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The Weakness of the West

In a recent colloquium at the National Archives in Ottawa on the subject of multiculturalism and the advancing subversion of the West, the question arose as to why the most advanced and preeminent civilization the world has ever seen appears to be imploding. It is in every respect stronger than its enemies and competitors and yet is clearly faltering, insecure in its purposes, given to appeasement and self-doubt, and dismissive of its own unmatchable history. Many reasons have been put forward for what is plainly an inward decline, from the natural inevitability of civilizational decay to the loss of religious faith and moral conviction to the apathy and narcissism of a flaccid and materially pampered citizenry.

Muslim author Salim Mansur, whose new book Delectable Lie was the focus of the discussion, steered a different tack, suggesting that our fate might be explained by two iconic figures from literature, Oedipus and Hamlet. This is a provocative insight that needs to be unpacked. Both are royal leaders, one a king and the other a prince in succession to the throne. Both wish to purge their kingdoms of corruption, sickness, and the scourge of illegitimacy. Both are driven to find and expose a buried truth so that the realm may be healed and purified.

Herein lies the problem and the paradox, for in seeking to disinter what is hidden or suppressed, both Oedipus and Hamlet in their diverse ways bring disaster upon themselves, one as a result of a relentless pursuit and the other owing to relentless reflection. One acts and the other fails to act, but the consequences are no less destructive: blindness and death.

If I understand him aright, Mansur’s point is that the central strength of Western civilization is also its attendant weakness, namely, contradictory as this may initially sound, the fostering of critical thought. The valorizing of the concept of truth and the search to discover it rather than adhere to a dogmatic authority which declares without evidence what a people are to believe and to accept as indisputable — or in a current formulation, “the science is settled” — represents the best that civilization has to offer. The conflict between truth and doctrine is, of course, inherent in Western civilization, but the steady progression, despite innumerable setbacks, toward the vision of the European Enlightenment and the legacy it bequeathed to the modern age was ultimately unstoppable. The problem is that the search for truth can — and does — issue in calamitous revelations, as with Oedipus, or in prolonged introspection leading to inaction, as with Hamlet.

If we examine the intellectual and political history of the West from the Enlightenment to the present day, it becomes obvious that Mansur’s theory is persuasive. The Oedipal pursuit of truth conducted by some of the celebrated philosophical minds in the West has led to the destabilizing and ironic conclusion that there is no such thing as “truth.” The pivotal tenet of Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals, the source of the postmodern movement in contemporary academic thought and scholarship, is that “there are no facts, only interpretation.” In What Is History, E.H. Carr defines the study and writing of history as a “hard core of interpretation surrounded by a pulp of disputable facts.” French post-structuralist Michel Foucault, in works like The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, claims that what we call truth is only the expression of dominant power relations that control the cultural semiotic, or “episteme.” In Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida, the founder of the “Deconstructive” school of thought, which has infected the curriculum of the Humanities in European and American universities, notoriously argued that “origins” are infinitely recessive and that words appeal not to facts but to other words—what he designates as différance, suggesting both deferral and difference. His colleague, the Belgian scholar Paul de Man whose Allegories of Reading  has had an equally deleterious affect on intellectual life, developed the notion of “rhetorical slippage,” the imp that inhabits language and sees to it that we can never say what we mean or even determine what we mean in the first place.

These are only a few of the names among the burgeoning caste of iconoclasts, schismatics, deconstructors, nihilists, post-structuralists, post-modernists and post-whateverites who have embarked on a campaign to undo the heritage of Western culture. This revisionist movement has been massively influential and, indeed, instrumental in preparing the way for the plague of cultural relativism from which we suffer today. Oblivious to the inconsistency intrinsic to such thought—that their argument is invalidated by the very position they have adopted respecting truth claims—these anti-cognitive guerrillas have nonetheless distorted a fundamental element of Western thinking: that truth is discernible. The Oedipal search for truth has paradoxically undermined and eviscerated the cultural investment in the epistemological quest for truth itself and those who have sought the grail will find themselves holding a Styrofoam cup. A virtue has become a vice.

A similar result flows from what we might term the Hamletic inquiry into the “problem” of truth, which differs from the Oedipal enterprise in that Hamlet is more preoccupied with the action to be taken in the wake of his conclusions. Once the truth is discovered—Hamlet is no relativist—how is one to proceed? Is violent intervention called for? Or protracted diplomacy? Or continued investigation to ascertain if the “truth” conceals yet more intricacies that must be isolated, turned over and over, examined for minute distinctions that require yet further study before settling upon a course of action? The outcome is that there is no outcome but only more reflection and intellectual stasis—until the moment arrives when it is too late to respond effectively to a growing peril or an imminent disaster.

We can observe this access of dysfunctional inertia, this phlegmatism of the mind, conspicuously at work in our politicians and diplomats, who cannot bring themselves to determine upon a sensible, coherent and effective mode of action in the face of pressing complexities. Admittedly, they are sometimes capable of reacting, but their reactions resemble reflex gesticulations or autonomic responses that generally make things worse. The American president lunging into Egypt and Libya is a perfect example of such immediate buffoonery. What we note on such occasions is the glaring absence of thought.