Some Comments on the Electronic Warfare in the Russian Invasion of Georgia 2008
1. Targeting Radio Communications:
a. Georgia is hilly and mountainous so to support terrestrial VHF and UHF radio (celltel) you need many point-to-point microwave relays and mountain top repeaters. Russian ID’d and then targeted military and civilian radio repeaters and cell sites. Once they took those out, the Georgian Army had no effective command and control communications (C3)other than VHF/UHF line of sight radios. I watched on FOXNEWS when one of the celltel repeaters was targeted. Maybe one of the reasons that the Georgian Army skidaddeled yesterday was because they lost the tactical radio links from the front line to the main force and didn’t know that the Russian tank column had stopped advancing north of Gori.
b. Jamming HF/MF Frequencies. Don’t know yet? The HF radio bands in the 3 to 5 MHz. range would be usable for tactical comms albeit that its the bottom of the solar sunspot cycle and radio propagation conditions can be categorized as “poor”. If the GA had manpack radios with spread spectrum anti-jam technology then they should have been able to maintain C3. No reports of Russian jamming Georgian TV or AM/FM radio broadcasts.
2. Radar and GPS
Lots of that used by the Russians for sure. GA probably used pre-programmed targeting info for the artillery barrage on SO so didn’t need GPS.
3. Satellite Communications (satcom)
Unknown usage outside of FOXNEWS coverage with a transportable uplink.
The GA has tactical satcom systems supplied by the US company Comtech. GA acquired in 2007 a Quick Deploy Satellite System (QDSS), satellite network bandwidth, training, and technical support. QDSS is a portable briefcase communications platform.
4. Common Carrier Telecom links(telecom)
Georgia Telecom – national telecom operator of the Republic of Georgia, established in 1994. Telecom Georgia has its own point-to-point Radio Relay Link network through entire Georgia and provides its customers with a wide range of services: local, domestic long-distance and international communication, voice and data transmission, Internet access. websitewww.telecom.ge
No info on damage to central office telephone switching equipment or long distance links.
5. Internet
Botnet attacks on servers with .ge. Unknown as to who in .ru was running the attacks.
