I refuse to believe that Al Q was not discussed for eight months. Especially with the USS Cole situation having not been addressed. I don’t know perhaps I am being more generous, but even with the alert status and with the chatter, neither the FBI nor the CIA could offer actionable (detailed or not) intel, not humint, nor sigint, except for what was kept from discovery by midlevel agents and the infamous wall.

If Clarke, Tenant and Scheurer could not make their case in a compelling and reasonable way, why is it criminal to fail to hear them? I understand the difficulties they faced, residue from the previous admin kept to ensure continuity with the incoming one, but they failed to adjust, they failed to make the kinds of effort to be heard that would ensure deliberation. But at that level of service, they’d better not be timid, so I doubt it was from a lack of trying. Perhaps their personalities could not adjust to working with the Bush team, I don’t know.

Keeping them on did seem unwise on the one hand, but I appreciate the necessity of trying to work with them.

What I meant, The memo infers that Mr. Clarke was prepared with the facts, names and options required to determine a policy. I am not convinced that was the case.