Please look at this Google terrain map of the area. It will be readily apparent that Georgia is behind the huge wall of the Caucasus. So is South Ossetia. This has two implications. The first is that South Ossetia’s long term value to Russia is as route across the Caucasus and as a dagger pointed at Georgia and, potentially, Turkey. The second is that in the short run, Russia is unlikely to develop major combat power across the mountain range. Unless it uses the sea flanks or builds up major infrastructure, Russia’s menace is long term rather than short term.

So while Georgia may have to lose South Ossetia, Georgia itself should not be sold down the drain by NATO. One option is to persuade Tblisi to forgo South Ossetia in exchange for a hard security guaranty for Tblisi against aggression. Moscow will find that holding on to South Ossetia, whose inhabitants have no particular love for it, were they not out for independence, will be expensive. Russians will become the occupiers if they don’t leave South Ossetians to their country.

One way to achieve this is to send private reassurances to Tblisi now that its national core will be protected, within reason, in exchange for a withdrawal from South Ossetia and simultaneously send a signal to Moscow that Tbilisi won’t fight for disputed territory but it will stand fast against incursions into the core of Georgia. One scenario would be to send a symbolic air superiority force to Turkey for exercises coupled with a conciliatory diplomacy and a proposal to put Georgia on the fast track to NATO membership.