The counterterrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus turned a spotlight on a large number of problems in combat rear service organization. It showed in particular that combat rear services are vulnerable to enemy firepower while their mobility does not match the mobility of troops. Nearly all combat rear service equipment has low off-road capability; cannot negotiate water obstacles on the move or ensure maneuver with materiel and assets in areas of destruction, floods, or fires; and has insufficient capability to maintain and replenish material, especially ammunition, stocks, provide medical assistance and evacuate wounded and sick, and ensure loading/unloading operations.

The existing combat rear service T/O structure does not ensure the necessary flexibility and operation of subunits in terms of materiel and medical service without outside assistance. The lack of rear service T/O protection, guard, and defense subunits, engineer subutnis and antiaircraft subunits as well as air transport sharply impairs the operational effectiveness of the combat rear service system.