More like drip, drip, drip. The Georgian incursion gave the US political cover to make an ABM deal with Poland, get access to Ukranian radar intelligence, and maybe get enhanced facilities inside the Black Sea. Since the Black Sea opens onto the Med, but it doesn’t link to Russian Northern, Pacific or Baltic Fleets NATO has the ability to surge vessels into it in a way that can’t be matched by the Russians. Of course, the Russians could use anti-ship airpower, but that would set off Armaggedon.

What I’d fear most from the Russian point of view is a request by Georgia to “demiltarize” ports it legally owns except for one or two under NATO control. Under International Law, the Western ports remain Georgian. Over time, the Georgians can diplomatically ensure that the Russian Army cannot be resupplied by sea. If the Russians send their convoys, the ports can be mined before their arrival by air with Georgian permission. This means the Georgians, via NATO can have command of the sea while the Russian Army must supply itself overland. That’s fine for now, with the weather good. But in the winter, things will be different, especially if they face a Georgian insurgency. And if the roads are closed or mined by Georgian guerillas, then logistically supplying the Russian occupation Army becomes harder yet.

So I don’t see a confrontation with Russia, rather a slow strangulation of its forces should they decide to stay. If they pull back into Russia, or even into Abkhazia or South Ossetia, I don’t see that NATO forces will do anything to discomfit them. As I said, Putin should cash in now, while the gettin’s good.