U.S. Lies, Minimizes, Obfuscates About Nuclear Terror Risk
On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City was devastated by a horrific explosion resulting from the detonation of a truckload of diesel fuel and fertilizer.
What if the explosive had been nuclear?
For all practical purposes, the physical destruction would have been roughly comparable. As Gertrude Stein might have put it, “A bomb is a bomb, is a bomb, is a bomb.” From a psychological and political standpoint, however, the difference would have been enormous.
It would have been the first nuclear device used in anger since July 1945, when Nagasaki was devastated by a single 20-kiloton bomb. Regardless of the magnitude of the explosion, which would have been extremely low compared with past and present nuclear weapons, the political and psychological results would have made past terrorist acts shrink into oblivion.
Are there nations possessing nuclear explosives that could have conducted such a terrible act? The answer, of course, is yes: the U.S., Russia, England, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel, plus others we don’t really know about. However, in today’s complicated nuclear-political equation, one nation stands out.
In terms of nuclear wannabes of concern, Iran tops the list for contentiousness. Nearly having the capability to deliver just one nuclear terror device, and not necessarily a military weapon, raises the possibility that the next hostile nuclear burst may solely have a malicious, political intent. This changes the equation for much of the Western world, particularly the United States, which has been phobic on discussing this issue.
Our national security matters, in particular our nuclear intelligence, has been run with outrageous duplicity to the world and to ourselves. From the very beginning following WWII, United States policy has been based on the practice of first worrying about the nuclear threat, then minimizing and even denying it.