Obama and the Iran Nuclear Veil: Covering Up Iran Nuclear Weapons Cooperation with North Korea?
In less than a month, Congress will vote on the Iran nuclear deal. It's a terrible deal, in all its sanctions-melting, cash-bestowing, arms-and-missile-embargo-lifting, nuclear-enrichment-approving and self-sunsetting capitulation to Iran.
It's even worse for having been rushed by the Obama administration to the United Nations Security Council for approval on July 20th, just six days after it was announced, and one day after the Obama administration officially transmitted a copy to Congress. And it's worse still for relying on secret side deals between Iran and the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency to handle inspections pertaining to Iran's past work on nuclear weapons -- the "possible military dimensions."
And still it gets worse, the latest bombshell being the news this past week from the Associated Press that according to leaked information on one of these secret side deals, the IAEA has agreed to let Iran carry out its own sampling for inspections of its past nuclear weapons work at the Parchin military site. As an AP story sums it up, the agreement "will let the Iranians themselves look for signs of the very activity they deny -- past work on nuclear weapons."
There's now a kerfuffle over whether the leaked document reproduced by the AP is the real McCoy, and even if it is, whether this arrangement is as appalling as it sounds (I'd say yes), or whether, as the IAEA contends, letting Iran do its own sampling is reasonable.
But here's one bottom line that's beyond dispute: Despite earlier promises to share the full deal with Congress, the Obama administration has been defending these secret side deals as entirely reasonable and reliable: nothing to see here, it's all yesterday's news, the IAEA will take care of things, just move along.
Not that Obama administration officials believe Iran's claims to have done no work on nuclear weapons. This June, Secretary of State John Kerry told the press, "We know what they did. We have no doubt. We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in." But Kerry mentioned this in the course of arguing that there was no need to be "fixated" on obtaining an accounting from Iran. Nor did he provide any specifics of that "absolute knowledge."
Actually, there are very good reasons for being fixated on a full and transparent accounting. These reasons go well beyond the technical needs of nuclear inspectors, who must know the past in order to establish a baseline.
A big question, which has not figured in the debate over these secret side deals -- though it certainly should -- is whether Iran's past work on nuclear weapons was done in cahoots with any other countries. For instance, the rogue nuclear-proliferating tyranny of North Korea.
If Kerry and the rest of the Obama administration know of any such nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Iran, they have not officially shared this information with the public. Any such confirmation would be, in itself, a blockbuster piece of news -- raising huge questions about Iran's potential use of North Korea's lively nuclear production and test facilities as a back shop for the Iranian nuclear weapons program that under this deal Tehran is supposed to be giving up.