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By Richard Fernandez

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The war in the ether

August 12, 2008 - 3:47 pm - by Richard Fernandez
Mike Sylwester
2008-08-12 21:16:04

In January 2005, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili presented a new vision for resolving the South Ossetian conflict at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe session in Strasbourg. His proposal included broader forms of autonomy, including a constitutional guarantee of free and directly elected local self-governance. Saakashvili stated that South Ossetia’s parliament would have control over issues such as culture, education, social policy, economic policy, public order, organization of local self-governance and environmental protection. At the same time South Ossetia would have a voice in the national structures of government as well, with a constitutional guarantee of representation in the judicial and constitutional-judicial branches and in the Parliament. Georgia would commit to improving the economic and social conditions of South Ossetian inhabitants. Mixed Georgian and Ossetian police forces, under the guidance and auspices of international organizations, would be established and Ossetian forces would gradually be integrated into a united Georgian Armed Forces.

Certainly this seemed like a reasonable and promising path forward, but this progress was interrupted by a still mysterious event.

On October 31, 2006, the South Ossetian police reported a skirmish in the Java, Georgia district in which they killed a group of four men. The weapons seized from the group included assault rifles, guns, grenade launchers, grenades and explosive devices. Other items found in the militants’ possession included extremist Islamic literature, maps of Java district and sets of Russian peacekeeping uniforms. Those findings led the South Ossetian authorities to conclude that the militants were planning to carry out acts of sabotage, thus raising tensions ahead of the independence referendum scheduled for November 12, 2006.

The South Ossetian authorities identified the men as Kist Chechens, many of whom live in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. South Ossetia has accused Georgia of hiring the Chechen mercenaries to carry out terrorist attacks in the region. Russia has previously accused Georgia of harbouring Chechen separatists in the gorge. The Georgian side flatly denied its involvement in the incident.

To me, this incident appears to be a secret operation concocted by Georgians to discredit the South Ossetians as collaborators with Chechen terrorists. These Chechens apparently were supposed to approach a Russian peacekeeper unit, disguise themselves as Russian peacekeepers, and then kill some unsuspecting Russian peacekeepers. The Chechens then would be arrested immediately by Georgian policemen, who would reveal that the Chechens had done their dastardly deed in collaboration with South Ossetians.

Or, we can imagine just as easily that the incident was a secret operation concocted by Ossetians to descredit Georgians as collaborators with Chechen terrorists. QED.

In either of these explanations, the intended audience comprises both 1) Russia and 2) the USA — two huge and powerful countries that hate and fear Chechen terrorists and that will look favorably on any nationality that catches Chechen terrorsits doing dastardly deeds.

If the international community investigates the development of this crisis, then perhaps we can determine a better explanation of this incident.

On August 7, 2007, there was another mysterious event. A missile landed, but did not explode, in the Georgian-controlled village of Tsitelubani, some 65 km north of Tbilisi. Georgian officials said that two Russian fighter jets violated its airspace and fired a missile, targeting a nearby Georgian radar outpost. Russian and South Ossetian authorities accused Georgia of staging a false flag operation in order to provoke tension in the region. Two investigative groups from NATO countries – Shaakasvili’s key allies – reported that the jet entered Georgian airspace from Russia, but Russian officials rejected this conclusion, citing their own investigation.

If the international community investigates the development of this crisis, then perhaps we can determine a better explanation of this incident too.

And there is a third incident that seems mysterious. On July 8, 2008 South Ossetia reported that it had detained four “officers from the artillery brigade of the Georgian Ministry of Defense” close to the village of Okona in the Znauri district at the administrative border the night before. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili told police to prepare an operation to free the four soldiers, but they were released before an operation was launched.

Russian military jets flew into Georgian airspace through South Ossetia on July 9, 2008 and then returned to Russia. The next day, the Russian authorities confirmed the flight and said, in an official statement, that the fighters were sent to prevent Georgia from launching an operation to free the four soldiers detained by South Ossetia. (The incident coincided with the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Tbilisi.)

Russia reportedly considered revealing the details of a planned military invasion of South Ossetia by Georgia to release their detained officers. On July 15, 2008 the U.S. and Russia both began exercises in the Caucasus.The Russian exercises included training to support peacekeepers.

I wonder if this incident involving four Georgian artillery troops is related somehow to the artillery barrage launched against Tskhinvali on August 8, triggering the crisis.

In this regard, there seems to be some reason to believe that some Georgian artillery units might have acted beyond the control of the Georgian government.

At the end of August 7, Saakashvili ordered his Georgian troops to stand down in a unilateral cease-fire. In a televised statement, he declared: “A sniper war is ongoing against residents of the [Georgian] villages [in South Ossetia] and as I speak now intensive fire is ongoing from artillery, from tanks, from self-propelled artillery systems – which have been brought in the conflict zone illegally – and from other types of weaponry, including from mortars and grenade launchers.” Was he referring at least in part to some uncontrolled Georgian units that were ignoring his ceasefire orders?

Soon after his televised speech, later that same night, August 7-8, some Georgian artillery troops started a long-range artillery attack, supposedly against a bridge near Tskhinvali and supposedly because 150 Russian tanks were “approaching the region” — whatever this undefined “region” was. This artillery barrage hit Tshinvali’s central hospital, university and some of its schools.

The above information is from

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian-Ossetian_conflict