STEVEN DEN BESTE LAYS IT ON THE LINE WITH A PREDICTION:

The Anglo-American conquest of Iraq will be seen in history as what historians like to call a turning point. It will mean the end of the UN as anything even remotely resembling a meaningful international body. It will also mean the practical end of NATO, which just refused a request that it move forces to protect its member Turkey from any Iraqi punishing attack north. It will totally alter the world diplomatic situation, with many bilateral relationships becoming stronger and others becoming much more cool and the reputations of some nations rising and those of others dropping through the floor. And it’s going to end up changing the political dynamic inside Europe which has until now fed the process of formation and expansion of the EU.

The conquest of Iraq will wipe away any remaining traces of the international diplomatic order left over from the Cold War.

And it’s going to happen and no amount of vocal opposition and diplomatic grandstanding is capable now of forcing Bush to involuntarily refrain from ordering the attack.

I think he’s probably right. And I think that a reformed Iraq has the potential to lead to regime change throughout the region — something that the various leaders have been worried about, as have their patrons (and clients?) elsewhere.

UPDATE: The Pontificator says I’m wrong to want regime change throughout the region, since it might be bloody and chaotic.

Bloody might be okay, if it’s the right people. I’m perfectly happy to see the last emir strangled with the entrails of the last mullah, if it comes to that. But it probably won’t, or at least it need not. After all, you could have made (and people did make) the same kind of predictions about the fall of the Soviet Union, and it didn’t turn out that way.

At any rate, regime change will come anyway, sooner or later, because it’s a region of weak states, unhappy citizens, and strong outside interest. I think this is a better context for regime change than we’re likely to find otherwise. And, as I said earlier:

I don’t pretend to offer guarantees that American intervention in the region will make life better for the people who live there. I think it will, I hope it will, and I think we should do our best to make that so. But those are secondary objectives. The primary objective is to make clear to leaders that if their country threatens America, they, the rulers, will be out of power at best, and dead along with all their family and friends at worst. Is that “nice?” No. I don’t care.

This is also why I prefer a Mussolini-style ending in which Saddam is lynched by his own people to exile, or even a trial. I think that would provide a valuable lesson.

ANOTHER UPDATE: Reader Ann Haker emails:

If Saudi subjects now see that their neighbor, Iraq, is using its oil wealth to build a dynamic and vibrant economy, while their own leaders have lavished most of the oil revenues on themselves and their Swiss bank accounts, they wil begin to demand that the oil wealth of the Arabian Peninsula be used for their benefit, not the benefit of the al Saud family.

That’s what the Saudi family must fear most.

Well, maybe not most, but yes, I think the “trust” move was a diplomatic stroke that hit several targets at once.