Please also read my article The Hamas Split and the Palestinian Political Mess

By Barry Rubin

Nageeb Kashgari is a young man in a lot of trouble. The 23-year-old Saudi has been spirited back to his country from Malaysia in a manner reminiscent of a kidnapping to be put on trial for his life.

His crime? To write three Tweets that Saudi clerics have deemed to be heretical. The lynch mob is baying for his blood.  Nobody in the world is helping him. Kashgari might well be doomed, despite his quick apology and erasure of the Tweets.

For details on his case and situation click here.

Even if Kashgari were an atheist or someone who renounced Islam or did indeed violated its precepts his freedom of speech and religion should be defended. But what is most interesting about his case is that he did not really do any of these things. He merely expressed a liberal, modernist-style interpretation of Islam, the kind of thing that developed in Christianity—and was sometimes punished then–about 250 years ago and became very common 150 years ago.

Nothing tells us more about the profound difficulty of reforming Islam, the totalitarian threat of Islamism, and the danger of Sharia law—to Muslims above all—than does the Kashgari case.

Let me begin, though, with a brief discussion about why freedom of speech is so important.  In the U.S. Constitution, the first amendment says, “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press….”

Why did they understand this to be so essential more than two centuries ago in a way that applies perfectly to today? Because once someone can decide what is legal speech—beyond a minimal limit of “fire in crowded theatres” and national security secrets endangering lives—they can interpret what is acceptable in any way they choose. And people being people, anyone in power is certain to do that in a way that enhances their own power and serves their own interest.

And that is why the very concept of “Politically Correct” is inevitably anti-democratic and will be inevitably abused. This is what we see today. When, as in Europe and Canada, courts start determining criminal expression then that country is in serious trouble.

Of course, in traditional societies such rules usually prevail and they are being reinstalled in Islamist polities, some of which have been established with Western assistance. Indeed, if the organization of Islamic states and Western supporters have their way, heresy against Islam will become an international crime for which even non-Muslims can be prosecuted.

Kashgari came from a Salafist family but developed liberal beliefs that he expressed in Tweets. There are two lessons here, showing how hard it is to develop a democracy in Muslim-majority countries or any liberal interpretation of Islam in such countries. In the first case, there is no freedom of speech on critical issues; on the second, the ability of mainstream or hardline clerics to interpret any other view as heretical will be enforced.

Earlier, Kashgari had tweeted: “No Saudi women will go to hell, because it’s impossible to go there twice.”  This is, of course, a witty statement of the status of women in Saudi Arabia.

More recently, Kashgari sent three tweets, addressed to Islam’s founder on his birthday. These form the basis of his “crime.”

Tweet 1: “On your birthday, I will say that I have loved the rebel in you, that you’ve always been a source of inspiration to me, and that I do not like the halos of divinity around you. I shall not pray for you.”

This is an attempt to present Muhammad as a rebel, a man supporting change that is common in Christianity (and especially on the political left) regarding its own founder. It is a pro-Muhammad statement and, of course, Islam strongly denies Muhammad’s divinity. Yet the clerics have the power to judge this statement heretical and have it punished by the political authorities.

Tweet 2: “On your birthday, I find you wherever I turn. I will say that I have loved aspects of you, hated others, and could not understand many more.”

Again, this is just an honest and very human statement about religious faith. Saying that he finds Muhammad “wherever I turn” is a profoundly religious sentiment. Here, though, his implication that he might dislike any aspect of Muhammad whatsoever—even one—makes him a candidate for the chopping block.

If the questioning of a single, even unnamed, precept of Muhammad is heresy then you can forget about reformers or liberal movements.

Tweet 3: “On your birthday, I shall not bow to you. I shall not kiss your hand. Rather, I shall shake it as equals do, and smile at you as you smile at me. I shall speak to you as a friend, no more.”

Again, since Islam holds that Muhammad is a man—a point that Saudi Wahhabi Islam especially emphasizes—this is hardly apostasy.  One should not bow to him or kiss his hand. Here is one point Kashgari might have better covered himself, say by referring to Muhammad as a teacher or a respected man. Still, if Muhammad is just a “friend” does that mean he isn’t a prophet? Kashgari seems to have meant this as an expression of love. At any rate, nobody responded by asking him to reply or even to repent but only to die.

There is no eternal or deterministic “essence” to Islam that decides what it will be like. Still, if Islam is interpreted by those who have power, even life and death power, over hundreds of millions of Muslims are requiring total obedience to hardline and Islamist clerics there is no hope in our lifetime that things will get better. People can only obey, fight against overwhelming odds, or, like Kashgari, flee to New Zealand. And even to such places, as we have seen, the intolerant interpreters will follow them.

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Dr. Jonathan Spyer, GLORIA Center senior fellow, has just returned from Syria where he met with oppositionists, members of the Free Syrian Army, and local inhabitants. Here’s his first interview on his experiences and observations.

Barry Rubin: Dr. Spyer, please tell us about your visit to Syria, what you saw and your impressions.

Jonathan Spyer: Well, I spent a week in Idleb province, traveling between a number of different towns. The most striking aspect was the extent of de facto control that the opposition and Free Syrian Army (FSA) have in this area. A number of towns are now entirely under their control, with FSA roadblocks at the entrance and the rebel flag flying everywhere. At the same time, it’s of course clear that the government still has intelligence networks inside the “liberated” towns, and will reconquer them if possible at a later date.

Barry Rubin: Many observers claim that the Bashar al-Assad regime will fall soon. What do the opposition activists think and what is your view?

Jonathan Spyer: The many opposition activists and fighters that I spoke to seem to be rather torn in their attitude. On the one hand, I heard none of the facile optimism that one heard among some analysts in the first months of the uprising, describing Bashar’s fall  as imminent. The opposition activists understand that with the support of Iran, Russia, China and Hizballah, the regime can continue for some time to come, even if it is bleeding resources and losing manpower to the rebel army.  The opposition is acutely aware of its own international isolation compared to the regime, and repeat endlessly the call for a buffer zone, and for the beginnings of Western support for arming the FSA.

At the same time, looking more broadly, the oppositionists are optimistic that they will ultimately prevail, but a number of them told me that without international assistance to their side to balance and offset the international coalition behind Assad, the situation could drag on for months or even years.

Barry Rubin: How important are revolutionary Islamists in the opposition? Can you explain about the larger — perhaps largest — group, traditional Sunnis?

Jonathan Spyer: In Idleb province, where I was, there was an undoubted presence of Salafi Islamists among the FSA fighters. But they were not a majority, and I certainly had no indication at all of the presence of foreign Islamist fighters. These were clearly local men. The regime, of course, has been keen to say that the opposition to it consists of al-Qaida. I would advise skepticism toward any claims made by the Assad regime.

However, Idleb province is a very traditional, religious Sunni area. There is undoubtedly a strong sectarian element to the fury and hatred that people have toward the Assad regime. People stress that this does not extend to ordinary Alawi or Shia Syrians, but I would counsel caution regarding this. So I don’t think Salafi Islamism is dominating the revolt, even in very traditional and religious places like Idleb. But at the same time, there is a strong religious and sectarian motivation among the rebels. You won’t be surprised to learn that the number of secular humanists in Idleb province is rather small.

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By Barry Rubin

The transition to democracy and capitalism has not been kind to Russia. It sank from superpower to sideshow internationally. The country is hurting and stagnant; it has no sense of purpose or goals; and Russia is in the hands of a ruthless dictator who knows how to use nationalism and demagoguery to ensure his power.

Of course, Russia’s rulers are weaker, less ambitious, far less well armed, and less anti-American than the old Soviet Union.  Still, though, the Russian government has a chip on its shoulder. It believes that the West betrayed it, tricked it into dropping Communism but then didn’t deliver prosperity. So the old traditional rivalry with the West and the United States has lost its Marxist element but gained a new factor.

Another new element is the search for money. Russia has two main assets: oil and the ability to export arms along with nuclear facilities that might be turned into weapons. Since the West, with a head start and superior products, has a head start, Russia has to seek riskier, more marginal clients which mean the more radical ones that the United States won’t accept. In short, Russia needs allies that don’t have the option of enjoying Western allies and suppliers.

What is most notable about Russian Middle East policy is that it tends to side with the extremist forces. These friends include primarily Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas.   Russia makes money by selling arms to Syria that Iran pays for, knowing that some of them will be transferred to Hizballah, and nuclear equipment to Iran. An alliance with Tehran also ensures that Iran doesn’t back Islamists within Russia.  Since there is no cost to Russia for engaging in this pro-radical policy it is most attractive.

In the UN, Russia has protected Iran from stronger sanctions and the Syrian regime from tougher action to back the revolutionary forces there.

Meanwhile, Russia’s regime is involved in a far less visible strategy of rebuilding its influence in Central Asia, the south Caucasus, and Central Europe. Russian enterprises, often strongly backed by the government, are buying up assets in these places, undermining the independence of former Soviet republics and some of the ex-satellites. The countries so menaced get virtually no support from the Obama Administration. Again, Russian policy is all gain, no cost.

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What’s so terrible about the ideological, agenda-based domination of the mass media and academia is that people don’t ask critical questions that undermine their political positions. Here’s one:

The Egyptian government says it will put on criminal trial 16 people who distributed funds to Egyptian moderates from pro-democracy forces. One of them is the son of U.S. Labor Secretary Ray LaHood. The prosecutions are going forward despite Obama administration threats to cut off all aid to Egypt, which mostly goes to the Egyptian military, which happens to run the country at present.

If Egypt’s government is ready for a confrontation risking its U.S. aid over this tiny and insignificant issue, then why should we believe that the fear of losing U.S. aid will keep it from imposing Islamization on its people, sponsoring anti-Israel terrorism, becoming entangled in a war with Israel, and doing all sorts of much more important stuff?

Haven’t seen that anywhere else, right?

Doesn’t this incident undercut all of the soothing words about how Egypt (or Libya, or other countries taken over by Islamists) will be constrained by such things?

And here’s a bonus question: Does anyone in those Islamist circles take Obama seriously as someone to fear?

Well, consider this:

Normal president: The Egyptian government is holding Americans as hostages. Therefore, I will withhold any proposal for more aid to Egypt until they are released.

Obama: The Egyptian government is holding Americans as hostages. Therefore, I will now introduce a proposal to give $800 million in aid to the new Arab governments, mostly to Egypt.

Get it? This administration either has no idea of how proper diplomacy and statecraft works, or doesn’t care. Either way, it is a disaster.

Now if you are a real moderate in the Arabic-speaking world, Turkey, or Iran, you know that your future looks very dim. You don’t draw your interpretations from the Western media. You don’t tremble at being thought an Islamophobe, because you probably are a Muslim yourself. So what do you do?

Another email has arrived in my box:

Things are getting too tough for a secular-oriented person like me. Can you help find me a job in a place that still has academic freedom?

I already have a collection of such messages and stories. There’s the engineer who found a teaching job in China; the journalist who is now in sub-Saharan Africa after being threatened with death; and the newly arrived Turkish Jews I’ve met in England, Canada, and the United States who have no illusions about the nature of the Ankara regime.

Suddenly, there are communities of thousands of Egyptian Christians in Europe, the United States, and Canada who weren’t there a little while ago. There is the well-known blogger who is now in the New World, and the democracy activist who has jumped out of the fire and into Washington, D.C.

And then there are the people who are talking about getting out. “You’re crazy,” says a relative of a more optimistic friend of mine to her complacent kinsman. “These people are building a dictatorship. I’m getting out of here with the children while there’s still time.”

Sensing what’s happening and going to happen, those who can get out are getting out. They include dedicated liberals who dreamed of democracy, and talented professionals who see no future in their homelands. Sure, lots of people would have loved to migrate before, but now they are either packing up or dusting off the suitcases. And their goal isn’t just to get a better life materially, but to have a life at all. They are, or will soon be, genuine political refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution.

I wonder how much higher the number of visa applications from Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey to North America, Europe, and Australia is now. Watch for their specialty stores, the churches of regional denominations, the ethnic restaurants opening in a neighborhood near you.

And they will find that the local extremists have preceded them there.

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There is a strong case that can be made for doing nothing about the Syrian civil war, but a stronger case can be made for doing something relatively low-cost and ineffective, indeed, precisely what the Syrian opposition is requesting.

Forget about major military intervention, which would be dangerous, costly, and above the level of available resources.

I’m also not enthusiastic about a major U.S. effort at regime change, since the Turkish regime wants an Islamist government in Damascus that might even be worse than what exists now. The less the Obama Administration is involved the more likely things are to go better.

Unfortunately, the Obama Administration doesn’t seem able to tell the difference between moderates and anti-American Islamists in Syria. Come to think about it, the Obama Administration isn’t too good at making such a distinction between such people in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, or Turkey either. Indeed, the U.S. government is taking the Muslim Brotherhood line on Syria.

Russia and China block UN action. The Arab League is talking about an international peacekeeping force but it’s hard to believe either that they would ever accept any non-Arab forces or they would send in their own armies to fight the Syrian military. Most likely this will all amount to nothing. Meanwhile, Syrian documents show that Tehran has provided $1 billion so far to back the regime against the rebels.

And will the Obama Administration shrug its shoulders — so to speak — and do nothing? Yes, quite probably.

There’s also an interesting political dynamic within Syria. I can’t say this with full confidence but there is evidence for the following thesis:  The “official” (that is, U.S.-Turkish chosen) opposition leadership doesn’t want armed struggle and indeed seems to prefer a deal with the Assad regime.

Why? Because they feel they aren’t going to win and can make some arrangement with the government that would lead to them coming to power at some time in the future when they have built a stronger political base. The opposition — despite all the Western observers confidently predicting Assad’s imminent fall — know they can’t win without outside help.

The strongest factor in the opposition are what might be called traditional, socially conservative Sunni Muslims. They might swing behind the Islamists; they are far less likely to back liberals. What might best be hoped for if the opposition wins is an Iraqi-style approach in which sectarian tensions and identities are heightened, the priority is put on getting things right at home, and they want to get along with the West without being “pro-Western.”

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The World Media Goes Bonkers: An Israel-Attacks-Iran Case Study

By Barry Rubin

For the second time in a few months we have seen a crazy global Israel-About-to-Attack-Iran Story. I don’t want to go into all of the details but this tale is an example of how the media has just lost it completely due to a combination of laziness (reporters don’t really do research or check sources); agenda; ignorance; and good old sensationalism. Partly, too, it arises from the difficulty of the mass media in dealing with the Internet media era and the difficulty of the Internet media in achieving decent journalistic standards.

A couple of months ago a level of hysteria was reached on the basis of three stories:

–A Jerusalem Post article, which could have been published just about any time in the last five years, saying that the Israeli air force was practicing for an attack on Iran.

–An interview with a former Israeli intelligence official who opposes attacking Iran saying that Israel had decided not to attack Iran but worrying that the prime minister might want to reopen discussion of the issue.

–A sensationalistic article in an Arab newspaper with no Israeli inside sources speculating that an attack was going to happen.

Out of this was built a worldwide story claiming something was going to happen that wasn’t. It was quickly shown to be wrong but no lesson was learned.

Now we’ve just been through phase two. A Washington Post columnist, not known for his accuracy, claimed that the U.S. defense secretary said that Israel was about to attack. This was immediately accepted as if the cabinet member had said so publicly when the supposed statement was completely unproven.  The man in question, Leon Panetta, denied the story.

In addition, a few hours later President Barack Obama said he knew Israel was not going to attack Iran. Think of what that means. Israeli leaders and American intelligence assessments have been daily reporting that no attack was imminent. If Obama knew it, Panetta knew it.

It is true that a respected Israeli journalist wrote an article based on interviews that he concluded there would be an attack. But my reading of the article concludes that they are clearly expressing concern and trying to influence Western policy. If Israel was about to attack, he wouldn’t have written the article at all. And consistent Israeli statements to the contrary were simply ignored. The most important was by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak who said what everyone knew: Israel would only attack if Iran had deliverable nuclear weapons, no decision had been made, and that was well in the future.

I could go on but what is lacking here is the equivalent of common sense.  There are many good reasons why Israel won’t attack Iran now which I have presented already. To its credit, the Los Angeles Times finally came up with a story noting that Israelis were “bemused” by all the hysteria that ran totally contrary to what they knew.

People have written about why Israel should not attack Iran but very few have written about why Israel would not attack Iran at this time. There has been indifference to all of the totally knowable factors involved regarding this decision.

In the end, the issue is one of fact. It is easily observable that Israel has not attacked Iran and still has not done so on any given date in the future. Yet what does this say about media coverage and public debate over other stories, especially international ones?

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A reader asks: Why is Egypt keeping Americans working with pro-democracy NGOs from leaving the country and threatening to put them on trial as criminals?

Here’s the answer:

1. The military rulers want to show they cannot be pushed around by the United States. This is, of course, also an effective way to muster popularity within Egypt. The resentment of foreign intervention is very high and as I pointed out in a recent article, even a U.S. Navy anti-disease program is being portrayed by a liberal party as a covert operation to spread disease, murder Egyptian children, and weaken Egypt so Israel can defeat it.

2. The armed forces want to weaken the “moderate” parties by blocking foreign aid to them.  These forces are the junta’s main critics and are organizing demonstrations against the government.

3. Ironically, the moderates are demanding the military turn over power to the Islamists even faster!  Yet there is no reason to believe that the armed forces will not give up power after the presidential elections in June. There have already been a lot of ideas for a deal between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military. For example, a special parliamentary committee could be created to manage the military budget on terms satisfactory to the generals. While the Brotherhood has demanded the government’s resignation, this seems more like a way of building leverage than a serious goal. In just five months there will be a new president and the junta will dissolve.

4. The Islamists, who did get almost 75 percent of the vote in the election, support this tough strategy in order to weaken their moderate rivals and also because they are anti-American and xenophobic. This is only the beginning of the anti-American populism/nationalism/Islamism we are going to be seeing in Egypt from now on.

What’s amazing is that nobody is pointing out that if an Egyptian government is willing to risk U.S. aid and have a confrontation on this small issue, what are they going to do regarding big issues!? What happens when the Egyptian government moves toward Islamism or helps Hamas fight Israel on some level? We have been told that fear of losing U.S. aid will constrain Egypt. But we are now seeing that this simply isn’t true.

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“Different men often see the same subject in different lights.” — Patrick Henry, 1775

Below is a fascinating exchange telling us not only about the contemporary state of Islam, Islamism, and the political issues involving them, but also about the debates and conflicts shaping Western civilization today. The exchange also taught me about the common theme between revolutionary Islamism and the revolutionary leftism that today masquerades as liberalism.

The interviewee is Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a leading Islamist presidential candidate in Egypt — the Salafists’ favorite. I’ll annotate his dialogue with my analysis. (Thanks to Raymond Ibrahim for the translation):

Host: You have already begun to try to impose a particular dress code for us.

Abu Ismail: I’ve begun to? It’s the Lord of the Worlds [Allah] who said so. I have nothing to do with it!

Salafists have been setting up vigilante groups to impose a dress code, especially on women. Though not much has happened so far, this is obviously a very dangerous implication for Egypt’s future.

What Abu Ismail is saying is that all sorts of extremist things (by Western standards and even — as we will shall see in a moment — the standards of many Muslims) are innate in Islam. In other words, by contemporary standards Abu Ismail is an Islamophobe.

But listen to how the host, who is also a Muslim, puts it. No, he says — this is not imposed by Allah, but by “you.” After all, the host could say, Egypt has been a pious Muslim country for a long time without such measures.

The host thus gives his interpretation of Islam:

Host: Allah left it for me to decide as a personal freedom.

Abu Ismail: Who said that? Where’d you get that from? See, that’s the whole point: If you claim that Allah considers it your personal freedom, show me your reference? Nobody has ever said that — except for people who have no understanding of Sharia.

Host: There is “no coercion in religion” [Koran 2:256].

Note that the host can come up with a key phrase and indeed one that is often used on Western audiences to prove the liberality of Islam. Some day — though it may be a century or two from now — an entire moderate Islamic theology could be built on that phrase. But that’s not going to happen in 2012.

When Abu Ismail says that only “people [who] have no understanding of Sharia” could disagree with him, he is simply asserting that his interpretation is the only valid one. This is the way of all totalitarian ideologies, true also for Communism, Nazism, fascism, and Arab nationalism:

Abu Ismail: This is concerning the creed. You don’t force someone to convert to Islam.

Host: So when Allah in the Koran mentions “religion”, it is synonymous with “creed”?

Abu Ismail: Exactly.

Host: So when He says, “Today I have perfected your religion for you” [Koran 5:3], He is only talking about the “creed.”

Abu Ismail: Yes …

Thus, Abu Ismail interprets Islam as a perfect dictatorship in which only one view is permitted, which happens to be his view. This is not how Islam has functioned historically, at least in modern history. There have been different schools of thought and variations in practice. Of course, there are limits that cannot be transcended, but that’s true of all religions.

Ah — but that brings us to a fascinating point, an understanding of the substructure of what’s going on here. Let me present a thesis:

Islamism, though quite different in its specific precepts, is parallel to Western leftism, and vice-versa. Each system claims to know what is the perfect society coinciding with the demands of God (Islamism) and that of logic and ecology (Western leftism).

The host proclaims freedom in parallel to, say, the U.S. Declaration of Independence:

Host: Allah left it for me to decide as a personal freedom.

The Declaration of Independence speaks of the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” endowing individuals “with certain unalienable Rights … among them are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Patrick Henry said in 1775: “Different men often see the same subject in different lights.” Precisely. But what does it bring when one group has the ability to impose its view on every aspect of society on all others? Liberalism developed in the nineteenth century precisely to reject the ability of an overly strong conservative state, structure, and ideology to do so. Now the same basic problem has returned, albeit with the position of the two sides reversed.

The two top-down systems of our era — the far left in the West, Islamism in the “east” — say, respectively: God or logic and nature tell you what precisely what you must do. I am the proper interpreter of those sources of Correctness. I’m going to make you do these things — to obey Allah or save the planet or live a healthy life, etc. — or else.

And the opposing view is: No, God and the nature of the world have given us freedom within wide but reasonable boundaries.

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(Also read: “The World Media Goes Bonkers: An Israel-Attacks-Iran Case Study”)

Since we can’t get good coverage of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the Western media, it’s necessary to turn to the Islamists’ intended victims — Arab liberals — to get a better picture. NowLebanon explains it all to you in an article on what it calls the “media blitz” of the Muslim Brotherhood and its politicians in the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP):

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has been displaying great skill in handling the media over the past year. Since the revolution last January and the party’s electoral success in the recent round of polls in the country, the Brotherhood’s media outlets have tirelessly tried to project an image of moderation. But many secularists and leftists remain suspicious.

The problem is that it has had the full cooperation of the Western media and governments in selling itself as moderate. Here are the NowLebanon talking points:

– “`The Brotherhood is very savvy and clever when it comes to the media, and they know their audience very well. They certainly have very good media advisors,’ says Khaled Fahmy, professor of History at the American University in Cairo.”

– “The Brotherhood has set up a TV channel and a newspaper, and both it and the FJP have been keeping daily-updated websites in English and Arabic.”

– “Their Twitter page, Ikhwanweb, has almost 8,500 followers. The managers of the account regularly engage their followers in lively discussions, and the FJP is the only party in Egypt that has its own smartphone App.”

“`They show a high degree of sophistication,’ says Said Sadek, a political analyst in Cairo.”

– “Sadek, along with other liberal and leftist commentators in Egypt, believe that the Brotherhood’s efforts aim at concealing their real intentions. `The Brotherhood and the FJP are trying to appease the growing fears of an Islamist takeover. They want to appear liberal. But what they are saying is just lip service,’ [Sadek] says.”

– “`The Brotherhood [speaks with] two tongues. … To the international community they talk like the Gulf States. But to their own members they send a different message,’ says Sadek.”

– “Senior leader of the Brotherhood Essam El-Erian recently said in an interview with the New York Times that the Camp David Accords are a `commitment of the state, not a group or a party, and this we respect.’ But other members of the Brotherhood said that there are parts of the treaty that will be revised, while still others have called for a national referendum on the pact. The peace treaty is widely unpopular in Egypt and would probably fail in a public referendum.”

– “The chairman of the Brotherhood, Mohammed Badi…said that after the elections his group got closer to establishing a `rightly guided caliphate.’ After newspaper commentaries used Badi’s statement to say that the Brotherhood wants to create a fundamentalist state, FJP spokesmen rushed forward to counter. Instead, they claimed that Badi was talking about something more in line with an economic union, like in Europe.”

In other words, while the Brotherhood’s rhetoric is fooling the West, it is scaring local liberals and Egyptian Christians even more as they observe the double talk. They know that what is said in Arabic is what really counts.

——-

Here is a good article on Kuwait’s election. The Islamists got 48 percent and the liberals were flattened, but it’s different from other countries because of a corruption scandal and a complex tribal situation. Here’s the point I found fascinating: the royal family is allied with the liberals in opposing Sharia law.

A good article on a whistle-blowing colonel who insists — accurately, I think — that the U.S. forces are not really winning in Afghanistan. Published to its credit by the New York Times.

And a great op-ed in the Washington Post by the leader of Turkey’s opposition on how the regime is turning the country into a police state.

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Want to understand the real Middle East? Then pay attention to the following. Let’s say an important and outspoken Gulf Arab gave a frank and thoughtful assessment of the region’s security problems. What would he say and what would that tell you? And how would that differ from the stereotypes of what Arabs — especially non-Islamist Arab leaders — think as presented by the Western media and academia?

In fact, Dahi Khalfan Tamim recently gave such a speech. He is the respected police chief of Dubai. I don’t agree that everything he says reflects reality but I believe — and there is plenty of other evidence for this assertion — that everything he says reflects what the Gulf Arab elite thinks.

First, let’s quote President Barack Obama’s State of the Union message:

“The United States [is] safer and more respected around the world.”

Is America seen as weak and unreliable? No, says Obama:

“That’s not the message we get from leaders around the world, all of whom are eager to work with us. That’s not how people feel from Tokyo to Berlin; from Capetown to Rio; where opinions of America are higher than they’ve been in years.”

More respected? Higher opinions? Well what does Tamim think? Just this:

“In my opinion, U.S. policy in the region is the number one security threat. Our American friends might not like this, but experience has taught us that the Americans do not have friends. On the contrary, they are quick to wash their hands of their friends.”

This, of course, is a reference to Obama dumping the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes while also reflecting the Gulf Arabs’ observing Washington’s breaking of agreements with the horrible Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, U.S. support for the overthrow of Bahrain’s regime, and even lack of backing for Israel. Even if relatively moderate Arabs don’t like the U.S.-Israel alliance, they know that American behavior in that case also shows how it treats allies. As a Saudi said privately not long ago, “If you treat Israel, part of your family, like this, how are you going to treat us?”

Obama says that the U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan are a success; that his policy has weakened Iran; and that his support for the “Arab Spring” and the Islamist movement is bringing gains for the United States.

What does Tamim think?

“U.S. policy in the Gulf constitutes a threat, because they have ulterior motives: to overthrow the regimes….They adopted the path and ideology of Khomeini. They embraced the same idea, and began to export the revolution.”

What revolution? The Islamist revolution. In the Middle East, if you are for change and Islamists taking power, then you are against the governments of Algeria, Israel, Jordan, and all the Gulf Arab governments.

It is a mistake — though we can understand why Gulf Arabs make it — to think the Obama administration supports Iran, the external threat they face. But it is no mistake to think that despite all of its efforts on the Iranian nuclear program, the Obama administration is doing nothing to battle the spread of Iranian influence in places like Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon or its overall hegemony in the Gulf.

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