what if russian armor proves just as “effective” as their jets? what if they *can’t* project *any* force into the area?
Hearken back to Grozny. Yeltsin was in charge of Russia; the Chechens had provoked Moscow which sent in armored units backed by gunships and attack jets. But in their hastiness they moved improvised formations and untrained units under an improvised plan. The Maikop Brigade was annihilated in the area around the train station, losing every armored vehicle. The regimental commander was killed. After that debacle, the Russians pulled back and did it right. Or at least better. They turned Grozny into another Stalingrad and are still fighting the pacification as we speak. And they were on the north side of the Caucasus.
The danger to Russia here is not that the Georgians will beat them in pitched battle: the Russians can’t lose in a prolonged engagement. It’s that Putin may be humiliated if the Georgians pull a Maikop on him. Putin was swept into power on the perception he could reverse the Yeltsin’s record of humiliation. But if he sends a pickup force in to “teach” the Georgians a lesson, his force, strung out over the mountains, with limited ability to concentrate its superior force because of a bad road network, could get the Admiral Rozhestvensky treatment. Going back as far as Nicholas, Moscow has had a penchant for setting itself up for humiliation by embarking on these lunatic adventures.
But I’m guessing that Putin is no idiot. He won’t push a multidivisional force across the Caucasus. He doesn’t have one parked on the northern side of the Caucasus. We would have picked it up. A mechanized division on a road can be more than a 100 kilometers long. Not to mention the fueling points, trucks, depots, ammunition dumps, etc that go into feeding this beast. So if he goes across it will be from a “standing start”, meaning nearest first. If he does that … I don’t think he will. He knows the history of Grozny as well as anyone.
That’s why I’ve argued that this engagement will be limited in the short run. In the long run the Russians can build up in South Ossetia. But if core Georgia becomes a NATO member, then it will be no different than the situation in Western Europe: Russia will be stymied. Georgia’s play for South Ossetia is stupid on one level, but a Russian thrust into South Ossetia would be even more stupid. That would push Georgia into a hard alliance with the West and give Russia a bunch of restive Ossetians.
