Michael Yon has a long and photograph filled dispatch from Afghanistan. He describes the slog. “People like Secretary Gates and General Petraeus think we create some sort of success here, and I do, too, but only with sincere, strategic intergenerational commitment. Ten years more will not do it. Twenty years will not be enough. A century is more realistic. Knock on wood that Stanley McChrystal can pull a rabbit out of his hat during his command, and buy time for progress.”
After promising to turn Afghanistan into the centerpiece of its strategy, the Obama administration hasn’t even been able to articulate it. Central to the difficulty is that it must communicate to everyone in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan that it intends to win — in order to win. The ultimate “effect” NATO operations must have is to lastingly convince everyone, including the Taliban, that the return of al-Qaeda will not be tolerated. It’s a chicken and egg cycle in which military force is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for success. In some respects the situation in 2006 Iraq contained several of the elements the US is facing in Afghanistan today. A STRATFOR article described it:
The expectation in November 2006 was that as U.S. President George W. Bush’s strategy had been repudiated, his only option was to begin withdrawing troops. … Most important, groups in Iraq believed that the United States would be leaving. Therefore, political alliance with the United States made no sense, as U.S. guarantees would be made moot by withdrawal. … Bush’s decision to launch a surge of forces in Iraq was less a military event than a psychological one. … The issue was not whether the United States could defeat all of the insurgents and militias; that was not possible. The issue was that because the United States was not leaving, the United States was not irrelevant. If the United States was not irrelevant, then at least some American guarantees could have meaning. And that made the United States a political actor in Iraq.
Once the US established that it was going to remain a serious and potent actor in the region the factions within Iraq reconciled themselves to its presence. They understood that the Red Lines were real and became convinced that they could not be transgressed. Force had been used to defeat the enemy in his mind; and that is the only lasting kind of victory. It is often forgotten that the defeat of Germany and Japan did not involve the annihilation of their populations. It involved their acceptance of an Allied victory. STRATFOR, in discussing the options in Afghanistan, argues that the heart of the debate is whether to deal with the “natural” rulers of Afghanistan or attempt to psychologically defeat the region a la Iraq.
Obama and Gates have stated that the goal in Afghanistan is the defeat of al Qaeda and the denial of bases for the group in Afghanistan. This is a very different strategic goal than in Iraq, because this goal does not require a coalition government or a reconciliation of political elements. Rather, it requires an agreement with one entity: the Taliban. If the Taliban agree to block al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan, the United States will have achieved its goal. Therefore, the challenge in Afghanistan is using U.S. power to give the Taliban what they want — a return to power — in exchange for a settlement on the al Qaeda question.
But the problem with this approach is that it reduces the likelihood that the Taliban will honor such a settlement. If the Taliban psychologically believes they have won — which they must conclude if the the US effectively buys its way out of the battlefield by giving them the keys to Kabul after a “decent interval” — then they will feel free to renege, secure in the knowledge that Washington, having worked so hard to pull its fingers from the fire, will not soon plunge its hand in again. What Petraeus wants, according to STRATFOR, is to convince all concerned that if Washington withdraws, it will be at its pleasure; leaving no doubt that if al-Qaeda returns so will the Predators.
From Petraeus’ view, Gates and Obama are creating the situation that existed in pre-surge Iraq. Rather than stunning Afghanistan psychologically with the idea that the United States is staying, thereby causing all the parties to reconsider their positions, Obama and Gates have done the opposite. They have made it clear that Washington has placed severe limits on its willingness to invest in Afghanistan, and made it appear that the United States is overly eager to make a deal with the one group that does not need a deal: the Taliban.
But despite Petraeus’ stature, STRATFOR is in no doubt who will win the strategic debate. “In the end, there is never a debate between U.S. presidents and generals. Even MacArthur discovered that. It is becoming clear that Obama is not going to bet all in Afghanistan, and that he sees Afghanistan as not worth the fight. Petraeus is a soldier in a fight, and he wants to win. But in the end, as Clausewitz said, war is an extension of politics by other means. As such, generals tend to not get their way.” In that view, the administration’s own priorities prohibit the kind of intergenerational, or other psychologically compelling commitment to victory that is necessary to achieve the psychological effect. One is left with slogging and hoping that something will turn up. “Knock on wood that Stanley McChrystal can pull a rabbit out of his hat during his command, and buy time for progress.”
Yet it is still interesting to examine the position of each from their merit. After all, Obama may be right about the impossibility of victory. For one thing, the real locus of al-Qaeda is in Pakistan, which is largely out of Petraeus’ reach. The second rationale for appeasement is history. The Pashtun may simply be incapable of being convinced of defeat. Third, the morale of NATO is bound to flag. It is almost as if they were simply going through a due diligence attempt at victory without any real conviction. Would it not be better to git while the going’s good instead of being the last force out of Afghanistan, if the NATO partners begin to peel off? The real weakness of what STRATFOR thinks is Obama’s plan is simple: if al-Qaeda returns after a NATO withdrawal then America simply cannot ignore it. Given a secure base al-Qaeda will be back on the attack again, something it has not been able to achieve on a large scale since September 11; and whether it will or nill, everything will go right back to where it started. You cannot leave the field to the enemy yet hope to enjoy the fruits of victory, simply because you ain’t got it. Between these dilemmas the circle must be squared.
But who is thinking about it? With the political focus, both in the US and in Europe, decidedly on the economy and domestic politics, Afghan strategy may simply drift. It was said that Britain acquired an empire in a fit of absentmindedness. Washington sometimes conducts international policy and warfare in that condition.
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I think obama wants to give america another vietnam…
how long did it take america to get over the last vietnam?
why you might ask?
simple really…
obama does not think america should be more than it’s 4% (of the world’s population) foot print…
what better way to curb american military lust than to give it a quagmire..
hence…
afghanistan….
How about we just build a solid fence around Afghanistan and tell them “You’re on you own. This is the path YOU have chosen as a people. Deal with it.”? We leave the fence up until something approaching actual humanity takes hold. There are certain parts of the world that are not worth our time and treasure.
I know, wishful thinking. But some parts of the world are simply not worth it. Except for their ability to export terrorism I don’t give a rat’s rear-end about Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan have kept their country a hell-hole for as long as I can remember. Until the people of Afghanistan want change, there won’t be any.
Obviously, not “deep-thinking” on my part, but I am fed up with the world’s perpetual hell-holes.
It occurs to me that it is a complete folly to negotiate a deal with ANY extremist. It is the lack of understanding who and why the enemy is that will end in our defeat. And to put it plainly we are too sure about the where our enemy is either.
You have to think of places like the ‘stan and such as boils on the world’s buttocks. If you don’t lance them they will fester and become septicemic. Not a pretty picture I grant you but it is accurate. I suggest we do it with a lot more aggression. Give up on the Andy Taylor style and go with Harry Calahan’s style.
If Obama, Pelosi, et al were capable of thinking multi-generationally they’d not be pursuing some of the domestic policies they do.
JFSanders: Except we were not defeated in Vietnam. We had withdrawn long before the South fell.
The real legacy of Viet Nam was communists gaining control of the Democrat Party and the MSM and though that, control in Washington. Along with that was the destruction, at least as far as reputation is concerned, of key institutions of our Republic. The armed services was one of them. But is was not by defeat on the field that brought this about, rather this was accomplished through relentless propaganda. I will posit that were it not Viet Nam it would have been something else that they would have used for this purpose. In this sense, the VVN war was incidenteal to their program.
Once Reagan was in office for 1 month the so-called “stigma” of Viet Nam was lifted. All it took was one shout from the buly pulpit.
It was not Viet Nam itself that did the damage but who was wielding power.
Yes, they created a false narrative around Viet Nam, but this in the end did not help the USSR much in the end.
They are using the same tactics with the WOT. The exact same ones. they have the same goals: The destruction of the USA as the Protector of Western Civilization.
It is sad that many Americans are buying it, but I wonder if it is as deep as as they seem to think it is.
The body bags are not coming home like they were then and there is no draft.
Certainly, one of Obama’s briefs (one and one the whole of the Democrat Party) is the destruction of America as a World Power. They may not have enough time to do it now.
100 years? Please!
American people have surprised me going 8 years in Iraq and Afganistan without getting bored, weepy and running home to relax and watch TV.
We most likely won’t be in Afganistan for very much longer unless someone just wants to get more Americans killed and maimed.
Do the job, do it quick and dirty then walk the hell out and don’t look back.
“Do the job, do it quick and dirty then walk the hell out and don’t look back.”
“I suggest we do it with a lot more aggression. Give up on the Andy Taylor style and go with Harry Calahan’s style.”
Both sound good to me.
Mongoose, who is talking about Viet Nam? Not me. Although, as far as I am concerned if you run you lost. The American soldier did not lose that war. His leaders and his countrymen did.
#10: “The American soldier did not lose that war. His leaders and his countrymen did.” For me, an assessment of the Viet Nam war cannot be stated any more clearly than that. What infuriates me most is people like Jack Murtha, who fought in that war and must have known that the defeat there was political, not military, and then 30 years later, now in power politically, tries to repeat that political failure with his public comments about the war in Iraq.
Sorry Sanders, got my wires crossed, that was directed at the What is occupation comment. My apologies.
WiO/1; is precisely right. enormous political power flowed into the Dem party via Vietnam –clearly they’d love to do it again. It can’t be remembered vividly enough, nothing repeat nothing trumps these people’s desire to suction-pump the fabric of reality into their wallets.
“You Americans have the watches, but we Arabs have the time.”
Attributed to O B L
I would not be surprised to see this administration punt this one. Cut a deal with the Taliban and skedaddle. Obama only seems interested in fighting uppity moms who speak badly of his takeover of medicine (a friend of mine who spoke out against Obamacare is in the middle of her 15 minutes).
The notion that the objective in war is convincing the enemy they lost is good. Rarely does a war end when an armistice is declared, as is long forgotten there was resistance in Germany after WWII and in the US Civil war the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia did not end the bloodshed there either. It usually becomes guerrilla.
Those malingerers or as Rumsfeld characterized them the “dead enders” usually need to become dead, literally.
Afghanistan’s problem is its poverty. AFAIK there is no real treasure trove of natural resources there, the agricultural environment only seems to be able to sustain subsistence agriculture (or opium poppies — which has real and diabolical value), so the population there is unable to advance beyond a tribal existence. This means there is no real interest in Afghanistan, the only interest in Afghanistan is to make sure it doesn’t bother anyone else. This is nation building for real — attempting to break a tribal warrior culture is step one and will be the hardest step.
James, #6: If Obama, Pelosi, et al were capable of thinking multi-generationally they’d not be pursuing some of the domestic policies they do.
In fairness to Obama, Pelosi, et al, I think the real underlying problem is systemic. The American political system does not reward elected officials in any meaningful way for thinking in any time frame beyond the next election cycle.
Pakistan Taliban chief’s death to split TTP: report
ISLAMABAD, Aug. 8 (Xinhua) — The reported death of Pakistan Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud in a U.S. drone attack will deal a big blow to the banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as its division in splinter groups seems imminent, the local newspaper The News reported Saturday.
The source said the outlawed TTP now was facing a revolt within itself and currently its commanders were facing the biggest problem of maintaining unity in their rank and file. He claimed that the Taliban movement of Afghanistan also wanted the man of its choice appointed as the head of the TTP.
The source said 28-year-old Hakimullah Mehsud, a cousin of Baitullah, had been responsible for provision of logistics for attacks on the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops in Afghanistan as well as suicide bombings inside Pakistan.
Hakimullah, however, was reported that already faces bitter opposition within the outfit.
Hakimullah Mehsud killed in armed clash: sources
Updated at: 2120 PST, Saturday, August 08, 2009
SOUTH WAZIRISTAN: Spokesman of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud and another Taliban leader Wali-ur-Rehman have been killed in an armed clash erupted during the Tehreek’s Shura meeting, Geo TV reported Saturday.
At the meeting Hakimullah Mehsud was appointed as TTP Chief after the reported killing of Baitullah Mehsud, the state media reported.
The agenda of the meeting was to appoint successor of Baitullah Mehsud, sources said.
MA/15–there are minerals there. Yesterday’s Wall St Journal had an article describing a very large deposit of copper ore discovered by the Russians back during their occupation. It also said there is oil and gas (which I hadn’t heard before). Given the known geology of that region there is reason to suspect other resources are there but apparently nobody’s ever looked except the Russians. Ancient records describe gems that were mined somewhere out there.
Now … would an Afghan mountain man want to work in an open-pit copper mine? No idea.
“After promising to turn Afghanistan into the centerpiece of its strategy, the Obama administration hasn’t even been able to articulate it.”
“Victory in Afghanistan” combined with “Iraq is an unjust war and Afghanistan is a just one” was a campaign theme that the Democrats (both Obama and Hillary) could beat a victorious GWB about the head and shoulders with. Now that they are both stuck with that promise, the malleability of the definition of “victory” is their salvation.
“Victory in Afghanistan” can range from simply the head guy in Kabul not giving us the finger to when we need to blow up yet another “wedding party” to the Up With People troupe going on tour in Tora Bora and Kandahar.
No matter how badly they screw it up, they can still declare victory and go home. No wonder they don’t want to articulate a strategy. They are going to build the plastic model kit first and then figure out if it is supposed to be the Starship Enterprise or a B-17 Flying Fortress. And no matter what it turns out to be, they can say it was their plan all along.
It sounds to me as if there’s a policy split developing between Obama/Gates and Patreus. Wretchard points out that generals don’t win such splits, but that is only true as long as Patreus works for the DOD. Look for Patreus to retire this year and start giving speeches supporting a firmer approach in Afghanistan, then emerging as the Republican choice to head the ticket in 2012. In fact I’m kinda surprised he’s waited this long — it’s almost too late to begin getting himself known inside the US. I think he’d be a good candidate to unite the GOP and would probably be ten times the president Obama is (think Eisenhower). Wonder how he’d look in a yellow dress? F
Given the presence of the preditors and the history of their use in revenge attacks this succession battle could do in the taliban.
Isn’t this the old issue of nation building?
The problem with Afghanistan is, there’s no there, there.
What there is is a culture so backwards Mohammed would have sneered at it, except with Enfield rifles and now RPGs and IEDs.
They don’t want anything else, and for the most part they cannot even imagine anything else. And someone will accuse us of cultural imperialism if we do a thing to change it.
So, maybe we should *be* imperialists. Fence off large sectors of the country and open them to western development … but I guess most readers here can fill in the rest, good and bad.
In the Graveyard of Fuel Tankers by Tim Lynch —
Meanwhile, JD Johannes reports temperature of 150 degrees Fahrenheit when he deplaned in Jalalabad the other day. TINS. It does get that hot.
Evidently there have been some periods of high civilization in Afghanistan, before the weather became harsher and drier about the 15th century.
VICTORY IS NOT AN OPTION
President Obama, in an interview with ABC News, said he does not like to use the word victory. “I’m always worried about using the word ‘victory’,” he said, “because, you know, it invokes this notion of Emperor Hirohito coming down and signing a surrender to MacArthur.” This is astounding, though not astonishing, given what we now know about Barack Hussein Obama and his utter contempt and dislike for the United States, its traditions and culture. Disregarding the fact known to most schoolboys that Hirohito was nowhere near the USS Missouri on the day in question, it is not clear to me whether Obama thinks surrendering to the Americans was a humiliation to the Japanese not to be borne, or whether it was a personal embarrassment inflicted by vengeful and vindictive white people on a dignified man of color. Whatever, the import of what Obama said is clear. He does not believe in victory. He strove mightily, as did other Democrats, to lose the war in Iraq, in the belief that losing the war would be beneficial politically to Democrats. Which raises the question, what are we doing in Afghanistan? Why is he sending men to die if not for victory?
Victory or death, men used to say
But such words now are quite passé
And victory as such is much deplored
Our president has said as much
And he is surely more in touch
With matters military ‘cross the board
Than those of us who seem to think
That when at war one should not shrink
From doing what we need to do to win
So we should follow Obie’s lead
And when we fight we should concede
That victory in war’s a mortal sin
For enemies that kill our guys
Are merely friends that we may prise
Away from habits warlike, harsh and cruel
And turn them into people who
Believe in all the things we do
And all who don’t believe this is a fool
But somehow I can’t quite believe
That wearing hearts upon our sleeve
Is quite the way to show them we are right
For in a war you win or lose
And which is not for you to choose
And victory or death be why we fight
1. Nation building. A simple ad hominem canard directed at Bush. That is now the justification for our continued effort in Afghanistan. Hypocrisy? Thy name is Alinsky.
2. Backwardness caused by poverty. Exactly backward. In the last part of the 12th century there was a debate amongst the clerisy about whether the Greek method of logic and reason was acceptable to Allah. The “philosopher” Al Ghazali prevailed and our western view of the world was deemed not halal.
3. Why we’re here and what’s going wrong. According to Just War Doctrine and our own philosophical foundation war is permissible only when our country or our strategic assets are threatened. Action must be limited to accomplish that end.
The attack on Afghanistan removed an immediate threat and hopefully proved to be a deterrent to other bad actors. It didn’t. Iraq threatened an area upon which we are critically dependent for our continued prosperity. Just war. It must be brought to an acceptable, to us, conclusion in our own vital interest. It has also proven to have a strong deterrent effect on the region. From the surrender of Libya to the mostly sub rosa choking off the financial resources of the troublemakers.
The war in Afghanistan is well in excess of Just War Doctrine except for the debatable proposition that it is vital to prevent Pakistan from takeover. If that is the justification then I believe it is a ineffective.
Is Afghanistan the main consideration, or is it Pakistan?
If Afghanistan, then why not Somalia as well?
If Pakistan, then perhaps we do well to keep Afghanistan as a base for supporting operations–as long as the Pakistanis continue the fight and need/allow us to help.
As a taxpayer, I’m really not interested in building Afghanistan a society from the ground up. If they are not willing to work and join the human race on their own, then they should be quaratined off where they can’t cause any further trouble. If that means we need to go toe-to-toe to keep Russia and/or China out and unable to cause trouble on their own, then at least that is a fight we can face and probably win. Ditto Iran, which would be good cause to nuke the Persians.
Of course, before we can do ANY of this, we need to tend to that small little matter of unseating Obama and getting a real American into the Presidency of the United States.
Dogstarman — Some very Sirius points.
…good cause to nuke the Persians.
I have friends in Persia, quite opposed to the current regime there, who might rightly take exception to that sentiment.
Walt–winking back @ you.
No, there is a point missing in all this analysis.
Obama and the losers on his side of the political isle have fractured the United States as a country. Domestically, that goes back to FDR, and certainly to LBJ if you want a shorter time frame. I think we all can agree on this.
But, in terms of international affairs, the far or better put “New” Left of the late 1960′s early 1970′s, and their Communist allies destroyed the historic bi-partisanship in foreign affairs that was a hallmark of America for most of its history.
Therefore there is no single principle that the country can unify around that can sustain a multi-presidency path. If, for example, W.H. Taft intervened in Afghanistan, it easy fairly easy to accept that through
Hoover, the policy would still be followed. And there would be support for it on both sides of the aisle.
The Philippines are an example of this.
I would submit that Obama could have begun a sustainable multi-decade Afghan intervention, except for the leftist losers who support him would trash him, and every other President after him until there was no support for the long-term change necessary. The opportunity and the ability is there to do it…….
….The political will and consensus is not, and that is why our foreign policy and Afghan policy is going to hell in a handbasket.
The Taliban, the teachers, is a movement that has its origins more than a century ago in Pakistan. While it is austere, even radical and Islamist, it is not inherently jihadi. As long as Pashtuns live on either side of the international border there will be no border! Pashtuns are a nation of warring tribes who only stop warring with one another when they agree to war against others, the central governments so called of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia. Until we extinguish the jihadi financing that comes directly from the Gulf and Saudi, allegedly our allies, there will remain a threat to us and to all governments. I do not see evidence that love of Arabs is high on Pashtun lists; money is. We are focusing on the wrong parties. Try the corrupted American Congress and government bought for decades by the Saudis.
jkumpire:
The only thing I would to your analysis is the complicity of the US press. Im sure Obama’s people and their predecessors could not have destroyed our international standing as quickly as they have except for the whole-hearted support of the press. F
Dubya didn’t want to nation-build and said so, but that was before 9/11. After, he/we have been forced into it. Haven’t we?
What is the alternative? Basically to nuke a place like Afghanistan after something like 9/11? I recall hearing that’s what bin Laden thought would be our reaction.
Shouldn’t Obama be a big nation builder? He obviously doesn’t want to just nuke the place. What else does he think his choices are?
Frankly, I’d be for it, as an experiment. As I said, it would have all the earmarks (sic) of imperialism, cultural or otherwise. And for laughs, we might try to strongly discourage Islam in our imperial gameplan. Per Bernard Lewis, the real mechanism for the spread of Islam was just that – a benign invasion, followed by a generation of promoting locals who voluntarily converted to Islam, and only then, putting the choice at swordpoint to the rest.
“I have friends in Persia, quite opposed to the current regime there, who might rightly take exception to that sentiment.”
What have your Iranian (not Persian when you get right down to it) friends done lately to overthrow their government, to get their meddling out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and to make sure than Iranian money isn’t actively involved in killing American soldiers? And, do they support Israel’s right to exist and not support Hezbollah or Hamas? If they’ve done nothing other than being “moderate” and minding their own business, then I submit that they’re part of the Ahmadinnerjacket / Mad Mullah problem, and not the solution, and every bit as nukable as North Korea or Pakistan.
I think there is a group of people who see Islam as the logical evolutionary step of Communism, and why Obama and associates are Muslim-friendly. It allows for absolute control and cannot be questioned. Allah has spoken and that is that. Americans are especially disadvantaged in combating such an ideology since we are a product of religious freedom ourselves. We are loath to question the manner in which the extremists have hijacked it due to our own belief in tolerance. But the Inquisition ended when people got fed up and so shall this. Just not under this administration.
I cannot take the Stratfor angle too seriously, especially given the treatment they say was afforded to the Sunni in Iraq, in all cases. And in the final resolution of the matter the Obama approach Makes no sense, but has made no difference in either the treatment Sunni or in the funding of insurrection by those who do. What the Shi’ah have done has had a greater measurable impact on relations withing Iraq as well as in the region.
There is no question that the Taliban and Al Queda are virtually one and the same in Afpakistan. To be rid on one you must be rid of the other. If you can turn a few that is better, but perhaps not in their long term interest. Our interest is to make such war making on the Afghanistan government impractical and to make such war making on neighboring tribes and nations bad for business.
What does that take?
If they’ve done nothing other than being “moderate” and minding their own business…
Actually, some of them have been imprisoned and killed. No, not my friends, actually, but a few of their number who have recently been actively showing their displeasure. Or haven’t you been paying attention?
I have been paying attention and that’s why I asked. Have you informed them, in turn, that freedom is not free? And if they don’t want to become nuked, they’d best get it together so that they are not perceived as lethal enemies of those who already possess nuclear weapons? (I note, too, that you just glided over the part where I asked about their attitude towards Israel. Which may say a lot in and of itself whether I want to have either your or your Persian friends as neighbors.)
Yon is reporting from a town that was the location of the main project of US aid to Afghanistan before 2001. The goal was to create a center of prosperity on the Helmand River at Sangin along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority. One might have hoped that our main civilian aid project for Afghanistan prior to 2001 might have provided some good will in a small town of 15,000 even if its implementation fell short. Also, consider that the British established their FOB at Sangin in summer of 2006. Yon is describing the third year of the effort to bring Sangin over to our side.
So, in this context, consider Yon’s words:
“Nothing here can be considered friendly. “
“In many places, such as Sangin, the roads can be a death sentence no matter what you drive, and the enemy can seed IEDs far faster than we can clear the routes.”
“Here in Sangin, there are conflicting lines of information that would indicate we are gaining or losing ground. Cooperation from locals—a crucial indicator—would indicate we are treading water.”
Then consider a June 1 analysis of the war from Stratfor:
“The United States is losing in Afghanistan because it is not winning. The Taliban are winning in Afghanistan because they are not losing. This is the reality of insurgent warfare. A local insurgent is more invested in the struggle and is working on a much longer time line than an occupying foreign soldier. Every year that U.S. and NATO commanders do not show progress in Afghanistan, the investment of lives and resources becomes harder to justify at home. Public support erodes. Even without more pressing concerns elsewhere, democracies tend to have short attention spans.”