We should be watching the election results, not microexamining operations. I’m certain Zarqawi would like to know which MOS’ are being called as well.

From the beginning, there has been a shortage of combat MP’s, most of whom wound up in “corrections” rather than in combat roles (street clearing, convoy protection, etc.) The corrections end included Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and a few other installations where many MP’s without a corrections specialty languished.

Signal MOS’s might also be needed, and other support specialities,(engineers, etc.) It’s hard to imagine that 3-5000 would alter the balance in infantry positions, unless they’re being used as replacements.

However, this doesn’t stop alarmists such as Andrew Sullivan from shrieking, “I told you so, I told you so.” ( http://www.andrewsullivan.com/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_11_21_dish_archive.html#110109421076049230 ). Andrew Sullivan, the military expert!!! My favorite quote: “The level of troops – like the war in general – is far too important to be left to the military.” I can’t even begin to figure that one out. Has the man never heard of Vietnam, a war in which the President and the civilians in the Cabinet were roundly criticized for micromanaging such things and interfering in decisions that required military expertise? Or, perhaps Sullivan REALLY thinks such things would be better left to journalists such as himself.

Is Army set up with enough linguists to do their own local surveillance in Iraq? I thought that NSA was the prime agency for generating actionable data for stuff like that…

Interagency is always a bottleneck, of course.

I don’t know if Army even does cellphone/satphone monitoring…but my brief exposure to Marine SigInt types was enough to know that they love nothing more than finding new ways to use the other folks’ comms against them.

If they ask, they shall receive, and more power to them.

It makes more sense to move commands vice individual replacements, which is a lesson learned at great cost in Vietnam. The theater units that have lost effectiveness due to casualties over the last month will probably be rotatated to quieter areas as they refit for the rest of their tours.

New units will augment where needed.

The end result is a lower-stress environment for the refitting units, acquisition of expertise and confidence on the part of the new units, and shorter reaction times to enemy attacks, coupled with greater commander’s latitude on where and when to conduct offensive operations…which I believe is probably the driving force behind the request.

We’ve gutted the enemy’s redoubt. Now we “keep up the skeer’ – maintain the initiative we siezed and keep the enemy reacting until they are driven off the field or so deep in their holes that the Iraqis can deal with them in detail.

Bad news for the bad guys. I used to look for a ‘hot pursuit’ declaration from this administration – a public statement naming what regimes were actively exporting personnel and support to the terror effort in Iraq – but I now understand that the value of siphoning off jihadis from other places to die or be capturedin Iraq pays for itself in enough ways to be tolerated.

Carry on.

I tend to leave this kind of thing to the guys in the field, they know what they need and when they need it.

It could be they did not ask for more troops before because they felt they did not need them until now.

If they are calling for chemical warfare units, we are in very deep trouble.