Great Prophet
Iran recently concluded the Great Prophet 5 naval exercise which feature swarms of speedboats attacking a corvette sized vessels with 107 mm rockets and machine gun fire. The pictures released showed swarms of small boats battering a hapless and burning target. The message is that this could be a tanker — or a US destroyer — in the Straits of Hormuz. According to Defense Tech “Iranian small boats will operate near shores using geography to mask their presence, use hit and run attacks, will operate in groups and attack ships with limited mobility in congested sea lanes, straits or entering or leaving port.” The tactics are reminiscent of World War 2 PT or “E” boat attacks.
One of the USN’s answers to this problem is the Littoral Combat Ship concept. These ships are very fast multi-modal carriers which carry small boats, helicopters, surveillance packages and whatever else the mission calls for. The payload can be tailored for a specific mission. But presumably one its missions will be to operate in the Persian Gulf, enforcing a blockade and keeping the sea lanes open. Presumably an LCS will be able to surveil, stop and search a great deal of shipping in crowded waters yet be able to defend itself against swarms of speedboats like those showcased in Great Prophet 5, missiles from shore or submarine and mine threats.
That’s a hell of a mission. A naval postgraduate thesis abstract summarized what a Littoral Combat Ship was supposed to do. But it also hinted at the kinds of tradeoffs it would be forced to make. It would have to be ‘expendable’ but capable. It would have to be fast but have a long endurance. It would have to be stealthy yet pack a humongous engine for speed. Those called for so many contradictory design elements that some compromise would be necessary.
The purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is to provide the Navy with an affordable, small, multi-mission ship capable of independent, interdependent, and integrated operations inside the littorals. The LCS will be designed to replace high-value Naval assets when conducting high-end missions such as littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW), and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) as well as low-end missions such as Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), and Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO). To accomplish these missions and successfully counter the enemy’s littoral denial strategy, the Navy has stated that the LCS must incorporate endurance, speed, payload capacity, sea-keeping, shallow-draft, and mission reconfigurability into a small ship design. Constraints in current ship design technology make this desired combination of design characteristics in small ships difficult to realize at any cost. This thesis analyzes the relationship between speed, endurance, and payload to determine the expected displacement of the LCS; determines the impact of speed, displacement, and significant wave height on LCS fuel consumption and endurance; and analyzes the implications of findings on LCS logistics. The Joint Venture high-speed, wave-piercing catamaran is utilized in this thesis as the LCS seaframe to demonstrate the logistical implications of the speed, endurance, and payload tradeoffs with respect to the modular design of the ship. The weight and space requirement of each onboard and modular system is determined and added to that of the Joint Venture seaframe. Factors considered for full displacement calculations include the base seaframe, installed weapons systems, command and control systems and sensors, personnel and supply load levels, fuel storage capacity, ordnance load levels, and modular systems (embarked manned and unmanned air and sea vehicles).
The LCS idea grew out of the larger need to distribute naval combat power. Some analysts felt that capability had become too concentrated in a limited number of hulls. When the scarce hull wasn’t there the capability was absent. The suggested solution was to create ‘expendable’ hulls which could distribute hitting power amid more platforms creating more “tactical stability”. Instead of having 3 dozen eggs in one basket, they would have lots more baskets among which eggs could be shared. They would resemble nothing so much as hi-tech versions of pirate ships. A mothership would be a center of a host of networked assets: helicopters, small boats, robotic underwater vehicles and UAVs. The watchword was “distributed offense, distributed defense.”
The result were the two ships of the Freedom and Independence class. They are magnificent vessels. Faster than a PT boat, able to cross oceans, radar evading and able to swap combat packages in and out. They can deploy robotic, missile firing speedboats. With an ASW package, they have by some estimates up to 10 times the capability of a Cold-War era Spruance destroyer. But that very fact has been criticized. By becoming a kind of naval one man band, some feared it became a jack of all trades and master of none. Some sources on the Internet have claimed that by packing so many missions into the LCS concept the Navy has set itself an impossible task. In particular it has been claimed that the ship is too fast to have much endurance and too noisy to hunt submarines. A relatively small ship able to travel at high sea states at 50 knots simply could not have a very large endurance. And why would a mother ship need to do 50 knots anyway? Wasn’t that what helicopters were for? As for hunting quiet diesel electric subs, one writer suggested it could be heard coming a mile away. It was suggested that the USN would be better off with a “diesel electric corvette”, a kind of surface submarine, able to turn the tables on what were essentially quiet moving minefields under the sea.
The threat to modern warships in the littoral is real. The South Korean Cheonan was recently cut in half by a torpedo fired by a diesel electric North Korean submarine, at least according to sources gathered by CNN. The Israeli corvette Hanit was struck and heavily damaged by a C-802 missile off Lebanon in 2006 ten miles off the coast of Beirut. The USS Cole was nearly sunk at a pier by an explosive laden rubber boat. In all cases, fairly capable naval units were ambushed by systems hidden in the littoral.
Both the Freedom and Independence class designs have been criticized as scandalously expensive counters to the cheap speedboats and coastal threats they are ranged against. However, their real value is probably as lead ships of the distributed combat power concept, which they may or may not validate. That can probably be reckoned from what they can see and track which other naval platforms could not otherwise detect. If one of the many LCS’ remote probes in the air, on the sea or under it are even now reading the serial numbers of Iranian missile batteries or tracking Iranian naval units without the mothership itself being within range, then the Navy will know whether or not they have value for money. They are not likely to broadcast the news one way or the other, however. And the public won’t know until actual events shows whether the concept works or not.
embedded by Embedded VideoYouTube Direkt
Tip Jar or Subscribe for $5
A related discussion from national review online live program “Uncommon Knowledge”, conversation between Victor Davis Hanson and John Arquilla, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. Focus of the discussion is “many and small” vs. “few and large” force structure. (the link will give access to all five segments; scroll down to find the link with Arquilla and Hanson, “New Rules of War”).
http://tv.nationalreview.com/uncommonknowledge/
The key concepts in the description are “distributed” and “expendable.” The LCS is designed to be part of a flotilla that serves to replace, at an overall higher cost, a single higher value unit. The classic steam powered naval unit that performed all the functions desired here, projection endurance and the ability to respond to multiple threats, was the independent cruiser. That was shortened to the designation Cruiser. In the Age of Sail the frigate served the same function. Smaller units such as brigantines or corvettes lacked the endurance or firepower for independent operations in distant waters.
One problem faced when comparing naval units over time is that the traditional terms are often reused to describe units with a different function. For example in the US Navy the term Cruiser came to be used for any ship whose primary function was providing (AAW) anti-air warfare defense to a (CVBG) carrier battle group. The cruiser being designated a major combatant is commanded by a (O-6) Captain. In 1975 the US Navy created a large number of cruisers out of thin air by redesignating air defense destroyers. This undoubtedly terrified the Soviets. At the same time all single screw destroyers were redesignated as frigates.
The largest high value units, the ship of the line or battleship or aircraft carrier, are designed to operate in formation and not as independent units. The problem with the high value unit is its value. The battleship or carrier is “to big to fail” so the cruiser was designed to be a cheaper and expendable alternative. Now the cruiser is seen as to valuable to risk and the LCS is proposed as a collection of lower value units to perform the same function.
The question is what if anything are you willing to risk in combat? For the modern navy the model has been the carrier that was of such value that most of the rest of the naval assets are devoted to providing it a layered defense. The only units that could be risked in offensive operations were individual aircraft, usually crewed by junior officers. As we became increasingly unwilling to risk casualties an effort was made to shift to stand off weapons, either airborne or ship launched missiles. When the Navy gave up the A-6 squadrons it lost it’s manned long range land attack capability. The F/A-18 is at best a stop gap until a new attack platform comes on line. The carrier battle group became essentially a vast expensive entity dedicated to protecting itself.
The problem is replicated for the surface navy where the cruiser is seen as to large to expensive to important with a full Captain in command and with to large a crew to risk in offensive operations. The LCS program is an effort to create the swarm of smaller units on the surface that can perform the roles that aircraft do for the CVBG. In a true cruiser, not the dedicated AAW units tied to the CVBG, a single ship would have the endurance to travel thousands of miles, the capacity to store supplies and loiter off a hostile shore, the sensors to detect all threats on above or below the surface, weapons to engage such threats, additional sensors to collect useful intelligence, communications to keep the fleet informed of any threat, a local Commanding Officer capable of exercising independent judgment in responding to an emerging situation, a crew sufficiently large and skilled and equipped with the tools needed to repair damage, and some means of projecting power onto the shore. If the LCS becomes a modularized set of ships each of whom perform part of the role of the (CG) cruiser then the overall cost is increased and the vulnerability of each smaller LCS unit will be greater than that of the more capable CG. As aircraft are dependent on their base the smaller units of the LCS flotilla will be tied to some resupply and maintenance base.
Breaking the large CG into a set of smaller ships can work if it is part of an overall naval expansion program and it is accompanied by a willingness to actually risk the assets created. To truly work the Navy would have to at least triple its overall size, creating more repair ships and supply ships supporting a swarm of small expendable craft under the command of junior officers. Unfortunately the continuing decline in the overall size of the Navy means that will not happen. Every junior officer in the surface navy dreams of taking a PT boat “In Harm’s Way.” We have the men but do we have he willingness to use them?
The advances in airborne drone technology will be matched or surpassed by advances in surface/submarine drones over the next five to ten years. It’s the REAL next phase in naval warfare.
This is a Littoral Combat Ship? What a relief. At first I thought it was a literal combat ship. Do we really want ships that engage in literal combat? Unless you mean “literal” in the sense of “figurative”. In this case a Littoral Combat Ship would engage in figurative combat. It could fight battles in the war against childhood leukemia, for instance. So instead of killing children once they are old enough to hold the gun that some mullah sticks in their hand — the crew could save their lives using remote sensing. Or both. Multitask.
LOTM #2
“The problem is replicated for the surface navy where the cruiser is seen as too large too expensive too important with a full Captain in command and with too large a crew to risk in offensive operations.”
Shades of Jutland? All those years, all that buildup, and the fight to the finish that didn’t happen basically due to the expense?
(Part 1)
I agree with some posters that indicate that air power can be the most effective force against a “speed boat swarm” style of attack. That said, I think we should never under estimate the enemy.
Iran has proven to be a vicious advisory to both Iraq and the USA. Saddam had a difficult time with Iran and some would say the RG Quds acted in the sophisticated Karbala attack in January of 2007 which killed five US soldiers.
Further, Iran has acquired Shkval supercavitating torpedo and apparently the Bladerunner 51 speed boat which could possibly be used as a launch platform for Shkval torpedo. Again, I would not under-estimate Iran’s abilities.
I believe that our helicopter and fixed wing gun ships could destroy a number of speed boats quickly – but exactly how quickly is the question. Worse, the Russians could do their version of the “Lend Lease Act” and loan Iran armed subs and surface ships. I am not optimistic of the situation given the limp response from the Obama Administration.
Below is some information on the swarm attack, the Shkval torpedo, and the interesting information on the highly armed Kursk class of sub that was sunk by a misfired Shkval torpedo:
[Swarm attack and Obama dithering]
“As the Americans, the Israelis and the West dither about whether to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, the chances are growing that Iran may strike first. The endless appeasement efforts by the West vis-à-vis Iran will only embolden Iran to be more bellicose, and this increases the odds of an Iranian first strike. What if the war starts with the launch of 200 Iranian cruise missiles and new high-speed torpedoes at U.S. warships, Saudi oil facilities and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf accompanied by a simultaneous launch of 20,000 missiles and rockets by Hezbollah forces in Lebanon vs. Israeli cities?“
http://stevenmcollins.com/WordPress/?p=1182
[Speedboats and Shkval torpedo]
“Looks like nuclear weapons aren’t the only thing the Iranian government is after. Apparently,they’ve also got a penchant for speedboats, specifically high-tech, very expensive speedboats. Multiple news sources are reporting that the Iranians have surreptitiously acquired a “James Bond-style” fast mover called the Bladerunner 51/Brandstone Challenger. Russian-designed Shkval (Squall supercavitating torpedo) against multibillion-dollar, highly-populated U.S. Navy aircraft carriers…”
See:
http://tinyurl.com/y8ktq6t
(Part 2)
See: Shkval torpedo
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VA-111_Shkval
“…rumors about the Shkval’s startling capabilities, an April 1995 article by David Miller in Jane’s Intelligence Review (“Supercavitation: Going to War in a Bubble”) stated that “Russia has developed an ultrafast underwater missile for which the West has no equivalent. With a speed in excess of 230 miles per hour — several times that of conventional torpedoes — the rocket-powered Shkval is sufficiently swift that it would give a targeted vessel … including another submarine … little chance to evade it. The weapon, which was deployed in the 1970s, is said to be a “straight-shooter” that follows a linear trajectory. Its maximum range is listed at about six nautical miles with a maximum running depth of about 1200 feet.” These are incredible capabilities when compared to anything we have at this time.”
“But what exactly is the Shkval VA-111 and what is its purpose? The Shkval is a sub-killer, particularly if it’s fitted with a tactical nuclear warhead. Some in the West consider this torpedo a “revenge weapon” because any Russian ship that launched a nuclear-tipped Shkval against a target only a few miles away would likely also succumb to the shock wave.”
“Admiral Aleksin is reported in the [NYT] Times article, however, to have said that Russian submarines are sufficiently robust to withstand such a blast. It could be — Russia’s subs are certainly beefier in construction than ours and in many ways superior … those, that is, that are still seaworthy. Other informed sources claim that the missile is in fact an offensive weapon designed to destroy entire aircraft carrier battle groups with a higher-yield nuclear warhead. During a nuclear war, it could even be directed at a port or coastal land target … like New York City, Washington D.C., Boston, L.A., or San Francisco. “As there are no known countermeasures to such a weapon,” states the 1995 Jane’s article, “its deployment could have a significant effect on future maritime operations, both surface and subsurface, and could put Western naval forces at a considerable disadvantage.”
http://www.jerrypournelle.com/reports/jerryp/kursk.html
(Part 3)
Here is some in depth information on Kursh nuclear submarine and associated weapons.
See: The Recovery of the Kursk sunk by misfired Shkval torpedo(PDF)
http://www.largeassociates.com/kurskpaper.pdf
Before Iraq was invaded it was first blockaded, an effort which consumed a very considerable US air and naval resources. Operation Southern Watch implemented the “no fly zones”. The UN Security Council authorized the naval embargos and sanctions. The US carried it out and was roundly condemned. The blockade supposedly resulted in the deaths of “half a million” Iraqi children. UN agencies refused to “administer a program that satisfies the definition of genocide”. Apart from the fact that it shows how the UN is a funny place it also illustrates the fact that a blockade requires putting ships in the littoral.
When President Obama talks about sanctions on Iran, what it basically means is that the USN is going to have to put ships in near contact with Iran to do it. Back in the day one or two warships would stop a merchantman and send over an inspection party or do a vertical insertion. In this swarm-warfare crazy world things have gotten more complicated.
The Iranians showed they could kidnap a boarding party of British sailors. And Great Prophet 5 suggests that with luck, they could do the destroyer too.
If any carriers were involved in these operations they would probably be engaged in providing cover for the smaller warships from distant locations. Nevertheless, they might be exposed to diesel electrics or longer-ranged missiles on occasion. In war, nothing is certain, though politicians like to pretend they are in control.
One way to reduce exposure to own ships is to get all kinds of networked sensor platforms into the area. That way you can detect the bad guys when they’re forming up and keep track of their subs and such. But such platforms need a mothership to recover to for maintenance, fuel, etc. And so you get your LCS. Eventually the LCS itself may become a target. And so you have the carrier. Mutual protection at different ends of the spectrum.
Still a blockade, whether blessed by the UN or not, is inherently a dangerous business. A blockade if resisted (and there’s every chance Irani will resist asymmetrically) may lead to fairly frequent incidents, not all of which may go the USN’s way.
There’s this tendency to think of “sanctions” as inherently peaceful. But a blockade is traditionally an act of war, and the only difference between a blockade and “sanctions” is that a sanction is a UN mandated blockade. In police terms a sanction is going in to look for guns with a badge on. Things can still go wrong.
But even if no blockade were enforced, the USN would still have the task of keeping open the sealanes. And in that situation the Iranians could play the role of the “fleet in being”. A naval threat against tanker traffic would raise the prices of insurance and oil. The USN would have to convoy and as you will probably guess, no safety it can provide will be safe enough for its critics. Either way, force may have to be projected in tight, crowded waterways overlooked every which way by land, and with terrible sonar conditions.
Still people need their gasoline. And everyone knows that gasoline comes from the gas station until the gas staton runs out.
I have not believed CVBGs survivable since the 1970s.
The high-tech, multi-layered defenses MIGHT work in a fleet-to-fleet slugfest. But as soon as a CVBG posed an existential threat to the USSR or the PRC (i.e., by entering the Denmark Strait, etc) the USSR would just nuke the whole thing. Not with a supercavitating undersea superweapon, but with an SS-20 and a hydrogen bomb.
I mean, would a POTUS engaged in equal combat trade New York for a CVBG by retaliating against a Soviet or Chicom city? Of course not.
Would Obama nuke Teheran over a CVBG lost to an IRBM nuke? Don’t be absurd.
It is safe to assume that both sides have learned a lot in the last 7 years. They question is who learned the many lessons better?
The Iranians likely learned the impotence of standing and fighting a conventional war. The Iraqi army that fought them to a standstill for a decade was swept away in a matter of hours from initial contact. I don’t think there is serious risk of anything like a russian lend lease of traditional large naval warships. It is futile, and I think the Iranians are smart enough to know that. Even if the equipment were up to snuff, the training could not be.
So they aim to change the rules of the game. The guerilla war…the question is what exactly is a naval guerilla war look like? I believe that if the US Navy of 1989 sailed into the gulf, they would have serious problems, just like the Army and Marines had a lot of problems adapting to the guerilla war once the conventional was over. But it won’t be the 1989 Navy that goes in. It will be today’s navy, which has been thinking about these issues for years. As well as thinking about what the Iranians might be thinking about.
For example, I would guess if the software on a Phalanx point defense system software could be upgraded to target small boats, their ability to get close would be pretty effectively nuetralized. Much like the Patriots were updated from anti-aircraft to anti missile. So the explosive laden boat doesn’t work anymore. So the Iranians put a torpedo, or missile on it to gain some standoff. But now it is much more expensive than a dingy with a fertilizer bomb. Is it worth it? Or more precisely, do the Iranians think it is worth it? Each side is probably at least 3 if not six steps into response, counter-response. And none of it has been tested in the real world yet. The obvious stuff won’t be the game changer. The thing that makes you go, “now THAT is interesting” has a good chance of a breakthrough. I have a few ideas, but no point in publicizing them.
My guess is that the Iranians know enough to know they don’t know. My guess is that they try almost everything they can think of, and hope something works. Because the way the opponents define success and failure are different. If a couple of supertankers, or a major naval asset are sunk, I think that defines Iranian success. If the battle goes 90% to us and 10% to them…they win. It is like homeland defense versus terrorist bomber. Stopping 19 out of 20 attempts is failure.
My guess is that we have some initial ‘failures’ if the balloon goes up. The combination of multiple untested layers of response and counter creates what amounts to a chaotic system. If they test it enough times, something unexpected is likely to come about. Something likely bad for us.
However, I don’t think that is really the measure of success. Just like the early IEDs which did so much damage. If we are willing (key metric alert) to bear some casualties and stay committed to the objective, the rules change. The early IEDs hurt us badly, but our leadership was committed, and our military adapted and overcame. Those that did so much damage to us were killed or otherwise largely nuetralized. The question is not whether the Iranians can sink a few ships. They probably can, and will. The question is whether we can deliver so much punishment to their necessary facilities that it can be kept to only a few ships. Whether we can figure out what was necessary for what worked for them, and deny it. As an incorrect example (this won’t be it) if rubber dingies prove effective…how effective are we (helicopter gunship? fast mover? UAV?) at scouring their shorelines keeping it under surveillance and destroying them before they make it off the beach? If large speed boats are effective, how quickly can they, and all facilities to make more, be destroyed? I think the answer will be non-obvious, because I think the thing that makes a difference will be subtle. The swarms of speedboats are a distraction. What makes a difference will be small, inconspicuous, and ‘under the radar.’ The torpedo equivalent of a UAV.
What will determine success is the will to success. That worries me greatly.
If I was going to engage a swarm of inbound speedboats I would not do it with any current naval weapons but with the US Army’s MRLS. 18 mile range, with the normal warhead fit in each rocket 844 bomblets. Ripple off 9 of those suckers and throw up a steel wall at the point where they will be. It’s already developed and you could fit one on just about any ship – probably even a WWII Elco PT Boat.
WWII PT Boats were not effective because they were not really fast enough to dart in and hit ships that will be pushing 30 Kts anyway and not fast enough for their speed to replace armor. If you can stop a TBD or Kate or even a Swordfish torpedo bomber a PT boat looks pretty simple. Most PT boats ended up becoming miniature gunboats.
Now, do it stealthy, using, say, the Lockheed Sea Shadow, and you might have a chance.
A quick look at wikipedia confirmed that the Phalanx to surface target upgrade was already made in Block 1B.
“The result were the two ships of the Freedom and Independence class. They are magnificent vessels.”
For an informed contrary opinion, peruse
http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/search/label/LCS
A shallow draft craft capable of 50 knots in high sea states that was designed for modular, mission oriented payloads will have a long an illustrious career. It solves the problems of ships designed in the ballistic artillery age and having to be laboriously converted into missile launchers. The payloads are changing very quickly now, whether weapon systems or next gen robotic vehicles, it is not the LCS itself that is so intimidating, it is what it is bringing with it, when it opens its belly to the enemy, all hell will follow.
The Iranians can concentrate their naval prioties on
developing a green water high speed offensive force.
They can equalize us in theater because we also have to
allocate resources to our blue water fleets in multiple
theaters .
John Batchelor discussed this at length on his Monday
night show ;mostly concentrating on the rapid
development of the Chinese navy . The strategy is to
neutralize the air power by making it too risky to bring
the platforms for launching too close to the fight.
Re Daedalus comments regarding Phalanx, and RWE’s comments regarding MRLS: where are the guns on this ship? Just one gun on the front, and some small machine guns on the sides? A WW2 light cruiser was equipped with 8″ main guns, many 5″ guns, and many 40mm and 20mm guns which, to me, would seem a far better defense against a swarm of small boats.
WRT the Iranians’ view of “victory”. They take–their population and their expendable military–a horrible pounding. We lose a cruiser. They think they win.
So?
Point is, what did they win besides satisfaction and bragging rights?
We think we won. Ditto question.
The real issue is what capabilities remain to the actors which are relevant and useful to future plans.
The problem is, however, that the prediction of victory by their definition, if the Iranians are willing to take the hits, might encourage them to start something. Finishing it will be expensive, whether or not they end up winning in any sense of the word.
The problem is with US will.
Is it going to be like a boxer hitting his opponent’s forearms when the opponent throws a punch?
Will we take out their military-industrial principle, or only some of their annual interest?
Obama is president.
Isn’t this just the next stage in a contest that has been going on for as long as humanity? The contest between attack & defence.
The response to the efficacy of the sword was the survivable armored knight. The response to the armored knight was the development of more capable archery — the stand-off weapon with which the Mongols destroyed the flower of European chivalry. Similarly the development of the castle, which led to the development of the siege gun.
The difficulty for the Iranians with swarm boat attacks (which do sound like an almost unstoppable threat) is – what will the response be? With Obama, the answer is clearly – nothing; so the Iranians face no danger from going ahead & making the swarm attack. But with a more rational commander, the line would be — sinking my aircraft carrier would be treated as a declaration of all out war, with full “make the rubble bounce” nuclear response against every city & hamlet in your domains. Still feel lucky enough to launch the swarm?
The issue today is one of will, not of technology. As long as educated fools insist on “proportional” responses to attack, aggressors will be tempted to see just how much damage they can inflict without triggering a meaningful reaction.
Anyone thinking Obastard will take any retaliatory action against anyone attacking U.S. troops or civilians anywhere is dreaming. He WANTS us hit by our enemies, preferably quite badly. We made a very bad mistake in electing an America-hating traitor as president, and I suspect we’re going to pay even more dearly that we already have for doing so.
I’d like to know how the updated Phalanx would work against a swarm. It traverses and elevates with startling rapidity. Its rate of fire is high, of course. The software reads the target and reads the outgoing projectiles and brings the two together, which is probably less of a problem with a speedboat than a missile. Or not–how about a crossing track as opposed to incoming? Four rounds, half a second to see, another four, half a second to pick another target.
There are Oerlikon 25mm cannon, manually operated, on a number of ships and, being more or less bolted to the deck where there is space, can be added with little trouble. Used to be aimed at aircraft, when they were in 20mm in WW II. You’d think a bit of bird-shooting practice off the fantail would make a speedboat a fun target with the cannon.
I suppose you wouldn’t know until you got, say, two dozen remote controlled speedboats to simulate an attack.
The cannon, such as they are, on these ships, three-inch, or five-inch, have an anti-aircraft capability, which means lead and timing in fire control, and proximity fuses. Ought to work against speedboats as long as the water doesn’t set off the shell prematurely. Fix for that?
The unlamented Sgt. York system put proximity fuses into 40mm rounds, and there is all kinds of sophisticated stuff going into even 20mm.
Can you get shells for those guns with submunitions?
Wretchard, correct me if I am wrong (or I am sure someone else will here) but perhaps the USA is looking at this the wrong way. After all, should not a blockade be the US weapon of choice, not the Iranian. It is Iran that is utterly dependent on its ability to import gasoline and export oil. It can hardly run a modern economy on pistachio nuts and carpet exports.
\
All the US would have to do is bomb Irans refineries, oil storage tanks, electric generators, pipelines and wells. Then mine the ports and coastline, presumably with air-dropped mines. Speedboats will make poor minesweepers, and the minefields could be reinforced by air assets far faster than Iran could sweep them.
Would not Iran try to mine the straits of hormuz in retaliation? Let them. The US can get by quite nicely with oil from other sources, and if necessary pipelines could be laid overland to by-pass the straits – which should be done anyway.
Instead of the US worrying about Iranian swarm attacks, would it not be better for for the US to make Iran worry about a total blockade of its ability to import and export energy, energy without which its economy and armed forces cannot function?
As for the specific arguements for or against the LCS – I would think experience from WWII showed air power was the best way to deal with E-boats and such, Irans speedboat swarms are simply the modern version of that. A-10′s and Spectre gunships are probably the best way to handle the speedboat swarms.
If the Iranians sink a carrier, Obama will surrender. He wants to surrender anyway. So do most Dems. They WANT Gas at $20 a gallon. Which would leave only important people like them with cars and decent lives.
We don’t have many carriers, so I think the Iranians will try and sink one. Its not as if Obama would do anything other than surrender. Heck, Congress under Pelosi and Reid would issue an apology to Iran.
Wretchard, if you’re not following Commander Salamander, I highly recommend the ‘Phib. He’s been sounding the alarm on LCS for years, now. Both designs stink.
Oh, and one thing nobody has mentioned yet… the primary speedboat-popper for LCS was NETFIRES/NLOS-LS. The Army just announced that they will most likely cancel it after the key part (an IR seeker that picks out moving targets after the missile flies to a set of coordinates) failed in testing. I remember back when NETFIRES started, some guy (can’t remember who) argued that we would have been better off spending the $1B+ in R&D on 1,000+ Tomahawk missiles. In retrospect, maybe he was right.
Looking at the situation from the Iranian (attackers) POV, if confronted with one of these ships I would attack with expendable speedboats from multiple vectors but use their sensor inputs to lock in a battery of updated Silkworm shore to surface missiles. The Iranians may not be able to come up with any exocet-class air to surface missiles, but a different opponent certainly could.
Can the LCS survive an attack of this type? Because that’s certainly the most logical course of action for anyone trying to take one out. It seems to me that the LCS may only be survivable if it is equipped with the full AEGIS system, but that may make the ship too large to fill it’s role effectively.
I suspect that the wave of the future will consist of smart, programmable devices that are a combination of a mine, torpedo, and submarine, all relatively small, and support ships and/or submarines to recharge and direct them. Not killer whales, but a school of piranhas, waiting for the trigger action or a command that will cause them to attack the prey.
There has been a dicussion here, and elsewhere too, of an expectation…a premonition…of an impending event that will trigger a cascade sufficient to shift the flow of history in a fundamental way.
The North Koreans probably sank that South Korean naval vessel, but it appears their crime will pass w/o reply. The Iranian radicals are being encouraged by our appeasement at the same time they are being driven by their own apocalyptic, ‘Twelfth Imam’ fantasies. They WANT a war–not so much as a means to address past grievances, but to create the condition precedent for their peculiar version of utopia.
In the Third Conjecture, Wretchard pondered the question of ‘how much would it take?’ for the West to let loose its dogs of war. That calculation, IIRC, was based upon suffering a threshold number of civilian casualties. Might there be other, alternate forms of threshold? A lost corvette doesn’t seem to be sufficient causus belli for the South Koreans and their allies. So what would it take? What about a destroyer? A CGM? A CVAN? Multiple supertankers? Perhaps the key question is, how big of a loss would it take for the American electorate to override its’ rulers’ desperate attempts to maintain an unsustainable status quo?
Lifeofthemind @2:
Wonderful comment. You sum up the history behind the current surface warfare mess very well. I certainly agree with much of what you said, especially the part about the USN surface fleet being largely worthless for attack against an opponent with a real military since the premature retirement of the A-6 Intruder. What a waste and debacle that was, and is! The F-18 and F-18E are very poor substitutes.
I’ll add, that for much of the littoral piracy we’ve encountered for the last four decades, and to support conventional USMC and Army forces, there still isn’t a substitute for our retired battleships, and nothing on the horizon will fill that role adequately either. Don’t tell me about retrofitted boomers with swarms of cruise missiles, at $1.6 million a pop! What a joke. Submerged boomers provide zero “presence” in the mind of terrorist thugs, mullahs, Jihadis, or pirates. Battleships were worth the expense just for the sheer overawing terror they provoked in enemies and potential enemies. They should have been equipped with nuclear power plants and all other systems and structures upgraded for another 50 years of active service.
It seems our Navy and defense contractors have foisted a high tech, poorly armed and protected, very fast, ship with poor endurance and the capabilities of a corvette upon our sailors and taxpayers, but with the price tag of a major combatant.
It seems they’ve created the classic horse designed by committee which we all know results in a camel. Overly large for the task at hand, smelly, foul tempered, uncomfortable, difficult to work with, and unable to carry really heavy loads. They wanted it to accomplish an excessive number of things well, only to see miserable mediocrity in all but one category. The only thing a camel does better than their more conventional alternatives is to survive in the desert. It appears the only thing the LCS does better than more conventional and much less expensive warships of similar capabilities is go fast, for short distances!
Endurance, endurance, endurance, why on earth, in the 21st century, are any of our major naval vessels equipped with anything but nuclear power? Volume and weight of nuclear reactors suitable for running a destroyer or larger sized vessel are not an impediment. In fact, the smaller volume of the reactor and support equipment enables carrying additional personnel, stores, fuel for aircraft or smaller conventionally powered vessels, ammunition, weapons, etc. In addition, during civilian relief activities, a nuclear powered warship of the proper design can pull up to the wharf of an earthquake, hurricane, or attack ravaged city and become the cities primary electrical power plant for several weeks or months of recovery, until shore based electricity is restored.
I’m not a naval strategist by training. I am an experienced targeteer and planner. Based on the published information, I think the LCS as it currently exists, is far more expensive than it should be. It has inadequate weaponry to fulfill any mission that justifies its price tag. What does it do so much better than conventional designs? It doesn’t seem to be particularly well armored or survivable against a wide variety of conventional attacks. Why don’t we just buy an off the shelf shallow draft corvette design from the Germans for example and build it here in the U.S. under license. With the money we save, we could buy another fifty F-22s, which really can justify their price tag with capabilities far exceeding less expensive more conventional designs. That or if it must be spent on the Navy for littoral warfare, bring our battleships out of mothballs and upgrade them to serve for the next 50 years!
The single most effective thing the U.S. Navy can do against the Iranian swarm concept, should significant fighting erupt, is to destroy the infrastructure from whence the “swarm fleet” emerges.
All one has to do in my scenario is define “significant fighting.” The threshold should be low, so that instead of allowing for a protracted campaign of naval skirmishes where the Iranians score some psychological victories, the U.S. chooses to allow one or two incidents and then “you’re out.” Harbors, staging areas, manufactiring sites, weapons depots, etc. Take them all out in a major, multi-sortie air campaign. And I am talking about specifically targeting those assets directly involved in and necessary to Iran’s small-boat fleet, not an all-out bombing campaign of all Iranian military assets.
I have been following Salamander, and had actually bookmarked him some months ago for just such a post but it wouldn’t come up on my bookmarking search … but I remembered enough from his articles to know there were issues, which I recall were fundamentally the low endurance and expense vs vulnerability. Those arguments are in the post and they seem to me the single most damning criticism of the concept. One other criticism is noise. So the fundamental design criticism is that it is overspecified for speed, which it can’t use frequently anyway for lack of endurance.
The other aspect of the LCS which may transcend the limitations or advantages of the hull, whichever way it turns out, are the mission packages. Here I think the risk is much lower. The concept of having all these networked robitic devices I think is a good one. Whether they should be based on a big, expensive, 50 knot hull is perhaps another issue. But you can have the LCS concept’s hull rejected in the end and still end up with the distributed concept surviving somehow.
In a way the problem reflects a lot of the issues featured in the Araquilla/Hanson video which lc sent. Arquilla claims that the Pentagon as a whole always reverts to the Big Band mode; start an operation small and sooner or later they’ll magnify it into a gigantic logistical effort. In the same way you can argue the Navy will take an ‘expendable’ hull concept and make it a multibillion dollar floating starship with the endurance of a sprinter, a reversion to type.
In the end I don’t know enough one way or the other. The key issues it seems to me are: the swarm challenge, the USN response and the philosophical differences between the two. And that if any blockade or incident occurs in the Persian Gulf or similar waters, we are likely to find out what’s what.
The iranians as well as all the other enemies of this Nation are watching South Korea at this time.
The North Koreans have sent a RoK corvette with 40+ crew to the bottom with a well aimed torpedo or mine.
The dialogue there now is, do the South Koreans retaliate big or small and risk war with the NorKs and China over the loss of a small warship and crew?
The answer will determine whether the iranians attack an American warship or not. If the iranians see the RoKs accept the loss with no reprisal out of fear of damaging their economy or fear of starting a larger war then the iranians will believe the American’s won’t retaliate either.
Once the idea of America standing still and not retaliating for a Naval loss becomes entrenched it will be like Mogadishu was for Osama.
Then iran will strike, a ship or ships will die with their crews and America will look weak for not responding forcefully. Obama will negotiate or blockade but it still will be a victory for the iranian regime. I do not see anything but a win/win situation for iran.
It all rest with what the RoKs do about their sunken warship and dead crew.
“Go fast” boats get to throw one punch, on suprise attack, and then it’s over for them. They can’t stay on station, they have to go back somewhere for food, fuel, and rest.
At which point we destroy anything that floats in port.
A sniper, in a helicopter, can stop a “go fast” boat with one Teflon coated round to the engine block from a .50 cal Barrett.
They are easy to track. No one has figured out how to mask wake. I doubt they have much in the way of radar or night vision. Our SOC Mk V (a small craft of far greater sophistocation than anything the Iranian have)can outgun and outfight any of them.
The enemy is always so clever and we are always so dumb (to the analysts).
Just a few thoughts:
The COLE, the HANIT, and the CHEONAN were not at any state of battle readiness. The COLE was conducting replenishment tied up to a dock with no real state of alert. The HANIT did not have her ECM/Chaff/etc. systems on, during active hostilities in a bleeding war zone. The CHEONAN was functionally in transit and not at GQ [if the Captain was asleep in his cabin and trapped there at first by the impact, they were not expecting hostile action].
No, this is not a “No Fair, you hit me when I wasn’t looking!” excuse. It is blame. In all cases, the vessels were in a known dangerous area and were not ready for combat. It is a combination of complacency because nothing has happened to them so far, and a cultural disbelief that bad things could happen to them because they were following SOP.
That latter has several components. One of which is akin to … to put it crudely … what happens in the process of coercive interrogations. The first defense a subject has is the ego, and a belief that no one will really hurt them. You break the solipsist defenses by inflicting some sort of pain. It does not have to be much [a good hard hit will do] but it shatters the first line of psychological defense, pure denial.
In addition there is a organizational cultural template. In the American armed forces, those who are warriors are constantly being hammered by those who are bureaucrats. With the advent of almost instant communications with higher authority, doing something as irrevocable as shooting back without getting prior clearance from TF, Fleet, Theater, JCS, JAG, State, and NCA guarantees an eventual courtmartial, loss of career, and the very high probability that even if you are right you will be made a scapegoat for reasons totally unrelated to reality. I note that the communications process is almost instantaneous, but getting any or all of the above to make a decision and go on record takes almost as long as it took to get orders from the Admiralty to a frigate in the blockading Channel Fleet during the Napoleonic wars.
That leads to an increase in reaction time that means the enemy gets in the first blow with relative impunity. And will continue to do so until there is a change in that culture.
Before the December 7, 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, at about 0630 hrs. the destroyer WARD was on very routine patrol just outside the harbor. This was thousands of miles from where we thought the Japanese fleet was, and in what we could reasonably believe was a very secure area. The WARD detected a Japanese midget submarine trying to follow a towed barge into the harbor. No hesitation. She sank it. And sent the message to Pearl that she had detected, attacked, fired upon [indicating it had been actually seen], depth charged, and sank a hostile submarine in the Defense Zone. The air strike was at 0755 hrs. If anyone in the chain of command was paying attention and willing to make a decision, we could have been on alert.
Conversations later with the officers of the WARD showed that there was the thought that they would be in trouble for doing it [it was peacetime, in our own waters], but they did not let that stop them from reacting immediately to defend the base as was their duty. In these PC days, can we automatically assume that the people commanding the people at the pointy end would react as quickly.
Another factor, which was mentioned, was the nature of the response that would come down from the “Admini-sphere”. When it came for decision at the NCA level, and all of the bureaucratic and political remoras put their two cents in too; how many believe that an order to take action would result? Both tactically and strategically? If accidentally somehow sanctions were in fact declared against Iran; does anyone believe that this regime would actually take any actions to enforce them?
Several decades ago, I had the privilege of examining an 800+ year old Japanese Dai-To, a Japanese long sword of the type referred to in English as a “Samurai sword”. Hand forged old school, because it was bloody old. It is common in sword cultures, east and west, to attribute a spirit or soul to a blade.
Believe me or not, but when I held that beautiful and amazingly keen blade in ready position, I could feel it. It needed the trained strength and will of a Kin-jitsu [Japanese sword fighting] master to impel it; but it wanted to, and was ready to, fight.
But without that will, it was just a beautiful piece of decorative art. The finest weapon in the world is but a bauble absent the physical and moral will to use it when needed.
Our political and cultural “elites” lack the physical and moral will to fight for anything but power over us. THAT will be the most telling factor in dealing with the Iranians.
Subotai Bahadur
The war that Islam is waging against the West is as much a war to destroy our symbols as anything else. We in the West, on the other hand, don’t seem to be much concerned about this. Yes, a few decapitations such as Saddam or Zarkawi serve to demoralize the camp of Islam for a time, but the hydra sprouts new heads nearly as fast as we can decapitate.
Destroy one major ship, through sheer dumb luck or otherwise, and WE begin to question the entire structure of our defenses.
So the Muslims fight against us mainly by attacking our capital symbols, destruction of those symbols is metaphorical death of the West in Muslim minds. The destruction of one major Western or American symbol (USS Cole, Twin Towers, using “United” and “American” Airlines as their missiles, etc) is tantamount total victory for the barbaric camp of Islam. Nevermind the fall of Afghanistan and the Taliban, nevermind the fall of Saddam, nevermind the capture or killing of Bin Laden; the collapse of the Twin Towers in NYC, that amazing “victory” for Islam, will inspire generations of Jihadists to wage genocide against the “infidels”.
We need to neutralize far higher numbers of enemy, and we need to begin to dismantle the symbols of Islam systematically, beginning with the symbols on our soil. Until that begins in earnest, the Jihad will continue perpetually, no matter what we conventionally do to Muslims in the interim. We are not fighting the correct war against them, whereas they are fighting the correct war against us, and moreover, it is our enemy who is defining the terms of battle nearly a decade after 9/11, and three decades after the rise of Khomeini in Iran.
Last — we have done virtually nothing to attack and subvert the ideological epicenters of the Sunni branch of Islam. The distortions continue to dominate in the West, including the notion that Iran is the “leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world ™”. That distinction goes to Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Muslims of the world — for it is they who are waging and funding ongoing Jihad in virtually every theater of Islamic war today. Every patch of dirt which has a Muslim above it is thought of by Muslims as territory claimed for Islam. Until we start removing them, and more importantly their symbols, from above growing numbers of patches of dirt, those efforts by us in this fight with Iran or that fight with AQ in Iraq are transitory and meaningless.
The war games do show iranian speedboats swarming one ship, that’s the plan to capture or damage even kill an American warship. we can bomb all the bases and ports we can hunt down and sink all the boats but we will not be able to stop the iranians from declaring a victory and the current Administration is NOT going to war with iran for any reason.
I would hope the Navy’s gaurd is up and the ROE is sufficent to prevent such an attack. But knowing Political posture from POTUS Obama I’d say as in Korea is as it is in the strait of Hormuz, “stand down, do not escalate situation for any reason” and that about says it all.
The career of the skipper of USS Cole was over instantly. Admiral Kimmel of Pearl Harbor was cashiered.
I hope this generation’s naval officers reads history.
“Damn the satellite communications, smoke them attacking I-ranians.
“Is this POTUS? Sir, you’re breaking up. Can I call you back in 15 minutes.
As others have noted, the key factor involves what our rules of engagement will be.
If spotting a speedboat swarm leaving the Iranian coast results in all the speedboats being strafed by our air assets, followed by a thorough scouring of the Iranian coastline and destruction of anything that even looks like a threat to shipping, and the Iranians know this will happen, then the attack will not be launched.
If the Iranians are confident that they can attack, and we will do nothing effective in response, then shipping will avoid the area upon a simple warning from Iran. Based upon the West’s ineffective treatment of the Somali pirates, the latter scenario is more likely.
As was once said long ago, “There it is.”
#26 Tcobb
“I suspect that the wave of the future will consist of smart, programmable devices that are a combination of a mine, torpedo, and submarine, all relatively small, and support ships and/or submarines to recharge and direct them. Not killer whales, but a school of piranhas, waiting for the trigger action or a command that will cause them to attack the prey.”
You say potato, I say pota-tah.
For all the talk of endurance etc., at some level surface and submarine equivalents of UAV’s and drones will be the level of engagement. Capital ships will always be needed, but they will actually engage less and less.
If they do engage it won’t be directly, it will be as a target of an inexpensive drone piloted from thousands of miles away.
Subotai Bahadur for CiC! What are your plans in 2011-12 sir?
What doth it Prophet a man if he take not the world litorally?
You’ve got to take your hat and doff it
To the guys who ran Great Prophet
Showing itty bitty speedboats sinking ships
Smiling how they would just hide ‘em
And at proper time just ride ‘em
Out from bullrushes that mask the radar blips
If they get one that’s just gravy
But of course the US Navy
Has an answer that the mullahs sure will hate
Little speedboats in the water
Will have need for Pharaoh’s daughter
For the bulrushes won’t save them from their fate
#29 Don Rodrigo
Yes–destroy the infrastructure and everything else falls apart. Its what I have often thought about the idea of going to war with Iran. The notion that we need to invade them with an army is, I think, an outmoded notion. We should think along the lines of a modern equivalent of siege warfare. If you destroyed their ports and electric plants and rendered their transportation networks unusable all you have to do is set back and wait. If they try to bring anything back up knock it back down. Let them know that we will not invade. Until they surrender we’ll just let them starve or freeze to death–and that time is on our side.
Sounds like the wargame Millenium Challenge 2002
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002
In which cruise missiles and small boat swarms were apparently devastating.
The LCS designs are mostly akin to a WW2 DDE, they’re fast, lightly armed screening elements that are also capable as a Special Operations platform. What they are not is a Littoral Combat craft. They’re far too lightly armed and far too large.
By default the LCS-2 USS Independence has 1 57mm cannon, 2 .50 mounts and an 11 cell Evolved SeaRAM AAM system.
In comparison, a l1945-era PT boat had 4 Torpedoes, 1 37mm AT mount forward, 1 40mm Bofors aft, anywhere from 1-4 20mm mounts and 2 twin .50 mounts along with 2 8 cell box rocket launchers and some units also had depth charges and .30 mounts. The far smaller PT boat was clearly far heavier armed than the current LCS designs, despite being a 30-75 ton design compared to the 3000 ton LCS.
Note that the LCS mission modules do not currently add significantly to the armament of the LCS and in no case would add significant direct fire capability (essential for littoral combat use, which is primarily short range).
While PT boats were never successful as an Anti-warship platform, they were very successful in littoral combat and anti-shipping roles.
Don’t get me wrong, the LCS ships are great little ships. But what they really are is a FFH, their primary offensive weapons are the aircraft and/or troops they carry, not the light integral weapons fit. They’re a good replacement for the Perry-class FFG’s and a modern version of the Fast Assault Transports used in WW2 for raiding forces which were converted WW1 destroyers. They’re fast, stealthy and can support & deliver a reasonably-sized force. But against a group of gunboats they’d be chum in the water as they lack the ability to self-protect at close range.
I’m not expert, but it sure sounds to me like what Adam Maas @ 44 says.
These LCS may be great against Somali pirates, they may even be great against Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but it still constitutes a high-value hull compared to fifty jihadis in everything from small cutters to rubber rafts, sporting everything from machine guns to RPGs to Russian anti-ship missiles.
The proper counter is a B-52 raid against either local fishing villages, or Tehran.
Wretchard (9): “Either way, force may have to be projected in tight, crowded waterways overlooked every which way by land, and with terrible sonar conditions. Still people need their gasoline. And everyone knows that gasoline comes from the gas station until the gas station runs out.”
It’s funny how after all these years, and after all the hemming and hahing about it, the United States is still hopelessly dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf. And still nothing is really ever done about it, thus leaving us continually at the mercy of events there. Curious.
Ignominious @46:
I hope you find the following link insightful:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html
As you can see, the top three sources of crude oil imported into the U.S. are: Canada, Mexico, and Nigeria…
This doesn’t take into account that about 40% of our petroleum product consumption needs are met from domestic sources in Alaska, Texas, Louisiana, and offshore.
The U.S. would get by just fine, thank you very much, if the Straights of Hormuz closed. China, India, Japan, and most of Europe would be in deep crap!
Since crude oil is currently a “freely” traded commodity, prices would skyrocket, but we’d still survive in the U.S.
Yes, we need, at a minimum, a new pair of large nuclear reactors in every state. We should encourage local delivery fleets and government motor pools to switch over to natural gas with significant incentives.
“…they lack the ability to self-protect at close range.”
That’s what I wanted to know. Worthless in any real combat operations, in other words.
Re: the supply of oil – it isn’t quite as simple as you put it, AR. We may not be using the oil coming through the Straits, but Europe, Japan, and China are. If it’s cut off, that opens up what could be termed a bidding war on the oil from the sources we have (such as Nigeria) We would probably see oil get in the neighborhood of $500/bbl in that circumstance, and that would quite obviously destroy what’s left of our economy, as well as Europe’s. Since as you say we are only able to produce 40% of what we consume domestically, price controls and any other concievable government mandates will have no possible effect on the price, but they *will* cut the supply even more.
So no, the US would *NOT* be “just fine” if the Straits were closed – our economy would collapse and we would see unemployment go past 20% rather quickly. That could be the endgame for this version of our Government right there. (Texas oil for Texans – why not? Screw those yankees unless they pay!)
The nuclear reactors would be a good idea if it didn’t take 16 years (currently) from groundbreaking to actual power production. Meaning anything you start construction on today isn’t going to generate power before 2026, and our problems are going to get here a lot sooner than that. Oh yes, Government is the primary reason for all those delays, but I don’t see that changing significantly either – at least not until *after* the crisis hits, at which point it will be too late.
“Believe me or not, but when I held that beautiful and amazingly keen blade in ready position, I could feel it. It needed the trained strength and will of a Kin-jitsu [Japanese sword fighting] master to impel it; but it wanted to, and was ready to, fight.”
Subotai,
I believe you. I have never had the pleasure myself, but I have heard those who handle really good swords, both old and new, speak of that phenomenon many times. “It woos you to strike,” as one collector said of a European blade of similar age to the one you speak of.
My thought is, put guns on our ships and use them. We shall not win with missles alone. The “use” part being the most important.
Reference high speed boats with high speed torpedoes.
I was told that the best defense is helos with chain guns and missiles.
I’m thinking those torpedoes when hit would make a pretty big boom.
The only problem is…is you would need a bunch of them and helos have very short range (comparatively).
Since the “picket ships” that protect the carriers might just have one helo if that many, how to get the helos in the fight is the question. The Marines have that answer in their ships. But there are nary enough of them to be sure mate.
Also if you talk to anyone who knows anything about our Navy…well it is not good, not good at all.
Anyway thought I would throw that out.
Papa Ray
#40 Armageddon Rex
What are your plans in 2011-12 sir?
Not a candidate, I assure you. Depending on what happens I anticipate I could be doing anything from campaigning for others and pushing pixels on a blog …. to studying various books by von Drach, Clausewitz, and some with FM prefixes. Assuming, or course, that we are not trying to deal with the Politically Correct American English translation of Lao Gai. ****sigh****
Subotai Bahadur
The nuclear reactors would be a good idea if it didn’t take 16 years (currently) from groundbreaking to actual power production.
If you could protect them from lawsuits and Federal regulators they could be built in a year.
“The nuclear reactors would be a good idea if it didn’t take 16 years (currently) from groundbreaking to actual power production.”
“If you could protect them from lawsuits and Federal regulators they could be built in a year.”
Protecting them from Terrorists is child’s play compared to that.
If you read http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/8-9952.aspx, you’ll see that they may be equipped to deploy these robotic speedboats called Spartans, which in turn will have a naval version of of the NLOS system (http://www.defense-update.com/features/2010/april/nlos_ls_navy_24042010.html), each little robot speedboat having up to 15 missiles. So the idea was that the Iranian speedboats would run into these missile-firing robots, not that the LCS would defend itself, although it is stated that the LCS could also have the NLOS system.
Unfortunately the NLOS has been rejected by the Army, leaving the Navy to continue it. But I suppose that even if the NLOS for some reason died, then someone would revive a weapons system to replace it.
But imagine yourself in a highly crowded waterway with ships, recreational watercraft, and aircraft all buzzing around, with the sonar conditions a mess. The real challenge will be identification. What if one of these speedboats, with a bevy of ostensibly bikini-clad women sunbathing suddenly dropped its disguise and headed straight for you. It might take a while before you saw the beard on the “beauty”.
Now maybe this is where the high speed of the LCS comes in. In self-defense situations when it can neither be sure of shooting nor certain the target is harmless, with 50 knots available it can keep a standoff distance between itself and the unidentified target.
9. wretchard
“Still people need their gasoline. And everyone knows that gasoline comes from the gas station until the gas station runs out.”
True and that is why I have asked people to get their dusty bicycles out, fix them up and/or buy a scooter or cycle and maybe a cycle trailer. They get much better gas mileage. If you have the land, get a horse if can feed it without undo extra expense. My grand daughters love horses and love to ride them but they do eat a lot and vet prices have not come down.
Anyway, if you have the money and the space, bury yourself a couple of 200 gallon tanks (with all the approved safety equipment and stuff) and buy your gas from yourself. Keeping it rotated so that it doesn’t get old. Yes fuel gets old. If you find the right distributor you can save a lot by buying in bulk. But be aware they won’t deliver unless you have your certificates. (at least right now in Texas, who knows what black market gasoline will be like in the future)
I hope we don’t have to find out.
Papa Ray
Josh @ 45: “The proper counter is a B-52 raid against either local fishing villages, or Tehran.”
That way lies madness, Josh. Shades of Vietnam and Johnston personally choosing politically correct targets. Proportionality in warfare is cruelty. It guarantees that aggressors will be tempted to see just how many windows they can break before the people inside get angry.
A credible disproportionate response is the best guarantee of a peaceful life — and of minimum total casualties in the event someone does get out of line. MAD worked!
So how to implement something analogous in a world with deniable front groups? Simple Assured Destruction – SAD. Announce today that, if certain thresholds are crossed, the following 50 targets areas in Iran, Syria, Pakistan and North Korea will cease to exist — in about as long as it takes for a ICBM to get there. Any regime that does not like being on the list can come forward and demonstrate to US satisfaction that it is genuinely doing as much as, say, France to prevent front groups from getting arms. Any individual who would rather not be in one of the designated areas, say, Teheran has time to move.
It is absolutely stupid for the US to allow aggressors to throw stones, secure in the knowledge that the US will not respond with the perfectly adequate weaponry already in its arsenal. Of course, resolve is even more important that capability — which means that this discussion is moot as long as Obama is in the command loop.
Here’s a nasty little weapons system being marketed by the Russians:
(this is the actual marketing video, I understand)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqwMzQiXlK0&feature=player_embedded
A devastating surface to surface cruise missile system that’s disguised to look like an ordinary shipping container – the video shows how it can be stored on the deck of a cargo ship and not activated until it is needed.
With respect to taking out a shore defense system offensively, you could never identify and target these in hostile territory unless you were willing to destroy every shipping container there was. And you probably need a nuke or three to get that done.
21. Richard Aubrey
It is my understanding from a swabbie that the Phalanx has kinda fallen out of favor with the Navy.
Here is a rundown on the 20mm Phalanx systems over the years.
As you can see it is a “close in system” and if these fast boats are carring the huge Russian torpedos (plus who knows what else) if they explode by themselves or with our help within a few thousand yards of a ship they could still cause damage. If not to the ship, to the personnel on those ships.
From what he told me the Phalanx is being replaced on most ships he knew about.
Here is an interesting article.
Papa Ray
wws @58:
It looks really cool! It’s great that Russians can do such wonderful computer animation. No doubt, if the funding was available, they could build such systems. Various pieces of such a system already exist with various Russian defense contractors, but as of now, the container launched cruise missile system is a dream. Yes, it could be built, but I don’t think working, tested models have been built yet.
Coming soon to a rogue nation near you…
Thank God cruise missiles are subsonic. I believe it would take something on the order of 15 well placed Patriot batteries to defend our border with Mexico, call it 100-150 total batteries to defend both Mexican & Canadian borders, and both East & West coasts. Another 15-20 batteries would be needed to defend Hawaii and important targets in Alaska, and start us on our way to building Fortress America. That and significantly beefing up our Coast Guard and Immigrations & Customs Enforcement (ICE) to ensure not a single cargo container slips into the country without inspection.
Would the Russians ever allow such systems to fall into terrorist hands? With everything they’ve done in Chechnya I believe they would think long and hard, twice, before allowing widespread foreign sales, and the possibility of them falling into the hands of Muslim terrorists.
Russians are generally smart, weird, by our standards, and slightly crazy when it comes to the Rodina, but usually aren’t stupid…
22. BattleofthePyramids
The US can get by quite nicely with oil from other sources, and if necessary pipelines could be laid overland to by-pass the straits – which should be done anyway.
Yea, true but what about the stupendous raise in gasoline prices that we would all face? What about the absence of available gasoline to the rest of the world and the high prices they would pay (they already pay much more than we do.)
“pipelines could be laid overland”
Yea sure, and in a year or so they would be operational if everything went according to plan…which of course, it never does.
I don’t think the rest of the world or Joe Blow down the street would appriciate not being able to afford gasoline to go get his six-pack or the liberals to make it to their protest rallies.
The Russians of course along with other oil suppliers would make a bundle off of this little war…as always happens, some benefit some suffer.
OH..almost forgot.
“A-10’s and Spectre gunships are probably the best way to handle the speedboat swarms.”
Just where are these to come from and where are the tankers going to meet them. This would be a nightmare of logistics to employ these two airframes in this area with out massive efforts. Yea, we could do it, we have the best Military Personnel in the world. They would find a way.
Papa Ray
26. Tcobb
By George, I think you have it!
I read the same thing in a SF novel years ago and others have latched onto that idea. But you will not read about it for years.
Just don’t tell anybody, OK?
Papa Ray
A lot of the problems come from being in a de facto defensive mode. The real reason why the “container” launchers in http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqwMzQiXlK0&feature=player_embedded work is because the guys with the tanks, aircraft and warships wait until they get ambushed. They don’t attack, just tramp around looking menacing but without any menace, while the really warlike country pretends to be a peaceful nation of beaches and baby milk factories — until it launches its strike.
What is being exploited here is the the political weakness of the west. And that is hard to compensate for.
Another setback for the LCS.
Obama just canceled the NLOS missile system that the LCS relied upon for engaging multiple targets at range.
That lone 57mm cannon on the LCS had best not jam or get damaged.
28. Armageddon Rex
“I’m not a naval strategist by training. I am an experienced targeteer and planner. Based on the published information, I think the LCS as it currently exists, is far more expensive than it should be. It has inadequate weaponry to fulfill any mission that justifies its price tag. What does it do so much better than conventional designs? It doesn’t seem to be particularly well armored or survivable against a wide variety of conventional attacks. Why don’t we just buy an off the shelf shallow draft corvette design from the Germans for example and build it here in the U.S. under license. With the money we save, we could buy another fifty F-22s, which really can justify their price tag with capabilities far exceeding less expensive more conventional designs. That or if it must be spent on the Navy for littoral warfare, bring our battleships out of mothballs and upgrade them to serve for the next 50 years!”
You, LoTM and a couple of others have latched on and figured out a large part of the problems of the current U.S. Navy. Caused by not only politics but by current Navy leadership, driven by politics and/or that is still fighting in the last century or has ideas that current technology just isn’t up to.
Couple that with a Union controlled Military Industrial Complex that doesn’t have the talent nor the will (past lining their pockets with silver) to build what will work and what America needs at a decent price…(leaving out a lot more) and you have the state of the Military Union at the present time.
Hell we can’t build one plane anymore without it costing more than it’s worth and where we can’t buy but a few of them. We can’t get a tanker that was needed ten years ago because they can’t even figure out how to get an honest workable bid.
What happened to the America that produced and innovated so much in the past?
Oh well, don’t get me started. If you want to know the truth, just go read the Milblogs that have to do with the Navy and our other Services.
You will be shocked and really pissed off.
Papa Ray
very good point, wretchard. I’m reminded of Vince Lombardi who taught that “the best Defense is a strong Offense!”
I found an article which holds that the club-K container missile is much ado about nothing.
http://rt.com/Top_News/2010-04-27/club-k-missile-systems.html
That writer tops off his argument with this: “The company added that strict arms exports regulations in Russia guarantee that such a sophisticated weapon can only be sold to a responsible buyer.”
Call me suspicious by nature, but that’s not the kind of assurance that gives me a good nights sleep. And how many “responsible buyers” are interested in weapons systems whose primary benefit is that they are disguised as something civilian and harmless?
Great comments as usual. I can’t add anything new but would vote for best ideas as follows. (1) Assured Destruction idea is paramount. If enemy believes that whatever he tries will cost him too much, he won’t try. (This does not deal with Twelfth Imam fanatics but it’s still a good basic strategy). (2) For Iran, the vulnerability is imported gasoline. Choke that off and their days as a modern industrial economy are numbered in low double digits, I think. This would put enormous pressure even on the mullahcracy which may not care about the people but has to care about its own military capability and political longevity, both of which will be precarious once the supply line is shut off. (3) Closing off their gasoline imports would provoke some wild moves but we could do this from a standoff position. We just use aerial and satellite surveillance to identify any ships breaking our blockade, and then bomb or missile them into oblivion. So sorry. (4) If enemy fire does claim any valuable asset such as LCS, we just work our way down the target list of their infrastructure. No more power plants. No more ports. No more highways. Repeat as needed.
The idea of mixing it up at a tactical level with these people is misguided. Of course, under current administration, we won’t even do that. It will be Grovel City.
Agree that future combat systems will be heavily robotic. The problem of properly identifying foe in the chaff and clutter is not trivial but when any of us can go to a big-box store and buy, for a few hundred bucks, a camera with smile-detection and face-recognition systems, how hard can it be to deploy sophisticated optical sensor systems that will lock onto the speedboat with the sunbathing bimboes and, the minute it transforms into a weapons platform, just sends the kill signal to the UAV?
And as for exposing our valuable hulls to enemy swarms: I don’t see why. Just take some rusty hulk container ships and float them just at the edge of Iranian territorial waters. Stock them with rockets-in-a-box like the K System and all sorts of other goodies. Mobility of the platform is not an issue. Stick on some defensive systems to repel raiders and Silkworms etc. You’d need a few squads of marines and sailors to fight the ships and keep them more or less on station but once they had fired their main systems they would be eminently expendable and the crews could be in/exfiltrated by speedboat or chopper.
I admire our carriers and other big toys as much as the next taxpaying patriot but they are obsolete.
This is the 21st century and what were called E-boats or MTB’s (Bits) or PT boats (US) are called ‘targets’ today.
The LCS is completely bogus, a weapon system in search of a mission. It only reason for existence is to take taxpayers dollars out of their pockets and relocate that money into the pockets of contractors and Congress critters.
You deal with small boats by shooting a guided missile at them from over the horizon. If done correctly, the target dies before it knows it has been targeted.
Only some pentagon wizz kid that has never been shot at thinks it is a good idea to get within pistol range of the enemy and shoot it out. Rational people kill that sucker from as far away as possible.
On a positive note, at least somebody on the other side is thinking in 20th century terms instead of 7th century. Although a galley would have just as much chance against a CVBG as a bunch of ski boats with rockets. Plus a fleet of galleys would have the added benefit of helping with Iran’s high unemployment rate.
I think it was 10 years ago that I heard of an USAF new munition called, the BLU-92, I believe.
It was designed to kill armor in wholesale lots . You dropped one – or more like 20 from a B-1 – and it broke apart into 10 parachute platforms carrying 10 rockets each. As the platforms descended their targeting systems Ided the targets via IR and when they got into range fired the rockets down at them. 100 rockets per munition. Around 20 munitions on one B-1. Do the math.
What will work on tanks should work on speedboats, too. We can do swarming too.
RWE, yes we can do swarming, but will we?
It’s an interesting analysis, whether we really need swarms more against hard or soft targets …
Kinuachdrach @ 57: SAD, huh? LOL. I agree, of course. Though I doubt if Barak La Boca Obambus does. Yes, if we respond like that, it’s likely to spur further attacks against us, so we have to be ready to pursue things seriously. The idea is we have to be a SAD dog on a leash, and the idea is not to get that leash broken, or guilty and innocent alike will suffer. But that is all kinds of collective, disproportional, and preemptive action. Big bombs are like that. Big dogs are like that.
On the subject of ‘the best defense is a good offense’ I wonder at what point we (or someone else) simply puts a small team ashore with a russian 82mm or 120mm mortar near Iran’s biggest oil refinery and drops 5 high explosive rounds into the complex, followed by a few white phosphorus, and then a few more HE rounds and walks away? Or given its proximity to the Iraqi border, I am surprised some of the Iranian supplied munitions were not shipped ‘return to sender’ by unknown terrorists…you know how bad the terrorists were about dropping mortars on our bases all over Iraq. It would be better if they came from the east though.
Quite frankly, I would not be surprised if the Rooskies don’t do this at some point when it would be most beneficial to them. They would be one of the primary beneficiaries of the oil spike, hostilities and closing of the straits.
Although if they were going to do it, I would ask they simultaneously hit the major oil import terminal and its associated storage fields.
Re: nuke build times, it would take at least 3 years to actually build a nuke, seperate from all the permitting delays. However, there is no way to build on that timeline…there is only 1 facility in the world (Japan Steelworks) that has the ability to make the extremely large reactor vessel forgings. And they have an almost 8 year backorder. It is a shame that America cannot build a completely domestic nuke.
The Russians are smart enough and so are the Iranians. Religious fanatics yes, stupid? No.
Ahmadinejad is a useful facade of intimidation. The Ayatollah Khomieni is the alpha dog and reportedly, he’s a man who likes his luxuries. Such men do not gamble recklessly, they have too much to lose that they value.
Which is why, before they do anything with swarms of high speed boats, torpedo’s or cruise missiles, they’ll wait until they have nukes, which is the game changer. Nukes and a reliable mid-range delivery platform. They don’t need a long-range platform as Europe would work quite nicely as nuclear hostages, ones anxious to appease.
Once they have that, unless directly attacked, the US military with Obama as CiC… doesn’t do jack.
If they’re really smart and patient, they won’t seize the Strait prematurely. Instead they’ll start a campaign to create an Iranian led alliance, a new de facto caliphate.
A strong case for which can be made, that in 3-5 yrs Iran could have an alliance stretching from Libya up to Turkey and all the way across to Pakistan. With the only hold-outs of significance being Saudi Arabia, a few gulf states, and Indonesia.
No doubt they’ll share nukes with others in their alliance, once solidly in place, we’ll face an Islamic nuclear armed caliphate.
Then, they can send a message to the US; that they’re seizing the Strait and if attacked conventionally they’ll nuke Rome. (today’s brits and frogs aren’t going to commit nuclear suicide for the Italians, NATO commitments be damned) And that if we nuke them in retaliation, before our nukes land, they’ll nuke every large city in Europe and India.
The key is, don’t target us, target the innocent and populous cities of Europe and India, so that liberals will scream for appeasement at all costs.
Faced with billions of dead, they know the American public will back down. Then with 40% of the world’s oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz they can carefully suck dry the West.
Fortunately for us, they’re likely to be too impatient to keep their nukes in reserve and carefully build on a strategy against the west. Millions are going to die because liberals are in denial about the nature of evil and aggression.
Daedalus @71:
I was under the impression that the current Westinghouse AP1000 reactor vessel was modular, and the horizontal ring sections were welded together in the final assembly location, thus no huge difficult to force reactor vessel is required. Am I wrong on this? It is far outside my areas of expertise.
67. oMan
“Agree that future combat systems will be heavily robotic. The problem of properly identifying foe in the chaff and clutter is not trivial but when any of us can go to a big-box store and buy, for a few hundred bucks, a camera with smile-detection and face-recognition systems, how hard can it be to deploy sophisticated optical sensor systems that will lock onto the speedboat with the sunbathing bimboes and, the minute it transforms into a weapons platform, just sends the kill signal to the UAV? “
“how hard can it be”
Well, if past history and present R&D and manufacturing are to be used as a guide. It will be very, very hard, take years and many cost over runs and wind up with something that doesn’t work as advertised but costs ten to twenty times as much as it should.
Doubt it? I have a new idea I want to sell you for a just a few billion and will get it to you as soon as possible, But first let me talk to my CongressCritters I’m sure they want in on this.
Papa Ray
Armageddon,
I am not particularly familiar with the AP1000 design. If they have worked around the vessel head forging, I don’t know. The vast majority of commercial reactor in existance has a forged vessle head. I will say that the point of it is to have massive strength…and that it would be pretty difficult to achieve similar strength from multiple welds without much more physical steel and space.
Many of the designs are modular…and still incorporate a forged vessel head in one of the modules. As a matter of fact…having bands welded together on site is the exact opposite of the modular effect, which is to minimize the on site skilled resource requirements. Have as much of the work done as possible at the ‘factory’ where they can develop an extremely skilled, experienced work force that no site with a mobile work force can match.
Part of the point is that although the US is trying to start a nuclear rennaisance, the whole world did not slip into a dark ages needing a renaissance to escape from. Really only the west did. China built I believe 11 reactors since 1990. India has built about 5 since 2000, with several more about to come online. Japan has built several each decade through the 80′s 90′s and oughts, with at least 2 about to come online, and several under construction.
The enviro-nazis only killed this zero carbon energy in the Anglosphere and Europe. The rest of the world has been cranking along. They don’t need a renaissance, because they didn’t have a dark ages.
@45 Josh:
I agree. Our response should involve a counter-strike against whatever the ruling mullahs would be upset to lose, including the personal homes of the rulers.
#74 Papa Ray: You got me there! My post was written in an unusual fit of optimism, and now that I’m sober again I see how much more likely it is that you’re right. Sigh. …Still, the notion of “swarming” goes deeper than tactics. Right now we could use “swarm” intel analysis that used thousands of amateurs to evaluate signals collected by military (or civilian) sensors and posted online. Kind of a wiki approach. The lack of skill (and sometimes, deliberate efforts to spoof the system by infiltrators) would be offset by redundant analysis and professionals making final reviews. This method could be used for lower-value (but volume-heavy) work and allow the experts to leverage their skills.
Just an idea, hardly original with me, and already operational in other contexts. Like this one: BC sifts a lot of stuff very efficiently thanks to Wretchard and the contributions of those who comment. We, too, are a kind of swarm.
Papa Ray.
WRT the Phalanx, thanks for the info.
I presume–we live in hope–that its replacement is better, both in terms of range and hitting power, and in terms of fire control.
I hope the current CINC’s replacement is an improvement, too.
Daedalus @75:
I went to college to learn electrical engineering, I worked as an intelligence analyst, so I’m not an expert on welding by any stretch of the imagination. Having said that, if I remember correctly from the material science classes I took, a properly executed weld is supposed to be stronger than the materials it connects. Weakness from welding occurs in regions of the material adjacent to the weld as undesired heat from the welding process disrupts the steel crystal structure and causes migration of strengthening impurities out of the crystal lattice. Remedies for this are to use approved welding techniques. Use stronger material, or use additional material thickness to provide additional strength.
The U.S. Navy has been working with heavy duty, multi-layer, welding for over a century, and with nuclear reactors for 60 years. I have a hard time believing we don’t have welders with the necessary skills available to perform such work, especially when their work is exhaustively tested by quality assurance engineers performing x-ray and ultrasound examinations of all welds and completed assemblies.
Any QA engineer who fudges testing and documentation of work on a nuclear plant should be publicly drawn and quartered in the quad of MIT, Rensselaer Polytechnic, Georgia Tech, The Colorado School of Mines, Cal-Poly San Luis Obispo, or some other famous engineering school. Video viewing of such an event should be mandatory for all senior year engineering students nation wide.
As to nuclear power plants, I’ve spent the last 11 years building them in Asia and now in the US. That followed 20 years of running one.
It is largely true that Japan Steel Works is the current global supplier for reactor pressure vessels. However, the French have a fab facility in Europe and are building another one in Newport News, Virginia, albeit with a one vessel per year capacity. Other global players are considering the big capital investment in mega steel forging tools required. The market system can work but only if the politicans stay out of the way.
BTW, for a new vessel, JSW requires 100% cash down to reserve a place in the queue. The constraint is not the welding (they can be site-fabricated) but the forging of the big nozzles and lower spherical head. You need a really big forge to bend a really big and thick hunk of steel.
In the US it takes 4 1/2 years for a previous certified plant design on an existing nuclear site to get permission to turn dirt. Then, on-site construction can take another 4 to 5 years. So we’re figuring ten years from first money down to juice.
But the current constraint is the government loan guarantees. Start a new nuke without a government guarantee and I will promise you that you will need one.
And no, we can’t walk away from the oil reserves of the Persian (Arabian?) Gulf. That production is the lowest cost, industrially usable energy source on Earth. If the US decides it doesn’t want that oil, our economic competitors will still use it and gain a HUGE advantage over us. I will say one good thing about the US government’s reluctance to drill more in the US, those untapped reserves will prove useful someday. Teddy Roosveldt would have understood this as “conservation.”
A few months ago I was blown away by an article in Wired magazine about an alternative nuclear fuel that supposedly is safe and cheap (relatively): http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/12/ff_new_nukes/
I haven’t heard anything of it anywhere else but it seems, at least to this non-technical type, to be the answer to all our energy problems.
I know that the Belmont Club contains some really smart people that might shed some light on the viability of Thorium reactors. Your insights would be greatly appreciated.
As a nuclear engineer with long experience in the economics of electric utilities and the design and construction of nuclear power plants, I remain deeply skeptical of the economics of these small reactors. Thorium can serve as fuel for reactors large and small, and there’s 4 times as much thorium in the Earth’s crust as uranium, but we’ve got plenty of uranium, enough for the next few generations.
The reasons are 1) economy of scale. More powerful reactors have declining marginal costs. They scale nicely so I think even bigger reactors are the wave of the future.
2) Regulatory burdens – small reactors will have the same headaches from the government and political opponents as big ones but will have less output to amortize those costs against. See reason #1 above.
3) Where’s the markets? there might be small scale electrical grids that large, cheaper nukes won’t fit into (rule of thumb – no generator > 10% of peak load) like in Hawaii or Alaska.
The liberal side of the energy debates have been spouting fanatasies for decades – electrical pie from the sky stuff. Unfortunately, the conservative side has not proven immune to the same temptations.
Sorry, but there is no answer to all our energy problems. We’ll just have to gut it out with the tools we have.
I should add that thorium offers no inherent safety or performance advantages over uranium to my knowledge. The downside is that it requires a “starter” of uranium or plutonium to start a thorium-to-U-233 conversion cycle with follow-on reprocessing. It looks a lot like a plutonium breeder cycle only starting with Th-232 instead of U-238.
Also, I claim no expertise in naval warfare but during the tanker war, the USN killed off the Iranian speedboats very effectively. The weapon of choice was the air-dropped cluster bomb.
Are we still allowed to use those, even over water?
Arm Rex,
“if I remember correctly from the material science classes I took, a properly executed weld is supposed to be stronger than the materials it connects.”
I’m not and engineer, but I believe that was conventional wisdom until the Northridge earthquake of 94. Up until that time, welded moment framed buildings were thought to be the cadillac in structural design. Then, as a result of that earthquake, many of the welded moment frame buildings in LA failed, or to be more specific, their welds failed. You will now see many older high rise buildings in LA with retrofitted “X” braces on them as a result. So I guess the old theory that the weld was stronger than the surrounding steel failed along with all those buildings.
It is all down to the tensile strength of the weld filler – the rod, stick, or wire that is melted into the joint and merges thru melting into and along with with the ‘native’ metal on either side. Ideally, the same alloy is used for filler, and the cross sectional area is not significantly increased in a good clean, well designed and fitted weld. Indeed, ‘native’ metal is typically ground away at an angle or bevel to provide a trough or valley which is filled by the addition of the filler metal, resulting in an effectively uniform cross sectional area across the weld section. The notion that a weld is stronger than the material it connects I think stems from the old saw that a broken bone heals stronger than it was unbroken. This may be true for bones, but not for metals. If you weld two forgings together, the forged sections will still have a higher tensile strength, due to grain alignment inherent to forging, than the weld will have, which is simply ‘cast’ by the melting inherent in the welding process.
Unsk @84:
That’s why I qualified my statement: “…Weakness from welding occurs in regions of the material adjacent to the weld as undesired heat from the welding process disrupts the steel crystal structure and causes migration of strengthening impurities out of the crystal lattice. Remedies for this are to use approved welding techniques…”
How many of those structural welds on commercial buildings in Southern California do you think were up to the quality standards of welds performed on nuclear reactors? I would guess, none.
How many X-ray and ultrasound inspections were performed on each and every weld, and were then fully documented by qualified quality assurance engineers? Again I would guess none.
Comparing welds on commercial structures, where cost and speed are the two overwhelming factors, with welds on a nuclear reactor, or for that matter the pressure hull of a U.S. navy submarine where the highest possible strength and resilience regardless of cost is the deciding factor, is definitely an apples and oranges sort of comparison.
I do know that some drastic and expensive measures are pursued to ensure welds are strong and surrounding materials aren’t weakened. I’ve seen elaborate heat ablation, heat sinks, and use of noble gas atmospheres around the weld area to prevent oxidation, and degradation of surrounding material. I’ll bet there are a dozen other tricks I’m not familiar with that are equally time consuming, expensive and that require enormous training to complete properly.
I know I’ve thoroughly examined samples of welded steel and aluminum plates exposed to IEDs, and for steel armor, the welds usually don’t fail. If they were significantly weaker I would have expected to see a lot more ruptures where plates and seems were welded together. I didn’t, at least on remnants of U.S. vehicle armor.
I bet that at least some of the welds and / or rivets used on those X-frame structures retrofitted onto on older building around southern California are now inspected using ultra-sound and or X-rays by building inspectors.
P.S. Don’t go places with IEDs in an aluminum armored vehicle. Use ceramics & composites for armor or good old cold rolled steel, or hitch a ride on a blackhawk!
Whitehall @83:
Thank you for sharing a bit of your expertise with us.
Do you know where the reactor vessels for the General Electric S6W nuclear reactors are fabricated?
I’m curious if DOE and USN allowed the US to lose this capability entirely, or if we no longer fabricate commercial power plant reactor vessels, but still manufacture nuclear submarine and aircraft carrier reactor vessels.
Thorium has been tested as an alternate…
And then rejected by every nuclear power.
They never really say why…
But I think it’s due to its need for successful breeder technology ( fast or slow ) because it is totally economically dependent upon U235 to get rolling.
Which really means, Thorium cycle power is being ‘conserved’ since slow neutrons are scarce.
To compound that, U234 recreates the nightmare of isotopic resolution if any other U isotope is there… keeping it away from U235… lot’s of luck!
ANY blend of U234 and U235… you don’t know really what you’ve got. Each and every down-stream item becomes a blending headache; no consistency otherwise. Ultimately this means that ANY Thorium cycle is dependent upon a much larger Uranium burning infrastructure to provide it with its inputs.
In other words, too much trouble, dollar-wise. What appears to be a cheap energy source is such a hand-full that Thorium is dropped. Uranium and Plutonium run away with the market on pure technical economics.
For those willing to kill time, you can plunge back into the record. You’ll find just a hand-full of test systems — quickly shut down — and a complete lack of imitation by our atomic peers.
Thorium cycle reactors have NEVER gained momentum by any nuclear power. Economics is the reason.
The welded steel frames that failed in the California earthquake did so because of the concentration of stresses in the structure at the joints, not weakness in the weld materials. That old “Give me a lever…” issue.
The naval reactor pressure vessels are FAR smaller than commercial nuclear power plant pressure vessels. A sub motor might be 100 to 200 MWth while a new commercial nuke is 4,300 MWth. These smaller vessels are still fabricated within the US.
As per Blert, the Indian government has been making noises about thorium cycles but then India has HUGE reserves of thorium. I too am skeptical of any commercial thorium fuel cycle reactors within the 21st century given the large resources of uranium available. and yes, one needs a full fuel reprocessing cycle to make it work.