Yon is reporting from a town that was the location of the main project of US aid to Afghanistan before 2001. The goal was to create a center of prosperity on the Helmand River at Sangin along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority. One might have hoped that our main civilian aid project for Afghanistan prior to 2001 might have provided some good will in a small town of 15,000 even if its implementation fell short. Also, consider that the British established their FOB at Sangin in summer of 2006. Yon is describing the third year of the effort to bring Sangin over to our side.
So, in this context, consider Yon’s words:
“Nothing here can be considered friendly. “
“In many places, such as Sangin, the roads can be a death sentence no matter what you drive, and the enemy can seed IEDs far faster than we can clear the routes.”
“Here in Sangin, there are conflicting lines of information that would indicate we are gaining or losing ground. Cooperation from locals—a crucial indicator—would indicate we are treading water.”
Then consider a June 1 analysis of the war from Stratfor:
“The United States is losing in Afghanistan because it is not winning. The Taliban are winning in Afghanistan because they are not losing. This is the reality of insurgent warfare. A local insurgent is more invested in the struggle and is working on a much longer time line than an occupying foreign soldier. Every year that U.S. and NATO commanders do not show progress in Afghanistan, the investment of lives and resources becomes harder to justify at home. Public support erodes. Even without more pressing concerns elsewhere, democracies tend to have short attention spans.”
