THIS ISN’T ENCOURAGING: Lab Security Standards Raise Chances of Mutant-Bird-Flu Catastrophe.

Fears that bioterrorists could learn from controversial experiments that make H5N1 avian influenza more virulent have overshadowed a more pressing danger: accidental releases, laboratory infections and disgruntled workers.

Dozens of all-too-human mistakes have occurred in just the last decade inside high-security laboratories, and many experts say new H5N1 flu strains engineered to infect mammals have not been handled with the care required to minimize chances of unintentional catastrophe.

In fact, research on less-threatening pathogens is conducted at higher security levels than research on the new bird flu and other strains made artificially more virulent.

Accidental infections and disgruntled workers “are by far the most realistic threats associated with these viruses,” said Rutgers University microbiologist Richard Ebright, a vocal critic of the new research. “But almost all of the discussion to date has focused on whether to publish the details. That only addresses lower-order risks.”

I’m not happy about this.