@wretchard:
I just posted this on the horrifically old M.Totten thread but it seems to be more relevant to this topic, so I hope you don’t mind my substantially reposting it here.
One question I have is what is it ships like the Aegis tubs bring to the party? Air control, right? The other is what are the roles and rules of engagement for US forces on the ground going to be?
As to what Aegis and the frigates bring to the party, well, control of the air with missiles is one. Then, iff we start landing Patriots and SAM’s, aren’t we going to own whatever air we say we own? If so, the Russian troops dug in around Poti–all their “checkpoint” operators–are going to be feeling awfully bare naked, no matter how deep those trenches are.
But, other than promising to shoot down anything Russian-allied in the air over “free” Georgia (not Abkhazia or South “Ossettia”) do Americans on the ground have a value? Yes.
In a “Cold” war the primary belligerents never engage each other with direct fire; if a Big Bugger Belligerent gets shot at, it’s always from a proxy for the other side. That, so goes the theory, short cuts escalations which could quickly become a “Hot” War, i.e. thermonuclear hotte — whew! and that’s MAD hot, baby!
So, can our own forces on the scene afford to go eyeball to eyeball with the Russkies? I’d say no. Can our Special Operations Forces sabotage, e.g. the Roki tunnel? I’d say no. Can our Aegis tubs or Patriot batteries clear the skies over Abkhazia or South “Ossettia”? Again, I’d say not if we are smarter than your average rock.
On the other hand, can our guys clear the skies over the rail heads at Zugdidi, Poti, Batumi and from there up and through to the Armenian and Azerbaijani borders? I’d suggest, yes, and legally too. And we’d best do it with alacrity and clarity, too.
If we don’t impose a free fly zone for all non-Russian-allied aircraft or projectiles over free Georgia [exclusive of Abkhazia and South “Ossettia”], then Georgia will remain broken, subject to arbitrary incursions, and terribly harassed. The pipelines might languish underused. New pipelines remain unbuilt. And lots of wonderful Georgian wine will fail to make it to the American market.
If we do impose a free fly zone for all but Russian-allied aircraft over free Georgia, then Georgia herself will be capable of handling provocations by Russians masquerading as “minorities” and will be able to make her own incursions into those areas should she think she can get away with it. Bleed Ivan to death, you know?
Here’s the thing. It is actually a good “Peace-Now” thing to put US (live) and NATO (undead) forces at the ports and flash points of Georgia. They become tripwires, a new Fulda Gap or Checkpoint Charlie, as it were.
That is actually a greater deterrent to interdiction of trans-Caucasus trade than we’d have if Les Russes were to withdraw entirely but hang around just over the border without our guys continuously on the ground in Georgia. Therefore, a permanent military mission to Georgia is the only way to return the trans-Caucasus to stability.
By that scenario, Ivan has bought himself Abkhazia by virtue of earlier ethnic cleansings, but he has also bought himself a thorough bloodletting to come in South “Ossettia” as well as a permanent stop sign just North-West of the Enguri River (Zugdidi).
…if–that is–we guarantee Georgian air space first by US-NATO missile-armed ships berthed in Batumi. And soon after, by Patriot (anti SS-21) and SAM units on the ground along the rail all the way to Azerbaijan, and on side routes through Tkibuli, Sachkhere, Borzhomi, Mareuli, and Gurdzhani (keep that good wine flowing).
At some point very soon, if they tarry, Russian check point operators anywhere in free Georgian territory (i.e. not Abkhazia or South “Ossettia”) will have to be forced to withdraw, which Georgia will do with gusto once we’ve taken control of the air.
