Blasting Middle East Delusions
Efraim Karsh, professor emeritus at King’s College London and currently professor of political studies at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, has written a tour de force on the follies of great-power Middle East policies over the past century, down to the disastrous misconceptions and blunders of President Barack Obama.
The Tail Wags the Dog begins with some myth-busting about the Sykes-Picot agreement, now ritually denounced as a British-French imperialist grab of the Middle East from which its current woes originate. Actually, Karsh demonstrates from the historical record, Britain and France sought to construct a unified Arab empire that would replace the Ottoman Empire. Instead they were outmaneuvered by local actors—namely Sharif Hussein of Mecca and his sons, Faisal and Abdullah—into forging what are now Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, of which the latter two (at least) were undoubtedly problematic entities from the start.
Britain kept at it in Palestine, where, first, it accepted the League of Nations mandate to promote the Jewish national home; then, succumbing to Arab violence, increasingly betrayed that mandate to the point of sealing off Palestine to Jews almost entirely during the Holocaust; then finally misjudged Jewish tenacity and exited Palestine in humiliation as the Jewish state arose and survived despite the best, pro-Arab, malevolent efforts of Britain’s postwar Labour government.
Karsh then turns to the sad case of U.S. policy in Iran, where decades of cultivating an alliance with the pro-Western shah collapsed in the 1979 Khomeinist debacle. “The Shah,” the CIA assessed in 1977, would remain “the dominant figure in Iran into and possibly throughout the 1980s.” Instead came the Iranian Revolution, “a volcanic eruption of long-suppressed popular passions and desires” as Karsh calls it, one that, typically, the U.S. failed to foresee or understand.
And so it has gone. The Soviet Union, too, in Karsh’s telling, proved inept and ineffectual in the region, unable to dissuade Arab allies like Egypt and Syria from attacking Israel in 1967 and 1973—though here Karsh leaves out Moscow’s encouragement of Arab belligerence with its virulent anti-Zionist propaganda and support for PLO terrorism. And the Soviets, of course, had an even worse time of it in Afghanistan, where their 1979 military intervention turned into a decade-long nightmare resulting in “dozens of thousands of Soviet casualties, over a million Afghan fatalities, and untold mayhem and dislocation….”
No doubt the 1991 U.S. intervention in Kuwait, which succeeded in ousting Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces, went much better. But here too, Karsh points out, Washington misjudged Saddam’s intentions to the end and was blindsided by the invasion; then, after ejecting him, failed to protect Iraq’s Kurds and Shiites from his murderous wrath despite promises to that effect, with Saddam remaining malevolently in power for another 12 years.
Then came the second Bush administration’s 2003 intervention in Iraq. The ambition to build a democracy there, Karsh says, was “far easier said than done.” Iraq had long been “torn by ethnic, social and religious schisms—with the dominant Arab population hopelessly polarized between Shiite and Sunni communities….” But if Bush was overoptimistic about Iraq, his successor as president had much more comprehensive delusions.