@wretchard: “So I don’t see a confrontation with Russia, rather a slow strangulation of its forces should they decide to stay. If they pull back into Russia, or even into Abkhazia or South Ossetia, I don’t see that NATO forces will do anything to discomfit them. As I said, Putin should cash in now, while the gettin’s good.”
It’s the diplomat’s game now.
Russian professes it’s ..um… “military professionals” to be a “peacekeeping” force. The world knows that this is a lie, but diplomats can’t use that sort of language. Instead, they’ll take the Russian’s at their word. If in fact, Russia’s mission is to protect “Russian nationals” in the two break-away Georgian provinces, to prevent “ethnic cleansing”, and their current military posture is not an “invasion force” but a “defensive peacekeeping force”, then all that’s required is to displace the Russian’s with a truly neutral military force of U.N. peacekeepers. A legitimate force could include US troops under UN command, or other nationals, but it could not include participates from littoral states (e.g. Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, or Bulgaria). If the Russians, South Ossetians, and Abkhazians return to their homes, Russian forces return home, and a UN force “demilitarizes” Georgia (Georgian troops return to their bases), Russia has no diplomatic leg to stand one. If the UN mandate includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then Russian would arguably lose the ability to conduct war against Georgia via proxy. Citizenship issues can be ironed out, those short-haired 18 to 24 year old “recent immigrants” who have immigrated from Russian over the last five years can return home to apply for formal visa’s from Georgia, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia have a true shot at determining exactly what sort of government they want. They could become semi-autonomous territories entities such as Guam and Puerto Rico are to the U.S..
Of course, this is the scenario from the West’s perspective. Russia will try to counter via military action (e.g. possession is 9/10ths of international law), by holding “mock” elections in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and by forming the UN force favorable to Russia’s goals and disposition. Russian will advance these territories as “new independent democratic states” before the UN. That “peaceful” settlement will have a lot of support both from (corrupt) Western Europe as well as via Russian aligned states (e.g. aligned directly or indirectly). And of course, Russian will exercise it’s veto with abandon when it comes to the mandate, ROE, duration of the mandate, and content of the actual UN peacekeeping force composition (e.g no armor, no competent forces, no air cover, limited intelligence capability, no Naval forces, i.e. there are lots of ways to hamstring a peacekeeping operation, and Russian has been exercising those diplomatic capabilities for 50 years).
So, then, what’s the current purpose of the USN and NATO Navy’s in and around the Black Sea (aside from, of course, humanitarian purposes)? Force projection. Fill any vacuum left unoccupied by the Russians and temporarily vacated by the Georgians. Suck up any “oxygen” available to the Russian’s to operate in areas they do not already control, and pressure the Russians to operate as peacekeepers where they do operate. Fulfill the US Navy’s historical role, i.e. keeping the “sea lanes of communication” open and free.
I seriously doubt there will be any initial direct confrontation between US and Russian forces. The USN forces will advance under the unstated assumption that the Black Sea and Georgian ports are open and free. Russian ships will be allowed use as well as any other nation, but military hardware may be restricted (e.g. partial blockade). The USN would need some of the littoral states to invite the U.S. “humanitarian forces” in until a UN force is in place. There is ample precedent for this (though I don’t know if the terms of the Montreux Convention can be adjusted to allow a foreign Naval presence there for over 21 days – this is a real problem unless we reflag warships as dual US/Ukrainian).
In the end, the diplomatic show-down will proceed with U.S. forces waiting in the wings. The U.S. does not need to launch a CAP over Georgia or put boots and tanks on the ground to impact the Russian’s ability to maneuver and resupply. Push will come to shove diplomatically before any US/Russian clash in the ground. And, expect the Texan still in the White House to use his “shit-kickers” to bring NATO into line. NATO needs the US more than the US needs NATO, now more than ever, and the US has already committed to redeploy existing Western European bases to Eastern European allies. The USA can do more than that if Germany, France, or other Western European countries insist on giving Russia a blank check over Georgia, the Ukraine, and other new Nato entrant’s or applicants. I really don’t see GWB sitting by the White House hearth this winter, waiting to retire, while Eastern Europe goes to hell in a hand basket. Bush said that there would be repercussions: keep watching.
Your scenario could indeed come to fruition, i.e. the US and Russian forces could start maneuvering for advantage, with the US squeezing Russia at it’s most vulnerable point, i.e. logistics, with Russian moving into more of Georgia proper, even living off the land in response. Or, Russian could move other chess pieces, e.g. using Cuba and Venezuela to create havoc along the US Western Borders, by messing with oil supplies (and of course, world prices). I think that Bush will move along the line of action I laid out, playing Putin’s game against him as long as Putin constrains that game. If Putin makes the mistake of issuing naked ultimatums, launching attacks directly on US forces, or threatening the US in any significant way, I think observers here will be shocked at how fast US forces move to change the balance of power in Georgia. Russia can be hurt in Georgia, and though I and many others would kind of like to see that, there is both the Nuclear showdown aspect and the oft spoken maxim of “if you break it you clean it up” to constrain the US (not to mention the war-bored/war-weary US electorate). Bush will pursue diplomacy first, and the US fleet will be the hammer that keeps Russia from using diplomacy to consolidate its gains indefinitely.








