” I’m not so sure our trying to take out their sites (which we’re probably going to attempt somehow) will effect any change in Syria.”

Nor would I. Up to this point, Assad’s been taking advantage of the first law of thermodynamics (when the heat’s on somebody else, it’s not on you), and a strike on Iranian nuke sites wouldn’t change that. And if that’s the sum total of our strategy, I’d agree with your assessment. But I doubt it is, partly because it’s only marginally feasible, and partly because it doesn’t fit into a larger [grand] strategy.

Assuming the Administration had a plan from the beginning, a statement of the problem/solution would look something like:

The CIA had been working the bin Laden problem for years. We have a 60-country problem, he told the group. [. . .] “Let’s pick them off one at a time,” Bush replied.

The nations of interest are the State Department’s near/mideast terror sponsors: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Libya (and Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with support structures in Saudi Arabia). And the goal in each case is public renouncement of terrorism or regime change.

If that’s in fact our strategy, democratization is the ultimate long-term goal, but more of a side benefit than an immediate aim. The essential part of the Iraq campaign–regime change–is already complete. The same is true for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, and Sudan. The next step is regime change in Iran. After which, lighting a fire under Assad ought to be effective.

“Also, getting Syria in line will be important to achieving any Israeli- Palestinian settlement . . . “

All good stuff, and arguably the root cause of the whole Mideast mess. But it’s not the center of gravity, and ultimately manageable by Israel–while Iran is not. The Mullahs are also far more dangerous, the most militant and active terror sponsor, and IMO the logical next step in the WoT.