@DanM:
Azerbaijanis say there is an American base near Senaki.

If there is an organized base with American forces deployed in Senaki, well, that bodes well for our Georgian friends. Senaki controls the rail lines from the ports Poti to the West and Sukhumi [in Abkazia] to the North. It becomes an excellent tripwire preventing Russia from controlling the very long flatland corridor from Poti up to somewhere short of Gori.

If the Georgians can secure a line North-East from Zugdidi and on up the Enguri River, they can contest for “Upper Abkhazia”.

But, if they have to fall back to Senaki, well, they still command the central corridor, keep options open in the port of Poti and control the excellent rail line from the port of Batumi all the way up to somewhere shy of Gori (would go all the way to Baku if the Russkies didn’t control Gori).

Their next fall back would be Samtredia which controls rail from Batumi in the South.

Everything is flat from Batumi (south coast) to Sukhumi (north coast), from Poti (west coast) past Samtredia to Ktaisi. Ktaisi is the terminus of the Czarist military road direct to North Ossetia via Tkibuli, Oni and the Mamison Pass.

So, the Russians have a huge armour deployment in Abkhazia on the north-west corner of this Armeggidon-like billiard table.

If we challenge Russian air, at least over Georgian-occupied Georgia, they will have to stay bottled up in Abkhazia to avoid a Saddamite turkey-shoot. Even so, Abkhazia won’t be Georgian again for a very long time; Russia now has her alternate to Sebastopol.

Congratulations, Vladchika!

If Russia controls the air, the whole plain and all the ports are hers for the taking.

The next fall back, moving East, is Zestafoni which guards the river and rail northward up to Sakhere. Even though the core valley flatland becomes very narrow, it is still good terrain for moving large quantities of armour rapidly.

Between Zestafoni and
Kashuri, the Greater and Lesser Caucasus “French-kiss”. No one will move much armor–except by rail there–which explains the importance of the military road from Roki to Gori and how it is that Georgia saved herself by delaying the Russkies at that “Ossettian” garrison town.

Gori controls two narrow East-West valleys. The Northern one travels farther East than Tbilisi and effectively cuts Eastern Georgia off from The Greater Caucasus northward.

If Georgia can hold a line between Kaspi (astride the two valleys), Dusheti, and Mt. Kazbek, then she keeps the “Ossettians” bottled up in Leningori (Akhalgori) and denies the fourth Czarist military road (bring yer oxygen tanks) from the north.

If that line falls, so goes Tbilisi.

What remains, though, is the entire Lesser Caucasus. There are Turkish and Georgian highland (understatement, but some of it is sorta flattish) routes communicating “directly” from Batumi
to mountains controlling the Russian military rail line from their base in Gyumri, Armenia (if Georgia-Turkey chose to make incursions).

The center of the Georgian Lesser Caucasus is controlled by the rail line from Kashuri most of the way up the the Goderzdi Pass. Borzhomi connects the Western and Eastern mountain routes and opens to Kashuri. Perhaps Borzhomi is the single most critical point to defend if Georgia is forced to retreat into the Lesser Caucasus.

Brozhomi would be a great honey-pot to sucker the Russkies into attacking, if one really wanted to see them get ground up.

Lord knows, I love Google Earth!