Back to Sparta, r.e. Buddy Larsen
Spartan freedom of movement was important, but the ravaging of Attica did very little (see Victor Davis Hanson). Athens was dependent on its sea lanes logistically, the whole point of Pericles’ strategy was indirect, don’t defend Attica because they didn’t need to risk defeat against a superior military.
The Cavalry was a nice bonus in defending the Long Walls to the Pireus, but not ultimately intrinsic. Greek armies had no decent siege equipment to speak of (all sieges were won by investment and starvation/treachery, very rarely by direct assault).
Even after the plague, Athens had the better of things in the war, the Spartans were glad to accept the temporary peace of Nicias (c. 420 B.C.). Athens opened things up again with the Syracuse expedition (415 B.C.). That catastrophic failure more than anything else was what lost the war. Sparta never directly threatened the port until the final surrender of Athens.
The Golden Age of Greece began with the Athenian defeat of Persia (480/479 B.C.) and ended with the Pelopponesian War (431-405/4 B.C.). Alexander came seventy years later (c. 335 B.C.)
My whole point in bringing up this analogy was to show an example of indirect strategies (Liddell Hart) using leagues of allies to get at an opponents strengths without direct assault. Sparta couldn’t directly harm Athens (yearly invasions of Attica did nothing substantial VDH/Thucydides), but had greater long term success in chipping away at the Athenian hegemony, and the security to sit back and wait for Athens to make mistakes.
Which is precisely what happened when Athens decided to attack Syracuse, which did far greater lasting damage to Athens than even the plague.
This is what we can do with Russia. Moscow can only extend its power through heavy-handed dominance over the “near abroad” very similar to Athens once you look past the naval/land power paradigm. The US can play Sparta by adopting the moral high ground (the Spartans took the image of the “liberators” of Greece) and checking Russian expansion (Kennan 2.0).
This strategic defensive strategy forces Moscow to take the initiative, making Russia look bad internationally, and most likely forcing them into making mistakes (which Georgia will be in the long term, it’s already driven Poland/Ukraine into our camp just as Athens drove Corinth/Thebes into the Peloponnesian League).
