I don’t think it mattered one way or another, how effective the Russian cyberwar effort was, or the various propaganda moves. Though for the record I think the Russian cyberwar efforts were quite good, though Ukraine’s hosting of various Georgian websites something unexpected politically, for which Russian cyberwar was unprepared and did not respond. Notably, Russian efforts did not cross the US red line. They did not take down US websites and I’m sure they had the capability.

I thought Hanson’s take on the propaganda effort was spot on. That Russian efforts hardly mattered given the deep division in the US/West and utopian dreaming of a world without violence.

Somewhat off tangent (since I was asked about it earlier thread): I found the Russian military copying what the US did in Iraq/OIF, but without the logistical elements in full (reason for the pause). Nevertheless, it would seem that Gates was wrong (predicting counter-insurgency as the wave of the US military engagement) and Rumsfeld correct (in that RMA was paramount, as tactics in enhanced combined Arms was something that rivals/threats/enemies could copy readily). I don’t think Georgia was prepared for the tempo of Russian operations, or anyone else. That Russia achieved a tactical surprise of the US should give everyone pause. Though I agree with Hanson that Russia may like the Japanese in WWII overestimate their ability to continue to surprise the US.

But it was not the CIA alone that had egg on it’s face: the Pentagon also missed Russia’s obvious in retrospect build-up of forces. Showing dangerous limitations on our ability to predict hostile forces.

To myself, the dominant images and reports are Georgian troops fleeing pell-mell from Gori, Stalin’s birthplace, in advance of the Russians. I don’t think the Russians are ten feet tall, or unstoppable, but I am disquieted by how good they are and how different they are fighting from Grozny. They too have been watching how good the US was in Iraq-OIF. And learning.