The WikiLeaks Hoax, Part II
In part I of “The WikiLeaks Hoax,” I adduced a number of reasons for concluding that the much vaunted “whistleblower organization” WikiLeaks is, in fact, just a facade. This was not always the case. The original WikiLeaks website was, as I have put it, an “equal opportunity” platform for leaks of all sorts. It did not share the current site’s single-minded focus on alleged American misdeeds. The original site went offline in December 2009. Despite the new site’s common logo and “branding,” in substance, the old site has never returned.
Just who or what stands behind the WikiLeaks facade is not clear. But what is clear is that WikiLeaks has a special relationship with Germany, a country that spearheaded the opposition to the Iraq war and that -- despite the avowed Atlanticism of its current chancellor -- has continued to take a generally dismal view of America’s war on terror. Indeed, Germany has done much not only to malign, but even to obstruct the war on terror. (For related links, see here.) In a recent documentary on The Hunt for Bin Laden, Germany’s ZDF public television went so far as to insinuate that American authorities purposely allowed Osama bin Laden to escape from his mountain hideout of Tora Bora in December 2001.
The special relationship of WikiLeaks with Germany is manifest in the inclusion of the German weekly Der Spiegel among the new site’s chosen three “media partners.” It is also manifest in the site’s maintenance of a special account for donations at the Berlin-based Wau-Holland Foundation. (The WikiLeaks donations pages note that “this may be the best choice for German residents” and, furthermore, that donations to the Wau Holland account are even tax-deductible for the latter!) And it is manifest, finally, in the sketchy details that are available about the “structure” of the supposed WikiLeaks “organization.”
For if the reportedly Australian-born Julian Assange is the WikiLeaks spokesperson for the rest of the world, WikiLeaks also has a special dedicated spokesperson for Germany -- or “that region,” as Assange put it in a testy comment on a September 2009 Wired exposé about the site. The German spokesperson is named Daniel Schmitt. But “Schmitt” has admitted -- to Wired, as well as several German publications -- that his last name is a pseudonym.
In an interview with the German daily Die Welt, Schmitt was asked who has decision-making power in WikiLeaks and how many people were at his “level in the organization.” Schmitt’s head-spinning response was as follows:
Five people, I’m one of them. Though I am left out of all technical decisions. You can’t get hold of me to find out something. I don’t know anything. We are doers. None of [us] has a lot of time to discuss and to over-democratize everything. The only way to build up a reputation and trust within the organization is to collaborate: to show that one is competent. Around the inner circle, there are about 1000 experts with whom we work and whom, of course, we test in advance.
Schmitt’s logorrhoea hardly inspires confidence in the reliability of his account of the “organization.” In any case, one may be permitted to wonder what exactly “1000 experts” contribute to a site that, despite its association with two publicity-generating coups, has essentially been inactive. One thousand “experts”… and WikiLeaks could not manage to renew a SSL certificate.
As discussed in my “The Strange Career of WikiLeaks,” the “old” WikiLeaks had a somewhat conflictual relationship with Germany and, in particular, with the German foreign intelligence agency, the BND. Perhaps ironically, arguably the biggest genuine scoop produced by the old site involved blowing the agency’s online cover. In November 2008, the site published a list of IP address ranges that had been assigned to the BND under a disguised domain name by the German telecommunications firm Deutsche Telekom.
At the time, the WikiLeaks submissions form was still functional, and it is presumably via the form that the document was uploaded to the WikiLeaks servers. The story became even bigger when it was discovered that the outed BND-linked IP addresses had been used to edit Wikipedia entries. In the most astonishing of the known edits, a presumptive BND employee added advice on how to build a “dirty bomb” to a German-language Wikipedia entry on "Nuclear Weapons Technology." The same IP address was used to edit the German-language Wikipedia entry on the BND itself, editing out a reference to the “open secret” that the agency uses branches of the Goethe Institute in foreign countries as its “unofficial headquarters.”
Oddly enough, the WikiLeaks editors somewhat downplayed the significance of their scoop. The WikiLeaks “summary” on the matter suggests that the BND contributor to the "Nuclear Weapons" entry “apparently had second thoughts” and quickly deleted the advice on “dirty bombs.” Simple consultation of the relevant Wikipedia user logs shows, however, that this is false: the contributor had added the same passage twice and merely eliminated the redundancy. Otherwise, the WikiLeaks “summary” page tells us that the BND personnel made “a lot of standard edits.”