Will the Rebels Win Syria’s Civil War and What That Means
The tide seems to be turning in Syria. While the civil war is far from over, the regime is clearly weakening; the rebels are expanding their operations and effectiveness. There have also been more high-level defections. What does this mean and why is this happening?
There are three main factors that are making a rebel victory seem more likely.
First, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with Turkey’s facilitation and U.S. coordination, are sending arms to the opposition.
Second, the regime has been rushing the same trusted units around the country to put down upsurges. After many months of battle, these forces are getting tired and stretched thin.
Third, President Bashar al-Assad really has nothing to offer the opposition. He won’t leave and he can’t share power. His strategy of brutal suppression and large-scale killing can neither make the opposition surrender nor wipe it out. Even if he kills civilians and demonstrators, the rebel military forces can pull back to attack another day.
Even though the fighting may go on for months, then, it is time to start assessing what outcomes might look like. Here are some suggestions:
–Ethnic massacres? While there have been reports of such actions—the regime killing Sunni Muslims; the opposition killing Alawites and Christians—what we’ve seen already might be nothing compared to what is to come. Such murders might take place during the civil war or after it ends.
–An Alawite fortress? Assad has built up his defenses in northwest Syria where most of the Alawites live to make a last stand or to try to hold out. How would such a final phase in the war go and could Assad keep the rebels from taking this stronghold?
–Obama Administration bragging rights? We’ve already had leaks about U.S. covert involvement in the anti-Assad effort. If the rebels seem to be winning or do in fact win the war before November, the White House will claim Syria as proof of its tough, triumphant foreign policy. (The elections in Libya, in which reportedly the Islamists were held off by a U.S.-backed government, will be cited as another example of success.)
–But at great risk. What if the Obama Administration increasingly claims credit for regime change in Syria and then has to take blame for massacres or an Islamist takeover?
–The Kurdish factor. Syria’s Kurds have essentially walled off their northeast section of the country. Their armed militia, helped by their compatriots in Iraq, can hold out against all but the most concerted force. The Kurds generally view the regime as repressive Arab nationalists while they see the opposition as Islamists and Arab nationalists. Would a new regime in Damascus make a deal with them for autonomy, or would it be tempted to try to conquer the area? If so, how would the opposition’s Western backers react to such an assault?
–And then there’s the biggest question of all: Who among the opposition forces would take power? Syria is quite different from such relatively homogeneous countries as Egypt and Tunisia. Let’s just list the different groupings:
Alawites now rule and in general support the regime. The treatment of the Alawites—who pretend to be Shia Muslims but really aren’t Muslims at all—would be a key indicator for a new regime. Would it seek conciliation or would it massacre large numbers of them? Unless Assad can hold out in the northwest, the Alawites will have little role in a post-Assad Syria.
Christians also generally support the regime because they fear Islamists taking power. Will they face massacres and flee the country or will the new regime work to accommodate them?
Alawites and Christians together number more than one-fourth of the country’s population.
The Kurds have been discussed above. Their goal is autonomy, one that a new central government could meet but will it want to grant them such status?
The Druze, who live in the southwest of the country, have not played a major role in the rebellion. They tend to accommodate themselves to the status quo. Will they organize communally and seek some autonomy? The Druze strategy is of special interest to Israel since they live closer to the Golan Heights and, indeed, Israel rules a Druze population there most of whose members identify as Syrians. Would a new regime’s treatment of the Druze make the Golan Heights’ residents more rebellious against Israel or more eager to remain under Israeli rule? Israel’s military intelligence commander has already warned of the danger of jihadists infiltrating into the border area, though one might add that Israel already has strong defenses in place there that would stop any cross-border attacks, a contrast of course with the Sinai.
And finally there are the Sunni Muslim Arabs who comprise about 60 percent of the population. As a group they would be the new rulers. But they are very much divided among themselves. On one hand there are the Islamists, both Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists; on the other hand there are urban moderates who are more proportionately numerous and politically astute than their Egyptian counterparts. Who will get the upper hand?
Yet even that is an incomplete inventory. In addition, there are many rural Sunni Arabs who could be described as traditionalists, who want a socially conservative state but could swing in either direction politically.
Last and certainly not least are the military officers who deserted Assad’s army and now run much of the opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA). They can be described as both technocrats and as Arab nationalists in varying degrees. Would they impose themselves on a new government?
The exile groups, including the U.S. backed Syrian National Council (SNC) seem to have little influence and prestige within the country. Would the Obama Administration and others try to force this Brotherhood-dominated group onto those who did the fighting?
At some point, one side or the other will win and at this time that winning side seems to be the opposition. It will establish a new central government in Damascus. That government will have to complete the conquest of the Alawite region and to decide on whether to grant some autonomy to the Kurds. A huge problem is whether it can, or wants to, prevent ethnic massacres. And of course there will be the question of who, and which political philosophy, will rule. I do not think Syria is going to fall apart. Everybody pretty much has a vested interest in the survival of the state as a whole, just as happened with Iraq.
As you can see there are many questions and unknowns about Syria’s future. These apply regardless of the timing of any rebel victory, and they are going to be major factors affecting the Middle East over the coming decades.
Do you see Syria as essentially devolving into a series of essentially, city-states, or fiefdoms, where each ethnicity/religion has its own area and no one controls the whole area — at which point “Syria” as a nation-state ceases to exist? And if so, how would the world deal with the area formerly known as Syria?
No, I think that at one point someone will win. At this moment we should assume the winner is the opposition that will establish a new central government. At that point it will have two special problems: Can it take over and incorporate the Alawite areas and do so without mass murders? And should it try to take over or leave alone the Kurdish area. I think it will try to conquer the former and make a deal with the latter though of course we don’t know for sure. I do not think Syria is going to fall apart. Everybody pretty much has a vested interest in the survival of the state as a whole, just as happened with Iraq. Thanks for your question.
Thanks for the answers. Regarding the Kurds, I agree that’s probably the outcome. Isn’t it the same case in Iraq, and are we beginning to see the creation of a de facto Kurdish state?
Assad is a murderous, terrorist supporting thug, I just don’t see a new regime being any different. He needs to go, but I hope his young sons get to safety and sadly there are going to be many innocent casualties. Can’t eat popcorn while watching atrocities.
The Kurds are restrained in Iraq by knowing that they have de facto independence now to a large degree but to seek actual independence would bring the Turks and Iranians crashing down on them and would elicit international support. The Syrian Kurds are studying that model.
Thanks.
I don’t agree with Dr. Rubin – like with the Soviet Union, none of the ethnic groups repressed for decades by Arab nationalists have any interests in remaining in Syria. A strong central government is one thing they all reject. I think Syria would fall apart into units congruent with their respective national units like the Soviet Union did.
The Kurds want independence. And perhaps the Alawites, too. The Syrian state would be too weak to impose central rule on them. And Arab nationalism doesn’t exactly fit the heterogeneous nature of Syria’s population. I suppose that would be the best imaginable outcome for Israel and the West in a possible post-Assad Syria.
Since there is no higher unifying power or effective Muslim supranational framework, agreed, fragmentation is an inevitability. War, civil or external, partitions, population dislocations, redrawing of internal and external borders are the watchwords for the Muslim countries between Morocco and India. These are all artificial states (including India), constructed by their former colonial masters anyway. The question is how long (years or decades) this will all take to play out.
Forgive my cynicism, but their misfortune,(if handled properly), is a tremendous opportunity for the West and Russia to potentially remold these societies into less threatening entities.
Another concern: Syria’s immense stockpiles of WMD’s (chemical, biological, etc)
Definitely.
Assad attacks Israel to get Israel to respond. This gets most Muslims to turn their attention to Israel.
At first the rockets he sends are just high explovices. Israel does not respond, so he uses rockets with WMD. Israel destroys Damascus.
I hope I am wrong.
With Rubin’s excellent explanation [above] of the historic ethnic and social and religious complications in that artificial country, it’s no wonder that that the French, who had that Syrian Mandate, are sitting this out….hoping no one will notice. “Let the Americans handle it” is getting very old for us Americans.
The same with the Brits who had control over most of the rest of that nasty Central Asian Theatre. . They also want no part of this ever-lengthening entanglement, even assuming that they had the money for the materiel and manpower required.
So…..the leaves us Americans, as usual; and this American thinks strongly that we should bear and tolerate absolutely no finger pointing in our direction implying that we are somehow morally bound to sacrifice our young lives in that intractable arena…..as the European line of thought has been wont to foist off on us Americans some sort obligatory guilt-trip…. for far too long.
…correction:
read…”So….this leaves us Americans,….”
Lets return both Syria and Lebanon to French colonial rule. It was better then. There is no evidence that after several decades of waiting, competent self rule will happen
It seems to me that Syria has been and will continue to be a proxy war between an US/Saudi/MB side and an Iran/Russia side. Actual Syrians are unlikely to have a say in the post-war situation except as they represent their faction to whichever side can impose an outcome on the other.
I am glad that you mentioned the possibility of ethnic massacres. Much of US policy as regards Israel is based on the fear that there will be a general massacre of Jews if Israel’s defenses are breached. In Syria the Alawites certainly, and also the Christians (many fleeing from religious persecution in Iraq I believe) are correct to fear a massacre of their populations on the same scale of what is feared in Israel.
Thanks, Dr. Rubin, for yet another helpful article on a complex situation.
Thank you for this great article on the Syrian conflict.
All my questions answered.
I think obama wants Assad to fall and islamists to prevail because he thinks what is standing in the way of a new caliphate is nation states with local tyrants like Assad and the kings. To him Mubarak and Ghadhfi were impediments to the muslim dream of dominance that he shares. That is the dream from his father or the man he thinks is his father.
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