Westhawk describes a largely unnoticed but important bureaucratic change in the Department of Defense. The Pentagon has decided that irregular warfare is now co-equal with regular warfare. “After years of internal discussions, Mike Vickers, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low intensity conflict, has hammered out a consensus inside the U.S. Defense Department that establishes the Department’s comprehensive policy for irregular warfare. Small Wars Journal has provided a copy of the new irregular warfare directive.”
That change has profound implications, as Westhawk observes. One of the most important is that it recognizes the dissolution of the neat boundaries between “war” and “peace”. They are no longer binary, mutually exclusive states. Instead, they are intertwined threads in history; contemporaneous and — for the next decades at least — almost inseparable.
Irregular warfare is now considered to be both a “steady state” as well as a “surge” activity. This means that from a U.S. policy perspective, there are no longer alternating states of “peace” and “war.” There will only be a constant hum of irregular warfare in its various forms and conducted at varying levels of intensity. This will include traditional Phase 2 and 3 conflict, which will be followed by Phase 4 stability operations – more irregular warfare.
AdvertisementThe directive is replete with requirements for the Department to conduct irregular warfare by, with, and through indigenous forces and allies. All corners of the Department are required to acquire capabilities to utilize this technique. Interpreted broadly, the entire U.S. military has now become John Nagl’s Advisor Corps.
The directive assigns U.S. Joint Forces Command, and not Special Operations Command, the lead role in developing the Department’s doctrine, concepts, and capabilities for irregular warfare. USJFCOM will design and evaluate the irregular warfare training and preparation of all U.S. general purpose combat forces. And USJFCOM will supervise the coordination of general purpose and special operations irregular warfare activity. Those who thought or hoped that irregular warfare would be an activity just for Special Forces must now have their hopes dashed.
Historians have criticized the military for always preparing to fight the next war. But that is to misunderstand the situation. Military organizations are configured to fight the conflicts they are faced with. It’s future conflicts — the enemy they haven’t met yet — that they are completely unprepared for. In that sense the unreadiness to fight the next war is the consequence of being ready to fight this war.
Given the fundamental unpredictability of the future, it is usually only the societies and military organizations who have a broad and general-purpose capability, one that can be tuned to any given task, that can successfully adapt. A critique of the Pentagon’s new emphasis on irregular warfare would ask whether the larger American society is prepared to support it; whether the man on the street gives a hoot about the focus on irregular warfare at all; whether there are now young men and women who are planning to enter language school, learn other cultures or have given thought to what it might morally mean to live in the perpetual twilight.
For those with a sense of historical drama, the new directive means an end to the dream of the End of History. Perhaps one day the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatted calf together; with a little child shall lead them. But not yet; or mayhap, we’re getting there; we just need to work at it.
Sounds like Thomas Barnett ideas about force structuring maybe be edging ever so slightly closer to reality. At first blush SOCOM’s lack of leadership on irregular warfare may seem worrying, but they have never had (or ever will have) the numbers it requires to really do Low Intensity Ops on a really large scale (as required in Iraq and Afghanistan). If the DoD gets behind a more flexible doctrine force-wide, more systemic attention may lead us to finally institutionalize lessons learned at great cost in VietNam, and re-learned at significant cost in Iraq. The organism that adapts gets to live.
1. The military is usually criticized for always being ready to fight the last war, not the next. Being ready for the next would be good.
2. Insurgency arose partly because our enemies cannot fight us in a conventional war. The risk is that in specializing toward insurgency, conventional ability suffers.
Consider Israel, whose army was trained to infiltrate Palestinian held areas but did not do so well against the more conventional Hezbollah.
As an extreme, training your army to do police work mistrains them for military work. A soldier must shoot first, a policeman must prevent violence altogether.
Nevertheless, the US military in Iraq has learned to square the circle.
The military may be ready for semi-permanent war, the public is not. For example, there will be constitutional issues.
One more thought – your End of History comment in the last paragraph touches on what is perhaps the single most misunderstood book on international relations ever penned – The End of history and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama. I read that book the week it came out and thought his basic thesis quite plausible – that the fall of Soviet Communism has decided the debate about which system can credibly deliver the material and societal goods for humanity – Capitalism or Socialism. It’s thesis was that the argument IN THE ADVANCED WESTERN SOCIETIES was over. Islamofascism, authoritarianism (as practiced in China, say, or Zimbabwe), or sheer primitivism (think Darfur, Burma, etc.) may exist, and may exist for a long time, but (Fukuyama’s thesis goes) they are hardly ideological competitors as organizing principles for advanced societies in the way that Socialism was.
Now, I don’t think Socialism is anywhere near as dead as Mr. Fukuyama predicted back then (watch what happens after January 20th, 2009), but he never stated that once Communism as practiced by Russia collapsed, that all war, poverty, oppression and strife would magically wither away into a democratic utopia. He just said the intellectual argument over which system was better for it’s people was finally, definitively over. I think he was right, even though I hate defending the guy because for the last few years he has been spouting some astoundingly asinine thinking re: Iraq and the “War on Terror”. I guess even a blind squirrel finds a nut once in a while.
Fred2: Excellent points. Let’s hope we don’t end up mediocre at both. We had a little room on the conventional war side, though, especially in terms of our Air Force & Navy’s striking power in a conventional conflict, which is nearly useless in counterinsurgency.
and just when we think conventional war is over something absolutely monumental will happen. and it may engulf the world.
RE: Fred’s Point #2– I wouldn’t worry about that overmuch. Our conventional warfare ability is so superior to any possible enemy that I think we can spend some resources on this sort of thing, especially since we’re facing these sorts of wars all over the globe.
The SF novel by Joe Haldeman, “The Forever War” is strongly recommended. Two other excellent novels by Haldeman are:
“All My Sins Remembered”
“Mindbridge”
What is critical in this is the answer to what will happen to DoD’s “plans” after a future administration unilaterally throws away the nuke retaliation option, [no matter how silly one may think that action to be]? How will DoD react then to another “big one”? That, I think, is where the rubber will meet the road.
On a side note, good luck with selling this policy to about 60% of the generals and admirals. As a class they are the least amenable to change and have made their careers one long foot-dragging episode, imo.
Neither conventional nor asymmetric warfare is “over”, but by advancing the concept of multitasking to include looking at the conventional warfare terrain through asymmetric eyes opens up vast new potentials for avoiding irritating missteps.
Should Pakistan fall apart there would be needed a conventional capability to secure our commitment in Afghanistan, to secure any nukes falling into criminal hands and perhaps to secure the Pakistani Government. There would be a huge peace to win asymmetrically, and I think it is pretty evident that much of our trouble in Afghanistan is due to loosing the trust of many people there. I think we can win their hearts and minds easy as apple pie, but winning their trust that they will be secure in their villages from the Taliban and Al Qaeda that is another story altogether.
#7 Brock —
At anything like reasonable odds, I would agree with you. But a war against China would be fought a lot closer to their bases than ours, and it wouldn’t happen unless they could make the odds very unreasonable in their favor. We might win, anyway, but we might lose, too.
#4–I agree; I read that book back then and parts again a couple of years later and that’s the way I remember it. It is mis-quoted the same way Greene’s ‘Ugly American’ is, ie the Ugly American was the good guy, not a bad guy, who happened to be a bit homely.
Re the main topic: clearly irregular war is going to be with us, probably for decades. Many will worry about China and the need to maintain a conventional force also. There will be lots of wrestling over this.
One of the more distressing aspects of the U.S. Military is that it is given to embracing fads. While it opposes civilian fads such as hair length (either too short or too long), it has its own fads.
In the 50’s long range nuclear bombers were favored and conventionally armed fighters took a back seat; that reversed in the 60’s. In the early 90’s, as huge cutbacks were planned, the USAF Chief of Staff sent out note asking what good were missile early warning satellites, “After all, all they do is tell us to get ready to die; we can’t shoot down the missiles.” Shocking perhaps, but it was a response that reflected the psychological impact of the loss of valuable aircraft and beloved squadrons as much as it did an attempt to think out of the box.
And one consequence of the end of the Cold War was de-emphasis of strategic nuclear weapons, with the eventual result the recent recreation of Strategic (Air) Command when the deterioration was found to go too far.
The difference between a reasoned, well-planned response to a new threat and a desperate attempt to hang onto a crumbling empire – or the difference between a bold new initiative and a major personality flaw in a senior General officer – is not always obvious.
As they say in DC, where you stand largely depends on where you sit.
Well, we should look at this quite cautiously. There is a very large section of the Democratic party that want to disassemble America’s military might. The Clintons used a “international peacekeeper/Peace dividend” model to cause it damage, and damage it they did. The same sort of ruination can be wrought under this “doctrine”. If this diminishes the conventional and strategic forces — most particularly in the area of procurements — then this is dangerous indeed. The WOT psuhed many of these programs in holding patterns, they cannot be dumped now if we are to maintain our edge.
I mentioned before that Gates could prove a disater to the f22 program, but there are many other programs that need to be funded. not buiding out mre planes will place us in a disparate position a few years down the road.
BTW, those who claim that the F22 is a “Cold War platform” are lying through their teeth, and this rhetoric needs to be address. For my part, I consider it treasonous to not get us a decent number of these birds. Let us not kid ourselves for a second: The Democrats and the Left detest the very notion of American power and would do completely away with it if they could manage to do so.
Another point: The motto of “fighting the last war” may come back to haunt us. There is no reason to believe that the “next war” will not be conventional, and in fact if conventional powers see us draw down this capability then that just increases the likelihood of a conventional showdown.
In reality, the notion of unconventional warefare relies on the implicit threat of conventional might.
Also, remember that JFK also pushed this notion in the early phases of Viet Nam.
The GOP better stand up and be counted on all of this — the day may come when a major campaign is lost on the field of battle, they best not have that on their souls.
We are about to find out how serious America is about remaining a superpower. My guess is that a majority of us no linger cares.
Shameful times.
Is the title of this post supposed to be a reference to the book Forever War, by Joe Haldeman?
Oh my God….What about the Powell Doctrine???
Even after we declare “Victory” in the Global War On Terror and revert back to the 9/10/2001 mind set of placidly grazing sheeple, we will remain a profitable target for the wolves of the world. Some of these wolves will be aided, abetted, encouraged and supported by Westphalian nation-state actors, who will deny any connection to such, and these plausible denials will be uncritically accepted by our transnational progressivist, multicultural, peacenik element who will oppose our efforts to defend ourselves.
Other wolves will be NGO’s and super-empowered individuals with agendas, axes to grind, and access to extremely powerful weapons of destruction, disruption, and disorientation. They may not have any recognizable connection to hostile Westphalian nation-states against whom we can retaliate with conventional kinetic military force. These hostile NGO’s and SEI’s may very well be American citizens with all the civil rights and lawfare that entails. They may well be more than law enforcement can handle, yet our military is not trained, equipped, or organized to defend against such entities. Our military breaks things and kills people, and wishes those broken things and dead people belonged to the Other Side’s military.
Third Generation Warfare, 3GW, Industrial Age fighting between our conventional forces and a Westphalian nation-state’s conventional forces, while not entirely out of the realm of possibility, is not the most likely threat.
Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges
We used to have IW fairly well under control. United States Army Special Forces used to be experts at Foreign Internal Defense. Big Army was too eager to rid themselves of bearded, smart-ass snake eaters, and now they find that much of the FID seed corn was ground up on the altar of Direct Action. IW is still pretty much a land forces problem. The Navy hasn’t covered themselves with glory supressing maritime IW in the Gulf of Aden. Aerial IW seems to consist primarily of teaching indigs to fly, although the use of Hellfire missile firing Predator UAV’s as snipers might be consided Air Force IW.
Most of the hostile irregulars in meat space are on land, and kinetic solutions to their problem will mostly concern Soldiers, Marines, and paramilitary policemen. Nonkinetic answers to the challenges posed by civilian irregular 4 and 5GW operators may rest with counter-insurgent supportive civilian irregular operators.
Concerned Netizens for Internal Defense and Development
Combat Cops
C4: I always enjoy your posts and mostly agree with them, but I cannot fully agree here.
1) We cannot meet our security commitments without strong conventional and strategic forces. Our security partners in Japan, Australia, Europe (I know, I know), etc. strongly rely on both our conventional and strategic might. And should that deterrent fail, for all we know the war with China might be fought in the street of Tokyo. We really do not know what the future holds — witness the thought f the decades prior to WW1.
2) Degradation of these capacities may not just encourage competitors to take advantage and move to a peer position (or beyond a peer position); it will force regional allies to increase their might and this could have many destabilizing consequences — Japan comes to mind. Both case are serious indeed to our actual physical security.
3) Even if we do not face a peer competitor in battle, conventional forces are still quite necessary: We would not have manage our success in Iraq with out them. Note also that the ability to bring off a more “nontraditional” campaign in Afghanistan was enabled by re-purposing the logistics and C4 investments that were made for the Cold War. In fact, we even utilized strategic platforms in an “nontraditional manner” in both theaters (BUFFS, B2′s, Subs, etc.), and these were particularly useful in Afghanistan. It is because these systems and platforms were designed for total war that allows for their flexibility in nontraditional warfare. That the reverse would be true seems unlikely. Pace Delta, one could even argue that SOCOM is really an adjunct to conventional warfare, as sort of parallel doctrine, as it were, and would have otherwise not developed into the weapon that it has become. In any event, 5 gen implies that all of these other system and platforms are in the mix, and this requires constant renewal of these systems and assets.
3) Conflicts quickly change their dynamics. There is no way to predict when or where a “nontraditional” conflict moves beyond that scoop. Moreover, The nature of geopolitics may require a conventional check (or threat of such) in one place in order to have an effective response to a 4th or 5th gen challenge somewhere else.
So doctrinally we should view the matter in terms of a spectrum of capabilities rather than two or more opposing doctrines, which, BTW was Rummy’s notion.
Interesting. Assistant Sec Def Mike Vickers is the CIA Officer from the book “Charlie Wilson’s War” who was the expert on building and supplying the Afghan resistance. At least he has winning experience….
Warfare, as a simple civilian like me, understands it, is based on logistics.
If we dwell on COIN or counter-insurgency warfare, which might be determined as “light infantry landwar”, which is training intensive, to the exclusion of presenting a credible “heavy” deterrent, which is hardware intensive, to a conventional war, the first thing to disappear will be logistical support. Sealift and airlift.
We can have a tank park of 3,000 M-1′s, M-2′s, and M110 SPA in reserve, but if we can’t get them overseas fast enough from Fort Hood, Fort Knox or wherever they are parked, then they are just about useless.
Logistics is never sexy or jazzy, but it is indespensible.
What are you disagreeing with, Mongoose?
Do you think 3GW between our conventional forces and a Westphalian nation-state’s conventional forces is the most likely threat?
Staring in Disbelief (4):
“… your End of History comment in the last paragraph touches on what is perhaps the single most misunderstood book on international relations ever penned – The End of history and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama. ”
============
Good comment. Your summary of the book is correct.
When people write that this or that development proves that the thesis Fukuyama’s The End of History is wrong, then it usually is obvious that they never have read the book. It has been obvious to me for a long time that Wretchard never has read it, because he has been making such remarks for a long time.
The Internal Conversation
Let’s break this down for simplicity. I have talked about the culture in the Army before. Our culture has heavily stressed the warrior ethos. We even create additional tags to go on the soldier’s dog tag chains with the warrior ethos printed on it, as a talisman of our culture. Elitism is bred in. Everyone wants to be elite. Pride is part of professionalism. Physical prowess and tactical proficiency are key to the pride. Excellent players of strategy and tactical games have succeeded.
We even produced our own video game, “America’s Army.” It is a tactical shoot ‘em up. Warriors tend to enjoy first-person shooters or classic games such as the “Close Combat” series of games. Hey, I’ve never in my life played “Dungeons and Dragons,” either. I’m really good at “Steel Beasts,” and I’ve kicked a lot of ass on “M1 Tank Platoon II.”
COIN is much more like “Dungeons and Dragons” or “World of Warcraft.” There is the first-person shooter aspect to COIN, but Verne Troyer’s Mage character is likely to be more successful at engaging the local village leadership than any “Tom Clancy’s End War” shooter.
“Launch kinetic strike!” is more our style than any circle-talking, wand-waving gnome in a pointy hat type stuff. It’s also something we cannot do so much. Kinetic strikes are what got the Soviets to be so universally hated in Afghanistan.
That and godless communism, of course.
Getting an avid player of “Medal of Honor” to play “Dungeons and Dragons” is not easy, and the participant’s enthusiasm level is likely to be low. Instead of knowing that he can lob a grenade or launch a missile into a particular target and achieve the desired result, he may have to cast a “Good Governance” spell combined with an “Information Operation” incantation backed with his multiplier card to move to the next level. Is it any wonder that our level of execution with COIN has been spotty?
Gentile Vs. Nagl: The Army In Microcosm
A Tale of Two Wars
RE #26
link
The Reconstruction Man
In the Pentagons New Map, there was a discussion of the evolution of the white paper for the navy, “From the blue water” or something like that in 1992. The fact that the JOC is looking to Marines to lead and conduct LIW is a recognition to their efforts in Latin America and the Philippines.
But it is not without the risk of Political winds tossing hard won gains aside. What President Elect Obama may find himself overseeing is the institution of a permanent Rumsfeldian style long war corp with an SOF style paving the way for the diplomats and NGO’s to teach accounting practices. How much HIW knowledge is required is a matter of tactical ability and being able to transfer between HIW and LIW may be one skill set beyond multi-tasking. It is not now nor will it be a military dependent on Draft Quality inductees that is for certain. Our forces work now due to the commitment of highly capable and highly skilled Volunteers.
Knowing if the force, or what kinds of force, are flexible enough to handle both doctrines is today more important than the eventual resurrection of Russia or the eventual rise of Chinese power. What evidence does this document cite that shows such a force is or is not achievable?
It’s a question of where the funding/manpower goes. If this new prioritization is an addition of resources, great. If it is a shift of resources, bad.
And it needs to have an equally interested State Department. Good luck with that!
as RWE’s comment suggested somewhere above, i think the USA is facing a fundamental reconfiguration of the strategic relationship that our military/strategic outlook is based upon – the irreversible faltering of the post-WW2 order. this is inevitable. it also points up the extent to which the fundamental feature of the free (i.e., non-communist) world has been US *supremacy* not US “empire.” that supremacy has been largely consensual, and had as its necessary predicate (1) massive destruction due to world war, and (2) desire to resist communist advancement. the most bizarre thing about the gaping hole in the popular imagination where the USSR should be is that USSR policy actually accounts for about 80% of 20th century geopolitics and about 100% of US geopolitical disposition and influence.
At bottom I think this restructuring is being forced upon us, not elected, and that therefore – as exhelo points out – our resources are being redirected away from being able to assure the kind of strategic stasis on which the globalization/UN/large-scale peace is based. unless we are reverting to the kind of Korea-era reliance on smaller armed forces and a willingness to use nuclear diplomacy, how can we prevent countries from actually employing force – a la Russia v. Georgia? we’re moving into a “new world order,” it’s just that we’re doing it slowly, and in a cultural moment where the vast majority of people aren’t explicitly or even sentimentally aware of the pinions of their world as it is.
Dan: how can we prevent countries from actually employing force – a la Russia v. Georgia?
By making it cost Russia more rubles to employ force in Georgia than they obtain by looting it The first thing we do is tear up any contracts we have with them (like the recent megamillion dollar deal to ferry our astronauts to the ISS). The second thing we do is extend our nuclear umbrella to every neighbor of Russia that doesn’t want to be the next Georgia. The third thing we do is encourage China to issue passports to people in, say, Vladivostok, which of course might necessitate the incursion of a “peacekeeping force” to protect “Chinese citizens” from Russian retribution. Russia wants to bite off chunks of Georgia? How about we look the other why when China bites off chunks of Siberia?
Ruby, you are a true enigma to me. Just when I’m on the verge of writing off your posts you come through with a jewel.
That or your writing team just got a new chief editor, either way, brilliant.
14. Mongoose: I used to feel the same way that you do about the F-22, but the sucess of UAVs in the current war has caused me to re-asses. I think that most uses of manned aircraft in combat are obsolete.
If we can run Predator UAVs in Iraq from Nevada, we can run fighter UAVs as well. They might have to be run from closer. But so what?
Imagine, if you will, a UAV capable of Mach 4 and 15G turns. Being unmanned it does not need life support or emergency escape systems. Unmanned the craft can therefore be lighter and smaller. It is not limited by the ability of flesh and blood to survive the G’s pulled. It can run higher temperatures. Nobody has to run a copter behind enemy lines to pick up a downed flier. Another considerable saving.
The mother ship could be something like a J-Star which could stand back a couple of hundred miles. Or the UAVs could be run by a ship with the assistance of a Global Hawk as the relay and reconnaissance.
Aircraft Carriers are obsolete as well, at least ones of the Nimitz class. Flight decks could be much smaller. And crews less numerous. The navy needs a complete rethinking at this point. Should large bore naval guns be replaced by GMLRS at this point. How do these changes affect crew sizes and ship construction?
23. E. Nigma: In my view, the most important manned aircraft project is the C-17.
After talking with some friends back from the JSOC in Afghanistan, most of the SOLIC missions seem to be direct action (DA) commando raids, etc. My belief is that conventional Generals, who have taken over SOLIC for funding and promotion reasons, have intentionally side-lined irregular missions like foreign internal defense and counter-insurgency. You cannot get promoted from Brigadier to Major General in the US Army “commanding” civilian irregular forces. DA, mostly leadership targeting, is a conventional mind-set’s approach to an irregular war.
36. Ruby: The Georgia invasion triggered the collapse of the Russian stock market in the summer. With a bit of an assist from the tail winds of the world financial crisis and the implosion of commodities markets, they are off between 75% from last spring. My guess is that between the economic fall out of the invasion and $40/bbl. oil, the Russians will be pulling their horns in quite a bit.
A critique of the Pentagon’s new emphasis on irregular warfare would ask whether the larger American society is prepared to support it; whether the man on the street gives a hoot about the focus on irregular warfare at all; whether there are now young men and women who are planning to enter language school, learn other cultures or have given thought to what it might morally mean to live in the perpetual twilight.
The ‘intellectual’ elites in this country actively encourage the man on the street NOT to support warfare of any sort except reflexive defense, and the ‘liberal’ education idea has been distorted into extreme civil rights absolutism instead of the formerly standard foreign language requirements supporting inquiry into the state of the world. How then is a citizen to judge his place in the world with sufficient perspective to determine whether his governing political system is worth defending at all?
Reflecting, the MSM have used the Iraq war for five years as a club to beat the supposedly crooked Bush administration, rather than reporting on the progress of a major national effort which was entered into with full support of both parties in Congress. That effort now having succeeded despite their best efforts, we do not hear a peep lauding that success. And in the face of that vacuum, how might a citizen brighten up and share some of the credit for a very tough job as close to completion as any political/military can get?
The ‘intellectual’ street is newly girded with one-way signs.
Webvideo – Ford’s most advanced assembly plant operates in rural Brazil
…and the UAW won’t let them duplicate it here.
Gas price: EPA explores tax on livestock emissions
Insufficiently Sensitive said:
“Reflecting, the MSM have used the Iraq war for five years as a club to beat the supposedly crooked Bush administration, rather than reporting on the progress of a major national effort which was entered into with full support of both parties in Congress. That effort now having succeeded despite their best efforts, we do not hear a peep lauding that success.”
I’ve harped on this before. The MSM considers their political agendas to be more important than national security. Consequently the MSM has become a threat to national security. However it is well known and logically obvious that a democracy can NOT survive without a Free Press. Therefore we have a serious contradiction, i.e. our Free Press threatens our national security.
Also, did anyone notice the news yesterday that Obama had 3/4 of a billion dollars worth of “private financing” for his campaign? He was spending money as fast as he could for saturation advertising and still could not spend the money fast enough (Obama buried McCain under an avalanche of advertising). Given that the economy is imploding, I think we can safely dismiss the quaint notion that Obama’s financing came John Q. Public or Ma and Pa Kettle. Who gave Obama the 3/4 of a billion dollars that bought his election? Who is the puppet master behind the curtain?
Here is Gov (commerce secretary elect)Bill Richardson saying in Spanish that Obama is an “immigrant.” (So he understands understands “immigrant” issues.)
You’ve heard people say “do not listen to what Israelis or Palestinians say in English. Listen to what they say in Hebrew and Arabic.
I wonder if the same rule applies here.
@ #39 OldSnakeEater:
Concur.
When I was at KAF, SF had Afghan Security Forces (ASF) irregulars guarding their team houses. I saw some of those guys. Ex-warlord troops. Some ex-Taliban. Excellent way to use indigs. The same anal retentive reflective-belt Nazis that can’t stand beards couldn’t stand SF’s Praetorian Guard, so it was done away with.
IMO, Big Army should never have surrendered SF to SOCOM.
What Happened to the Afghan Security Forces?
#17, Cannoneer:
When the elephant-tamer loosens the jute binds on the young male’s head and genitals, and withdraws the rump lance one excruciating centimeter, it is only because the new slave-to-be is relaxing compliantly into the tamer’s binds.
This is a long way from over.
Fat man: Well, you are misinformed about the technical feasibility at this point in time and out 20 years or so. UAV’s will not work against a great power at current technology levels. The Communications and Control networks required to guide them cannot be maintained in full scale combat against a peer competitor. We are at least a couple of decades away from having this sort of thing, probably three.
They can also be outflown — most UAVs are not even super sonic. UAV’s as they are now and as they are current conceived (even 15 years out) are mostly strike plaftforms and not Air Superiority platforms. This a a crucial difference. Little is know about “teleoperating” in the envelope that you are suggesting. It will take quite some time to work that out.
These are know matters and often discussed issues in military research. It will probably work out to UAVs being used in conjunction with manned planes — sort of automated wingmen as it were, but there are major problems that must be worked out first.
They only work in WOT because the enemy have such primitive air defenses and absolutely no anti-C4 capabilities (other than CNN). Knock out the sats/awacs etc. or jam the net and your air force is now on the ground. You opponent’s Air Force is not. There are other ways of disrupting the nets too.
Try defending Taiwan with UAV’s.
We cannot rely on UAVs as the primary Air Superiority platform — this is not a real option in the near to mid term (meaning the next 25 to 30years). It has nothing to do with some sort of “fighter mafia” suppressing them, it is a technology issue, along with some strategic and tatical issues in practice and doctrine.
The f22, or something much like it, is mandatory.
And remember, Air superiority is a different thing altogether than Air Defense.
It will be a disaster if we do not build it, for a new version of the f15 will not stand up to the latest (and planned) MIGS. The UAVs will not be up to this challenge for quite sometime: It will be decades before UAV. are the mainstay of air power.
And the f22′s strategic role has not gone away, BTW. they are still required there.
With only 180 or so we run the risk of going the way of the UK.
We have the platform we need, we need to build it in useful numbers. To do otherwise is just ridiculous. The democrats in congress have all the facts btw, they just want a weaker nation.
The only sure way to prepare for the next war, or at least for its opening phase, is to be the one that starts it.
So we’re necessarily in “reactive” mode, trying to be prepared for anything.
Old Snake Eater and Cannoneer #4,
Great points! We apparently use the same sources (D-N-I, SWJ).
By the way, Canoneer, I commented on your comments in an earlier Belmont post “Now This Means War….Against Islam?”. Both of Wretchard’s posts indicate to me that O, O and D are done and A is under way in this particular loop. As Old Snake Eater mentioned, the Military leadership issues still need work. I hope and believe the “Be’ers” are being overcome by the “Doers” a’la Boyd.
Ruby/Teresita, Dang! That was a good one #36. Not a bad piece of strategic thought!
Salaam eleikum All Y’all!
i dunno RWE – those seem like reasonable costs to impose, aside perhaps from relying on china. but it seems to me that the Georgian Demonstration was designed to show that there is a lot of -
well, it remains to be seen what the Georgian provocation accomplished, doesn’t it. if it only establishes problematic sway over two little provinces – oil corridor or no – then the result would seem actually to be a unifying of anti-Russian forces, rather than a demonstration of weakenss. we’ll have to see if russia takes crimea or even ukraine or not. i think we’re going to see some serious uptick in iraq/paki terror/somali-yemeni piracy as obama steps into place…
Mongoose #11,
A good illustration is a comparison between USMC and US Army and USAF regarding the F-22. USMC consistently does more with less. They fly Vietnam vintage Huey Cobras upgraded over time. Rumour has it they are as good or even better than the Army Apache. More likely it is how they are used. I quote COL John Boyd, “People, Ideas, Hardware, in that order”. This is from an Air Force COL the USMC listened to much more than the USAF. And….. it was the USMC who had the solution to the Iraq problem all along. Thank Allah a US Army General named Petreaus had the power and understanding to make the right moves because a USMC General named Mattis showed him the way.
Please forgive me for oversimplifying for brevity.
IMHO, F-22 is not a good investment, simply not enough bang for the buck. F-35 is a better buy considering the three versions of the airframe.
USAF is always overpriced since the ’60s. Look at their bases, freeking resorts! Sorry Wade.
Salaam eleikum Y’all!
36. Ruby:
Dan: how can we prevent countries from actually employing force – a la Russia v. Georgia?
By making it cost Russia more rubles to employ force in Georgia than they obtain by looting it The first thing we do is tear up any contracts we have with them (like the recent megamillion dollar deal to ferry our astronauts to the ISS).
………
“Mega” sounds like a lot. However, “million” is not so much.
There will be a period when the US will not have its own shuttle fleet in operation.
Likely the thinking is that it would be cheaper to use the fleet than to design, build and fly a series of one shot cabins on a missle like they had in the 1960′s.
This may not be true. But I’ve never heard anything to the contrary. Certainly megamillion is less than 1 billion.
This civilization fails if it does not also provide for the next great age of space travel. Here’s my post today on how to think of the current age in terms of fundamentals like power and water
Marzouq,
“They fly Vietnam vintage Huey Cobras upgraded over time.”
Not a good analaogy in a couple of areas:
The SuperCobra is so far removed from the “Vietnam vintage” Cobra it can’t be considered the same aircraft. Helicopters are also less susceptible to the stress that the G-forces and landings put on fighter/attack aircraft, thus it is more likely that the airframes can have a longer service life.
I don’t know much, but I do know this…
Politicians are critical in this equation. IW is not equipment-centric. Thus, Senator Foghorn Leghorn cannot long tolerate IW because it affords less opportunity to bring pork back home in the form of platform manufacturing. In my opinion, that is the largest “institutional” hurdle in the whole process.
We will maintain a more than semi-conventional focus because no politician could afford the unemployment increases that go with serious change.
We seem to have two Armies: One Army of true soldiers moving mountains to win wars, while the other Army does everything possible to break the machine while playing soldier. — Michael Yon
“I’d like to have two Armies — one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little Soldiers, staffs, distinguished and doddering Generals and dear little regimental officers, who would be deeply concerned over their General’s bowel movements or their Colonel’s piles; an Army that would be shown for a modest fee on every fairground in the country.”
“The other would be the REAL ONE, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflage uniforms, who would not be put on display but from whom impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That’s the Army in which I should like to fight.” Jean Larteguy
I rarely look at DNI, Marzouk. Check SWJ every day. Glad you like CIIDG. Stop by and join the conversation over there.
Guest Blogger: Jon – The Bridge
When the convey got to the road to Ghormache we learned that the village elders were the ones escorting it. We know that these are known Taliban elders, and could not believe that their own militia were the bridge’s security. These might have been some of the same guys we fought against a few days ago.
. . . whoever came up with the idea of the enemy escorting the equipment for the bridge connecting the 207th to the 209th Corps areas of operation didn’t think this one through! It was a bridge that was supposed to connect people and promote a stronger Afghanistan; however the enemy took complete credit for it locally. Sure you can say that ISAF took credit, but the people of Bala Murghab saw the elders bring the bridge. So what does that look like, and what do you think that looks like to the locals….come on people.
Cannoneer/snake-eater,
I respectfully disagree with you on a few points, brothers:
Afghan forces accompany SOF on virtually all operations, I think it takes God himself to allow unilateral US-only offensive combat OPS at this point. The difference is that the AFGHANs accompanying SOF are now military (often Commandos, which I will talk about later), or police forces, NOT militias.
The Afghan militias employed by US were disbanded, with the intent of establishing a standing Army as an institution. Many of the militia serve now as ASF, Afghan Security Forces, and perform defensive guard and convoy security missions; other s have joined the Army. Sooner or later, US forces will leave or draw down, so the move made sense, there has been no real lapse in capability because of it.
Speaking of foreign internal defense, I believe around 2006 the US helped the Afghan establish a commando training center, and started training a multiple battalion commando unit. THey trained Cadre first, then assisted the cadre as the cadre started training the battalions.
As battalions were trained, SOF partnered with the commandos as they moved into their operational areas.
That is proof positive that the Foreign Internal Defense mission is still alive and well, and still practiced by many with the SF Community.
Additionally, Foreign Internal Defense missions continue unabated around the world, mostly under the radar thorughout other areas in the world, like Asia and SOuth America, with little fanfare. This is the way it is supposed to be.
Take a ride to Fort Bragg, Lewis, or Carson, (or Campbell, I forgot about that place!) and see what the fellas with the green hats are up to (not elves!). Sure, a lot of them are deploying into CENTCOM and kicking doors down and stuff (but see my fid comments above), but many of the other guys are going into their traditional AORs and doing Foreign Internal Defense. Most units do a tour in combat, come back, refit, and then head out to do a FID mission somewhere.
FYI I also wrote about this subject here, albeit not as eloquently as Mr. Fernandez.
“USAF is always overpriced since the ’60s. Look at their bases, freeking resorts! Sorry Wade.”
You assume I disagree? About equipment, they’re still fighting the last war, but not being able to stay on station and watch limits their effectiveness, and can be a danger to troops on the ground, even in a fairly conventional fight, like the one described in “Roughneck nine-one” by Frank Antenori. Decreasing the cost of intelligent weapons and increasing the staying power of air craft is already having an effect on the utility of the large armored vehicle. Finding ways to insert boots and control the battle space will require more looks and more support. I am not convinced the overpriced army weapons, still a bargain, are a replacement for a horrendously priced Air Force in all areas of need, but I sure thank the powers that be for the make up of the men who can find ways to make do.
The problem I see with this is a disconnect between theory and reality. In theory we gain by motivating the whole army to join in the low intensity conflicts that will grind on. In reality what we do is defund all the heavy weapons systems so that we can add another two divisions of bodies while still cutting the budget. Real SOF troops are expensive. They take an enormous investment in selection, training and equipping to do their job and they are worth every penny. When Rumsfeld cancelled the artillery systems to fund his transformation I feared this would happen.
We need sufficient equipped conventional heavy forces to confront simultaneous moves in two theaters, regardless of what other threats emerge. If these forces deter any conventional conflict with China or Korea or Russia that is a good thing. They are worth keeping even if they never fire a shot in anger.
Given the realities of Congress and Obama’s supporters I expect that the large low intensity army will turn out to be a 3rd world jobs program of unskilled and untrained and under equipped forces, a TSA with guns. Much money will go to support schemes tied to favored insiders, like the crackpots that Waugh wrote about. The real professionals will feel increasingly isolated.
Eggplant: Who gave Obama the 3/4 of a billion dollars that bought his election? Who is the puppet master behind the curtain?
It occured to me in 2000 that we don’t really pick our Presidents. What was Bush’s qualifications to be Commander-in-Chief anyway? No, we pick brands. There’s the Elephant Brand and the Jackass Brand. The ideologically-driven inaction of the Elephant Brand from 1929-1933 led to the ideologically-driven interventionism of the Jackass Brand from 1933-1953 and from 1961-1969 with a brief flirtation with the Jackass-Elephant hybrid of Brand Ike from 1953-1961. Then Tricky Dicky gave us Watergate, which led to the biggest Jackass of all, Carter, which in turn led to an long-term Elephant resurgence. Even the Clintoon years were elephantine. Unfortunately, by 2000 this resulted in the makers of the Elephant Brand thinking they could throw someone with no competence whatsoever out there as the Brand Mascot, and people would overlook his deer-in-headlights look when 9-11 hit and Katrina and the 2008 market meltdown. They would stand by their man out of sheer brand loyalty. Now it’s clear that even brand names don’t help when you deliver stinkers like New Coke or Windows Vista or the Ford Pinto.
Ruby,
I recommend you stop looking for the riddles hidden in puzzles wrapped in enigmas, stuff just happens.
You’re uber off-subject by the way.
@Bob W,
Our host often, but not always, offers two threads. One is usually focused on matters of international security and policy and the other is either theoretical or a matter of domestic policy, often US focused. The Belmont Club is not the cheap white wine of blogs.
LifeOf the,
OK, I think; if that means we can go a bit off subject, then let me remind everyone here that today is href=http://acreofindependence.com/2008/12/05/interlude-end-of-prohibition-cavemen-the-sounds/>repeal day, the 75th anniversary of the end of prohibition.
I have been celebrating the little bit f freedom we gained on 5 December 1933 in the most appropriate manner possible. The bottle is empty, my friends. . .
See, I am celebrating, can’t even put in an HTML link at this point, goodnight all. . .
Policing Afghanistan
#70 is worth your time. Hazara ANP with Canadian PMT take on Pashtun Taliban.
Taliban is 90-95% Pashtun. Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks are fairly peaceful.
During the Taliban ascendancy, Muhammad Khan and all his men lived in Iran, as refugees. Khan himself has spent twenty years there—most of his life—and he speaks with a slight Iranian accent. Having been treated poorly as refugees, these Hazaras have no lingering fondness for Iran, but they have benefitted from the country’s superior educational standards. This, together with their determination to reëstablish themselves in what some Hazaras regard as their ancestral homeland, makes them effective janissaries for NATO.
The idea of irregular warfare was a very popular cutting-edge idea, in 1961. John F. Kennedy promoted special forces. Is this idea of perpetual warfare really “Back to the Future”?
Special forces are important and they should have good solid institutional memory. Still, a military that is built around fighting tribal militias won’t necessarily fight well against a solid conventional military, and vice versa. The American military should be built around redundancy and maintaining the highest practical number of capabilities.
When one doesn’t know what kind of enemy one will face in the future, it is best to keep one’s options open. The very existence of the enemies we presently have closes our options because we are then forced to tailor our military strategy to defeating the enemies we have, as opposed to defeating the enemies some people wish we had.
Al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers can be defeated. The war against them will not last forever. So, while it may be wise to focus attention on defeating an enemy we have not defeated yet, we need to be prepared for a future where the Islamists who are still alive are on their knees and begging for our mercy.
@Alexis #72; No particular disagreements
especially as pertains to the need for multiple capabilities.
However, as I read history, the guerilla-oriented force has an easier time adapting to conventional warfare needs than the conventional force has in meeting unconventional needs. So if I can’t have a perfectly balanced force, I think the tilt should be towards the irregular.
Likewise, it seems to me that the lean force has a relatively easy time adding muscle (Pershing in WWI). The over-equipped force finds it next to impossible to shed the useless (Westmoreland in VN.)
Finally, I’ve no complaints about Rumsfields’
“light footprint”. Very seldom that mass trumps economy of force. What I think would have been disastrous was General Shineskis’ call for 300,000 to 400,000 men in Iraq. Pre-Petraeus and his adaptations, that would just have given terrorists a “target-rich environment” and made a big enough mess to render victory impossible.
“They should have good solid institutional memory,” late in our the efforts in Iraq a WWII manual describing the cultural do’s and don’t do’s of Iraq was “remembered”, it was one of those things not, till then, found on the WWW.
“When one doesn’t know what kind of enemy one will face in the future, it is best to keep one’s options open.”…,
Interview with a Former Terrorist: Nasir Abbas’ Deradicalization Work in Indonesia
…,and knowing the psychological make up of terrorists helps determine and predict the options.
Excellent points Alexis.
Dave: Finally, I’ve no complaints about Rumsfields’
“light footprint”. Very seldom that mass trumps economy of force. What I think would have been disastrous was General Shineskis’ call for 300,000 to 400,000 men in Iraq. Pre-Petraeus and his adaptations, that would just have given terrorists a “target-rich environment” and made a big enough mess to render victory impossible.
I disagree. Didn’t the “Surge” roll up Al Qaeda in Iraq and more or less get us to Mission Accomplished? That was only 30,000 more troops. Imagine what 300,000 more troops would have done in a super surge. The war would have wrapped up in 2006 in time for the mid-term elections that bit the GOP on the ass.
Ruby: That assumption relies on having 300,000 troops to insert in 2003…not 2006. Doubling the number of troops in 2006 would not have had the same effect as the few that were put in, because CI requires the participation of the local indigenous population, you know the folks who live there. To give a damn they have to do at least some of the heavy lifting while undergoing OJT. 300,000 screams occupation not liberation and target rich would not describe the reaction of Iraqi’s and Iranian’s and Turks and Syrians and and and. It is a large part of the excuse what caused Bin Laddie to get his panties in a wad to begin with. Turkey shoot more like. Our guys are worth more than to abuse them in such a manner.
And other than CI, rebuilding was supposed to be the forte of the NGO and DoS. It is the reality of Iraq that had made it a function of the Marines.
isn’t there something… like, late imperial british about this theory? i can’t remember details, but i remember something about the british army getting badly mauled because they’d been fighting boer wars and afghan wars for too long when World War 1 rolled around.
@Dan #77; See if you can find a book called
“Social History of the Machine Gun”.
It more or less describes how and why all of the European powers took leave of their senses at one time.
In case of the Brits, they stopped imitating
George Washington and reverted to wearing red coats and marching in a straight line.
It would seem that they wilfully abandoned
squad tactic lessons learned elsewhere and paid a terrible price.
@Ruby #75: Your theory would be valid
if you were talking six to eight Million troops.
In other words, enough to simply smother any and all opposing elements.
That is a valid way of calming things down when the proper saturation levels can be achieved. However,achieving such levels requires a very compact geographic area coupled with no more than moderate population density. (Dublin, Easter 1916 might be a good example.) Trying it on an Iraq-sized problem would appear to be out of the question.
I completely disagree with the “light footprint” concept as it played out in Iraq. Yes, with improper strategy it could have resulted in a “turkey shoot” environment; but the fact of the matter is that the very concept that drove “light footprint” thinking completely missed the point.
When you topple a government, you create a vacuum. Nature and politics abhor a vacuum, and the result was first chaos and then local, regional, national and international strongmen (armed militias.) The real reason we needed 300,000 troops in Iraq was to provide the interim security; to be the government in the absence of Iraqi governance. We totally missed that point. The riots and looting began immediately instead of declaring martial law and controlling the neighborhoods for their own safety. That was just the beginning, but it was a harbinger of an insurgency that degraded into a civil war combined with an insurgency.
The deployment of 300,000 troops would have included this foresight, which was lacking. This foresight would have prevented a turkey shoot, as the results of surge-type social response would have enabled budding organizations to be broken up as criminal elements before they gained tactical legitimacy. Tactical legitimacy and the ability to provide a credible threat on the unconventional battlefield, along with the ability to dominate the population through intimidation, create legitimate insurgents.
Our conventional mindset brought us to the brink of failure and helped destroy public support for the Iraq Campaign in the GWOT.
The recognition at the highest level that the IW environment is not going to go away soon is heartening. It is true that, like admirals fought the submarine, generals will provide resistance to the new. Until the Army begins to predicate preference for officer promotions on proficiency in IW doctrine and practice, this resistance will hold sway. You have to reward productive behavior, just as capitalism rewards productive companies. That’s human nature.
The Special Forces are the most overtasked soldiers in this war. Six months in, six months out (sometimes,) they are in action in many more countries than our conventional forces are engaged. SOF have been underutilized as cadre/trainers for conventional forces engaged in IW, but how was an Army to use them while they are so overcommitted. Those guys deploy a lot.
Add to that the internal enmity between conventional officers and SOF and there you have the breakdown in knowledge transfer.
So, with poor internal knowledge transfer and high-level resistance to adaptation to the current battlefield, it took us five years after intitial employment in Afghanistan to publish doctrine. What the hell, over?
At least the new directive sets IW on the level of legitimacy on the institutional level. Yes, there will be resistance, but it provides hope. Soldiers are smart enough to be trained in using their warrior skills in different environments, but they must be trained. This directive provides general guidance that IW (and its child, counterinsurgency) will be trained to the lower leader levels, where it is actually implemented (“Strategic Corporal, Strategic Captain.)
This directive provides hope.
Well, Fred2 already said it way up top – I’m the public, and I’m not ready for it. Wretchard seems to see this as a glass half-full, I’m not so sure. I prefer the way Clint Eastwood says it on the trailer for the new movie Gran Torino, “I finish things, that’s what I do.”
If you want to see a situation like Afghanistan “finished,” trust me; IW proficiency is the way to go. Also trust me on this; Afghanistan will not be the end of this. Like a light flipped on in a low-rent kitchen, the cockroaches run for the dark corners.
We will have to deal with those dark corners, too. For now, the light is flickering in Afghanistan’s kitchen.
Forget about bug-bombing the house. We (as a society) just don’t do that.
Our Army is smart enough to make the shift without losing the conventional capability. War fighting is war fighting… but we’ve been boxers for a long time. Now it is time to learn juijitsu as well. The conversion is akin to a boxer making the shift to MMA… the way that the Army has already shifted from traditional hand-to-hand to “combatives,” contracting with the Millitage MMA group to be able to do ground fighting as well as striking.
That’s a pretty good analogy in my mind. Just because you have become proficient at juijitsu doesn’t mean you have to forget how to punch.
What the public isn’t ready for is losing. Ever. The difference is, the public can turn their back and blame the military. We in the military can try, but in the final analysis there is no one to blame but ourselves. Your (the public’s) safety and security sway in the balance.
Oh, by the way… ever seen a straight-up striker fight a guy like Royce Gracie? He submitted them every time. We are fighting a submission fighter who has no recourse than to use juijitsu. We must learn how to fight his fight and win.
Right now, it’s hit-and-miss with our ability to do this well. It varies from commander to commander. This new directive makes no bones about the requirement to be able to contend with the juijitsu fighters.
That “small footprint” worked extraordinarily well, no? We won the war in under 30 days. The new task of “winning the peace” – “nation-building” didn’t used to be the job of the military, whose job is to break things, etc. It used to be the job of DoS and NGOs.
For those of you who wished we had put 300,000+ troops in Iraq, speculate on the causualty count we might have suffered, compared to what we actually suffered. In today’s conflicts, we use 10X troops in support for every shooter.
Given the ROE employed until the surge, it’s a wonder we didn’t suffer far more losses among the support forces.
By far the largest failure was by the IW JOC’s definition in the area of shaping, occurring prior to hostilities. Whether we employed 30K, 300K or three million soldiers nothing could recoup the ground lost by lack of preparation. That prep being the bailiwick of CIA and DoS in conjunction with the military. We seemed to be out of joint, instead of performing a joint operation. Like the navy, the military ought to consider that they own the conventional battle field,at least in the neat term, and so determine how best to utilize the many aspects of IW to support the desired goal. Just the exercies of thinking this way alone forces a whole other reason for operating in certain areas beyond just breaking stuff and blowing stuff up.
Old Blue,
“Our Army is smart enough to make the shift without losing the conventional capability. War fighting is war fighting”
That hasn’t been the case in the past. Forgot the lessons from Vietnam, for instance. There needs to be a cultural shift in the military where being SF isn’t as much a limiting career factor. Hopefully Petraeus is the start of that.
I never was SF, but I remember when SF wasn’t a branch. It was a specialty that career soldiers moved in and out of, and the whole Army was sprinkled with people doing assignments in their basic branch in between SF gigs, or guys who were profiled out of jump status. Making SF a branch was a mistake IMO. IW, FID and UW expertise became ghettoized in the SF ‘hood instead of dispersed amongst little pockets of competency throughout Big Army.
Our civil society is not prepared for continuous warfare, as Insufficiently Sensitive mentioned in #41.
There have been numerous threads at The Volokh Conspiracy (popular law blog) where a number of people simply deny that a state of war does or should exist except between nation states.
The result is that many of the left and MSM in the US will wage propaganda and lawfare against the actions necessary to carry out the concept of continuous warfare. Some are already planning on attempting to prosecute Bush administration officials (ICC, US Federal Court, local courts).
The Pentagon needs to figure out how to deal with all of this, and the Congress needs to help (fat chance). Otherwise we will again be hobbled in our ability to fight unconventional war.
geoffgo: No.
We won conventional engagements in under 30 days. That obviously was not the war. The war has drawn on to this day and is still not over. It could be very successfully argued that the “small footprint” did not work at all and in fact was a complete disservice to the national interests of the United States.
It could be argued that the reason for the “small footprint” was to demonstrate the overwhelming conventional capability of the United States military to the rest of the world.
The rest of the world, duly impressed with the conventional capabilities of the United States, also learned a very important lesson; don’t fight us conventionally. Prepare for an insurgency, let the conventional forces breeze through and then attack as an insurgent and the US forces have no coherent response to it. Insurgents only choose insurgency because they have no hope of conventional victory.
Basically, we were showing off, and never properly considered how Iraq was going to be governed following the close of conventional operations. The “small footprint” was adequate only for the conventional operations and insufficient for the follow-on stability operations. We were caught showboating.
The Iraqi populace paid a far higher price than we did for this narcissistic pride and failure in foresight. Any initial relief on the part of the average Iraqi to the removal of Saddam’s weight from his back quickly dissipated in the resulting chaos. Many Iraqis expressed disbelief at the lack of American control of the situation and the largescale lack of security in the neighborhoods. This failure to provide for the security of the civilian populace put us immediately behind the power curve of the insurgency. Once you have failed the populace in the security sector, you cannot win -period- until that security is established/restored.
The simple fact that it took us years to provide local security to large portions of the population does not leave the Iraqis who suffered from this with a positive impression of American might. The rest of the world is also impressed with how much trouble a relatively weak enemy using IW can cause our overwhelmingly powerful conventional Army. We took a bloody nose from the little guy in front of the world on the Iraqi stage.
No. The “small footprint” did not work extraoardinarily well and was in fact the very symbol of the failure in leadership to perceive the course of events following the decapitation of the Iraqi government. It was, in fact, nearly disastrous.
Our failure to provide effective development in Afghanistan is a failure in the same vein, but with very different particulars. However, both difficulties stem from a basic failure to develop a consitstently proficient IW capability by the “main force” Army.
I did not read this into the document. I believe what was intended was that “steady state” referred to the predominate nature of a conflict, not an ongoing state of our nation being at war, regardless of campaigns. This is contrasted with “surge operations,” those operations being a short-term heightened level of a type of activity and manpower.
That was my reading of it.
The reason it took so long to establish security in Iraq is not because we had too few boots on the ground. It took so long because nobody had the balls to utterly subjugate Iraq and crush their will to resist. Woe to the vanquished never was our motto. We treated the Iraqis as victims worthy of compassion instead of enemies complicit by either commission or omission in Saddam’s crimes.
That bloody nose we supposedly took from the little guy in front of the world on the Iraqi stage is propaganda. It has taken them 5 and a half years to kill 4209 out of 305,826,141.
Well Old Blue, I guess you and I will just have to agree to disagree. In the most unlikely event that I have the say, economy of force will probably be “first among equals” in principles to be followed.
Much rather have “Old Jack” running things than “Tardy George”.
@John Moore #88: Good point you raise.
Since when is it necessary to have consenting governments in order to have war?
“War is the health of the state” is a popular phrase among certain anti-war types.
True enough. And heart disease is the health of the cardiologist.
The state, as it has evolved in western culture, was created to deal with the existing fact of war. To say that it created war or that war cannot exist without it is assinine.
The inescapable fact of the matter is that those things that enable human survival, (volition, culture, population density) guarantee that there will be war. And that it will NOT happen like folks think it will or want it to.
Anarcho-warmongering along with anarcho-imperialism is the only way to go.
The bloody nose we took was from the most powerful army in the world jumping through its ass to develop IED protected vehicles and taking 5 and half years to stabilize a country that we held outright at the end of the conventional operations. We were, briefly, the undisputed master of that domain.
Very shortly thereafter an American couldn’t walk down the street or drive down an MSR without fear of being blown up. We had no clue how to really get a grip back on the situation and we weren’t fooling anyone by claiming, “I got it, I got it.”
We looked like a rookie fireman by himself with a four inch hose.
That’s a bloody nose on the world stage, administered by a bunch of guys with no armor, no heavy artillery, no attack helicopters, no airborne. Just rags, AK’s, a few radios and a bunch of UXO. Dude, that’s uncool. It ranks up there with picking your nose at a stop light during rush hour.
Regardless of whether or not the Iraqi public was complicit or subjugated, if the end result didn’t matter, why did we not immediately leave upon the capture of Saddam Hussein? When a terrier goes down a rat hole and catches the rat, he doesn’t hang out to organize the cockroaches; he takes the rat and leaves.
The Russians are and always have been a great example that woe to the vanquished does not work as public policy. The last people that worked for got a command and carried it out; everything that had a penis had to die. Man, child, infant and animal.
You think the Democrats think they have a case right now? I think the freakin Hague would have a problem with that. The entire administration would wind up with Serbian cellmates.
No, we effed it up. Never saw the insurgency coming. We were parading around like a bunch of Kansas City ****** with one hand tied behind our backs shouting, “Look what I can do!”
“Oh, yeah?” says Achmed, “Well, lookie what I can do.” >BOOM<
“Oh, sh*t! My humvee has soft sides! Nobody told me that you’d be trying to blow me up!”
Sheesh. We never saw it coming, never planned for it. We just thought that we could park a few tanks around Baghdad and everyone would behave like there were actual cops on the street. There weren’t, of course, becuase we had fired them all. Told the entire government to take the rest of the decade off. Yes, we expected… what?… that the sheer awe of our conventional prowess would provide good governance?
Finger in the nose at the stoplight; everyone’s looking. Up to the second knuckle and wriggling like a pole dancer. Un.Freakin.Cool.
The only reason that anything positive happened was American soldiers can be handed a malodorous bucket of sh*t and find a way to make it a container of highly concentrated fertilizer with the power to make things grow.
Tongue in cheek a bit, ya know I love ya, C4
“The only reason that anything positive happened was American soldiers can be handed a malodorous bucket of sh*t and find a way to make it a container of highly concentrated fertilizer with the power to make things grow.”–Old Blue
Yer a freakin poet OBwan, a freakin poet.
The trouble with invasions is that they have to be followed by occupations. Those that
come to plunder more or less know what to do
after invading.
Those that invade in order to accomplish more ethical ends will always dance the tarantella uponst their male member figuring out what to do next.
“The First Iraq” was from Feb 1899 to Jul 1902 in the Philippines.
4234 dead. This was from Filipinos armed primarily with bolos. In comparison, we sure ain’t done bad in Iraq.
Here on the homefront, we got two kinds of problems. Those that oppose “foreign adventurism” because they are afraid the American soldier might not come through this time. And those that are afraid that he will.
The former have normal fears. The latter have phobias.
Re: Obama’s financing
H/T Patterco
Obama’s small donor base image is a myth, new study reveals
Old Snake Eater, Canoneer #4, WadeUSAF,
Thank you for your replies. points taken.
Salaam eleikum all Y’all!