too soft. So Johnson was adamant about controlling the signal and would let nobody else mess with it.
An article at History Net described how this desire to craft the signal reflected itself in rules of engagement.
Among the individuals affected by that type of bureaucratic thinking were a pair of Jacks, Air Force Colonel Jacksel ‘Jack’ Broughton (who 20 years later would serve on the original editorial review board for Vietnam Magazine) and Air Force General John D. ‘Jack’ Lavelle.
Jack Broughton’s story is well-known. While he was serving as vice commander of the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base in 1967, he destroyed gun camera film to save his pilots from certain conviction at a court-martial. Two of his ‘Thud’ (Republic F-105D Thunderchief) fighter jocks had been sent out to bomb a rail line near Cam Pha Harbor in North Vietnam. The harbor itself was designated as one of McNamara’s'sanctuaries,’ areas that were supposed to be off-limits for American missions. When AAA (anti-aircraft artillery) opened up on his aircraft, the pilot of the lead Thud, Major Ted Tolman, quickly decided that he did not want to become a POW resident of the Hanoi Hilton. When shot at, he decided to shoot back. In bringing his Vulcan 20mm cannon to bear on the AAA gun emplacements on the shore, Tolman’s gun camera caught the Soviet cargo ship Turkestan dead center in his sights.
There is no evidence to this day–no real proof–that any 20mm rounds hit Turkestan. But it was widely understood that such a violation of McNamara’s sanctuary policy would lead to an automatic court-martial for Major Tolman and his wingman, Major Lonnie Ferguson. For Jack Broughton, then acting as commander of the 355th TFW in the temporary absence of its commander, the answer to the problem was obvious: destroy the only incriminating evidence, the gun camera film, thus ensuring that the ‘wheels’–the Air Force military bureaucrats in Honolulu, the Philippines and Guam–would not see it.
Pacific Air Force (PACAF) commander General John D. Ryan, who would later become Air Force chief of staff, initiated court-martial proceedings against Broughton, Tolman and Ferguson for conspiracy against the U.S. government. By accepting responsibility for his pilots, Broughton ensured a ‘not guilty’ finding for them, but he was convicted on the much lesser charge of destruction of government property–i.e., the gun camera cassette, which was worth $5.
Unfortunately for Lyndon Johnson, despite his best efforts, Hanoi never got to “see the sign”. So one of the real and as a yet unresolved problems with giving every infantry unit its own mini-airforce is that it multiplies the chances that someone will sing from a different hymnbook and mix up the messages.
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http://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/raven/
Other than that we seem to be overpaying for them, seem nice enough. Not sure why the enemy can’t whip one up on their own. They will, so I hope we have some raven-killers ready.
I’m not necessarily against the F-18 “sending a message”, though I don’t know why you can’t do the same thing by launching some bottle rockets from the Raven at dramatically less cost. Battle with Taliban jihadi goatherds is not the same as battling continental modern armies. I’m just as happy sending a message with a B-52 dropping dozens of dumb 2000 pound bombs, but I do understand about message sending. If the bottle rocket works, go for it.
If we wanted to impress them with noise, we shoulda kept the F-105. One of those things going into burner with its hard light feature will get your attention.
And it’s a much prettier airplane, too.
When small portable radio transceivers first came out the Air Corps was horrified. Air strikes were to be planned by properly manned staffs. The idea that some private on the ground could call up a strike force and divert them to a target he thought was better was gaulling, at best.
So it was years into WWII before the idea of forward air controllers took hold. It was first used on a regular basis in Burma with the Air Commandoes. And the USAAF had to step up to the task, because the RAF had not thought to equip both their ground forces and airplanes with radios that could talk to each other – the RAF staffs were supposed to handle strike direction. The Americans had, if only by accident – the Burma theater was a lower priority and did not get the VHF aircraft radios that were the standard in Europe.
When airstrikes began in Afghanistan in 2001 they relied totally upon ground controllers and airborne FACs. And this brought complaints from the USAF that their command staffs were not getting to do the job.
Of course, the trouble with the UAVs and instant orbital relay of video is that it has ended the situation where Jack Broughton unreels the undeveloped gun camera film in the jeep headlights after strong arming it away from a junior enlisted guy. We gonna have to be more creative to get the job done and still stay out of jail. And this despite the fact that everyone, the world over, knows that our troops’ individual initiative is the weapon that is most to be feared.
The American experience in Vietnam just proves that Sun Tzu was correct: pick a competent general and keep out of his way.
Johnson.McNameria were about sending messages. The North Vietnamese were about winning a war.
When is comes to warfare, count me as a member of the Jacksonian Tradition
“Oh the tangeled webs we weave, when first we practice to deceive”
This sums up US military interventions since WWII. No one knows what US goals or even policy is anymore. Libya? Syria? Korea? Pakistan? what are the real goals? It is lie upon lie upon lie. What is Clinton up to and is it even the same as Obama? Are they working against or with each other. And Holder?
And now we have soldiers on their Nth tours having to negotiate PC rules that have conquered even the military. And Wretchard drills down to drones, are they good or bad? Well if the entire military structure is corrupt from policy making to ROE making to HR to finance to outsourcing, does it really matter? It is like trying to find a fortune 500 corporation to invest in that isn’t dependent on lobbyists and corporatism. The entire system stinks of corruption from head to toe and the only reasonable solution is to slash and burn, especially the DOD and MIC.
Nixon had an upgrade to LBJ’s plan, Linebacker I and Linebacker II but then as in Rolling Thunder when Marines and Paratroopers did not pour over the beach and rain from the skies over Hanoi and Haiphong the PAVN HQ knew they had won.
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If the enemy ever gets their own Raven I feel confident our Marines can piss them out of the sky.
B-1B’s were known in AFG for their impressive “shows of presence”. In addition to four after burning engines, and swept wing low-level awesomeness, they could puke out a bunch of flares, then loiter in the area for hours, ensuring bad guys read “signs” correctly. Then, in case of any misapprehension, unleash GPS guided 2000 pounders, at direction of those controllers on the ground.
…As Wretchard say’s, UAV’s are cheap. Pretty soon they will be as common on every side as RPG’s or AK’s. Here’s lookin’ at you, kid.
The best “sign” to our enemies is killing them in massive numbers.
Lather, rinse, and repeat again and again until the enemy surrenders unconditionally or is completely destroyed. This is the kind of “signal” that our enemies will always understand.
Like LarryD, I’m a Jacksonian in foreign policy and military affairs. When the United States fights our way, we always win. It makes you wonder why we continue to use other approaches to warfare.
The medium is the message.There is a massive difference between “Be afraid, be very afraid” and “You are so dead that you don’t even know that you are dead”. In wars that really matter only the latter counts. In wars that matter war is the medium.
With the fanatic, irrational enemies we currently confront the only really effective “shows of presence” are those which deliver real ordnance and kill some of the enemy “pour encourager les autres”. What we are doing now is morally obscene, tragi-comic farce.
“the answer to the problem was obvious: destroy the only incriminating evidence, the gun camera film, thus ensuring that the ‘wheels’–the Air Force military bureaucrats in Honolulu, the Philippines and Guam–would not see it.”
What a bygone era. Nowadays we have strategic corporals publishing their own documentaries on YouTube for all to see, honor be damned.
Late summer of 1966 saw a directive to wrap electrical tape around hand grenades to prevent the spoon from releasing if the pin were accidentally pulled. It seems some infantry were tying the pin’s ring to their clothing as an aid to carrying.
We had our perimeter on the west side of Highway 1, midway between Chu Lai to the south and Tam Ky to the north. The east side of the road had a ditch that was a favorite place for the local VC to sneak up and through a few grenades and pop off a few rounds at our bunkers. Invariably we’d pull the pin on a grenade and throw it across the road and into the ditch (60 feet max). The VC would unwind the tape and throw it back.
Damn, we’ll have to get tape removal into our grenade handling training manual.
The North Vietnamese read Lyndon Johnson’s message. Unfortunately they correctly read it as “America loses.” Obama with his letter, his defense budget cuts, his politicizing and inserting gays into the military, and his ROE is sending the same message.
There is a key difference between skepticism about the Afghanistan mission, with our troops increasingly isolated from routes of supply, and opposition to fighting our enemies on any front anywhere.
We didn’t ask for the war that al-Qaeda has been waging against us; THEY declared war on US. Never mind that – radical libertarians apparently regard a strong military as more of a threat than al-Qaeda. Look – I’m no fan of how some domestic agencies have acted more interested in controlling ordinary Americans than doing anything about terrorists, and I have long opposed how Madeleine Albright selfishly used our military to settle old scores against her childhood hosts in Belgrade.
Liberating Iraq has been a good idea because Saddam Hussein celebrated the September 11 attacks; that was enough and he is now dead. When Pakistan harbored Osama bin Laden in a safe house, Pakistan abrogated American sovereignty; so, turnabout is fair play when he got shot in his safe house. There is a difference between looking for enemies unnecessarily and seeking the defeat of the enemies we do have.
As it is, it looks as though the Obama administration has been able to prove how it is possible to bungle a war in Afghanistan more than the Johnson and Nixon administrations did with Vietnam. The Obama administration has both badmouthed Hamid Karzai while also seeking to bolster an Afghan national army that looks like a pale imitation of ARVN. Afghanistan is traditionally a tribal confederation under the aegis of a monarchy, and our military mission ought to reflect that. Instead, the Obama administration seeks to promote centralized power in a regime it openly distrusts and humiliates while also making diplomatic overtures to the Taliban – the same Taliban that harbored the same al-Qaeda that attacked us on September 11, 2001.
The Obama administration’s war in Afghanistan is a self-contradictory mission and hence an impossible one. That said, there is a huge difference between a tactical withdrawal from Afghanistan while continuing the war elsewhere and strategic surrender to our adversaries because nervous libertarians are more fearful of a strong military than from terrorist attack.
If it is found that the Iranian regime is assassinating – and attempting to assassinate – people on our soil, what are we going to do about it? Rather than rely upon our federal government to defend our sovereignty, should we really expect citizens to rely upon the “Law of Vendetta” against entities that attack us? There are good reasons why national defense is a federal concern; the federal government ought to live up to its responsibilities.
One of my contributions to UAV use was to suggest that we should swap out one of the payloads for the sensor ball with a machine pistol. I reasoned that it wouldn’t be super accurate but that it would scare the shit out of all of those Haji’s on the roof tops and make them think twice about exposing their heads, maybe even wear helmets! Now if you could get Al Queda to wear helmets, heck that would be half of the battle.
A tactic as old as warfare. Strike fear into the hearts of the enemy while bolstering the courage of your own. Strike up the drums, rattle the shields and swords, decorate your troops with fierce paint and plumage, sound the trumpets , dazzle them with shining armor. Many a battle has been won because the enemy has fled the field in the face of an awesome display of power.
That is just good solid basic tactic in certain situations. The drones are another matter. These are at another end of the tactical spectrum. They are stealthy and vulnerable. Virtual spies. Also very useful and as old as the great uproar in deceiving the enemy to get them where you want them to be.
Computer war and clandestine operations are the edge now. The US is by far overpowered in a conventional sense against any conventional attack. Our enemies will seek the soft spots and those exist. For now we control the sea and air whenever we put the resource there. I do not wish to give up our strength as it is. Still more resource needs to defend against those chinks in our armor.
Sun tzu said something about how defense needs to be prepared against the certainty of attack, not the possibility that it will not. Our enemies do not have carriers but they have many computers and bright minds to use them. They have cells and agents ready to go. Diplomacy is not a defense.
Whomever we elect this time needs to understand these issues, hopefully better than I do.
MSO #12:
I read where a USAF FAC flying O-1′s in Viet Nam came up with a clever idea.
He found that a certain species of peanut butter jar would just hold a grenade. We would stick the grenade in the jar and if he saw someone on the ground he wanted to irritate he would open the jar, pull the pin, put the top back on the jar and throw it out the window. When the jar hit and broke the spoon would fly off and the grenade would detonate. He even had a special jacket made with loops for holding multiple grenade-in-a-jar.
Alexis #14:
The Obama Admin “enthusiasm” for involvement in Afghanistan is simply a reflection of their “It’s simply a law enforcement problem” attitude, which is predictable given both the fact they are a bunch of lawyers and the Left’s preference for Lawfare.
Re: RWE #17:
Grenades in mason jars worked real well until the FAC fumbled one and dropped it on the floor of the O-1 and broke it – which happened a time or two. Real sporty when the live grenade rolls under the seat. Cheers -
Wonder if we could equip some drones with stereo sound playing AC/DC and fly them thru the valleys at night just to remind our friends that we also control the sound waves in their backyard. Maybe we can drop some empty beer bottles along the way too.
#17
Roger that.
That show of presence worked real well for me and a friend for whom I was covering while he waited for a wrecker to repair his tanker full of JP4.
O1 saw our stall and saw something in the bushes. Pair of A1 Skyraiders
circled lower and lower and lower. By the time they mowed the elephant grass,
some NVA remembered urgent business elsewhwere.
Some unmakred F4 Phanthoms did the same for Cory Aquino in December of 1989.
Trust the NYT to treat this as something new.
Sounds like a typical Obama Democrat way of waging war. Make it all a war game instead!
Problem with telegraphing your punch like that is that you become predictable. When you’re predictable, then you become “dead”. While you’re playing war games to the tune of the Democrat’s ROE, the other guys are playing for keeps. You warn the enemy, then they live, they gain the initiative, and then your guys die. How hard is this to understand? Should be easy enough that even a Harvard graduate could figure it out (if he ever saw combat).
Same ol’ sh*t, different Democrat. FDR, Truman, Kennedy, Carter, Clinton, Obama – all the same. They get American military personnel – DEAD!
Wouldn’t blasting them into hamburger send an even clearer message?
Speaking of “home-made” ordinance, friends of mine in Air America told me they used to put a 55 gallon of avgas on the trap door of their Pilatus Porter with a grenade taped to the top. If they saw someone they wanted to do away with they’d drop the drum after pulling the pin. The ensuing fireball, it was said, was quite dramatic. I got to fly around Laos a fair amount with Air America, but never saw this tactic employed at first hand. (I did, however, go along on a Spooky mission once, and that was a weapon that really impressed. Three miniguns spewing thousands of rounds of small arms ammo in seconds makes a mess of the ground below — and anyone standing there.)
Considering the cost of fuel in theater these days how many sorties does it take to equal the cost of a strafing run’s worth of rounds or one small missile ?