I read the RAND paper and wrote an article on it at the Pajamas Media main site. The RAND corporation talks about the way terror groups end, not necessarily the way they are defeated. The decision of many of these terror groups to join a peace process or throw in the towel was inseparable from the end of the Cold War, and the RAND report gives examples of these. To argue that these terror groups would have folded if the Soviets had won the Cold War isn’t very convincing and the RAND report doesn’t make it. It talks about how terror groups end. That’s not to be confused with how they lost.
It makes the more forceful argument that because al-Qaeda attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan increased after September 11 ergo military action against it was ineffective. This is a flawed argument because al-Qaeda operations are perfectly correlated with operations against it. So sending forces to fight al-Qaeda would have the effect of increasing hostile contact but not necessarily mean al-Qaeda was getting stronger. Japan launched more attacks on the US between 1942 and 1945 than before that, but that didn’t meean Japan was gaining strength. It was in fact losing. The end state (the Japanese surrender) was the real metric of effectiveness. Similarly, the argument that because al-Qaeda launched more attacks against the US in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 ergo it got stronger is not necessarily true. They were fighting for their lives. But if you look at the end state in Iraq today, it’s hard to conclude, “right. Military force was ineffective. That’s why al-Qaeda is beaten.” If US action were so futile, then why is the end state thus? This is not necessarily a refutation of the RAND argument, but you can see why their assertion need not logically follow.
RAND also argued that al-Qaeda attacks in Muslim countries or in European countries with large Muslim populations increased after 9/11. The implication is that military action didn’t put a damper on this either. But consider for a while why it al-Qaeda failed to significantly attack the US after 9/11. Why would they attack Muslim countries instead? So you can read the RAND evidence to explain al-Qaeda’s efforts to keep their base in line. Make a show of strength in their bailiwicks. That is more indicative of weakness than strength.
Finally, the question is why, if diplomacy and intelligence alone are so effective, 9/11 itself occurred and why afterward it was never repeated when diplomacy and intelligence was augmented by military force. I think the common sense answer is that diplomacy, intelligence and military action together are the most effective. It’s a triad. Military action in Afghanistan has provided a superior base for gathering intel which would otherwise not be obtainable using pre-9/11 methods. This is not to disparage intel gathering or diplomacy. It is merely an observation that intel and diplomacy are enhanced by the judicious military operations. It’s not either or. It’s a cocktail of policies that is the best countermeasure against terrorism.
