BBC is now reporting that the Russians have withdrawn from Gori.
I must admit that I have been impressed with their tactical flexibility. They avoided a pitched battle at Kodori gorge, raided Senaki and Zugdidi, and don’t seem interested in holding the ground at Gori. Their linkage of kinetic action with the information war seems to be aimed at the purely political goal of toppling Saakashvili. The clumsy bear is showing a surprising agility. They seem perfectly aware of the dangers of a protracted counterinsurgency in the Caucasus and appear to be confining themselves to probing attacks.

The Russians are performing better than in the old days. But still, they’re only up against a few brigades. They have the air, they have the sea. They have the numbers. But they can’t bag the Georgian Army. In the information warfare sphere, the Georgians are whittling away at the Russian meme that this is all about South Ossetia. If the Russians don’t withdraw this will be about Georgia.

Taken together, the performance of both sides has created an opportunity. If the Georgians had collapsed or if the Russians had run an old style Kursk-type campaign, things would be far worse. Think of it as two fighters in a ring, both of whom can plausibly claim victory. You can get them to shake hands yet. Putin’s best move, as I wrote above, is to declare victory, beat his chest and go back into South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But is Putin like that?