Wretchard,

A more accurate description than “Jon” Compton’s would be to say that Gen Petraeus changed the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and exploited previously gathered intelligence with the additional troops.

US Army and Marine boots on the ground provided the validated HUMINT targeting data, the ROE change (removing the layers of lawyers who previously had to approve attacks) for precision guided indirect fire weapons (Guided MLRS in most instances) killed the enemy in Urban areas, and the 20% troop increase allowed rotating temporary major troop increases in those urban areas the terrorists had been driven out of so the local warlords could effectively stand up their own security forces (“Concerned Local Citizens) to keep the terrorists from coming back.

The Air Force Role here was to kill the insurgents flushed into rural areas by the Army and Marines. Once disentangled from urban collateral damage considerations, the USAF’s full weight of “high collateral damage” 2000lb JDAMS could be used to kill the insurgents.

This was the small war equivalent of hunting down and killing a retreating column of trucks and addresses both the USAF claims of increased use of munitions and the total weight of munitions used in 2008.

Compton also said:

I had a long discussion there with one old timer who was very direct about the current situation at the Pentagon. He related that the perception of the Air Force among the other services and civilians was that they were arrogant. So much so, in fact, that it was hampering communication and cooperation with them.

I strongly bed to differ. The “Other Services” are speaking from cold hard truth.

Consider the following notional numbers:

Five strikes in six months. Twenty strikes in six months. Four hundred percent increase.

A ‘four hundred percent increase’ doesn’t mean anything without context.

Context like this observation from Strategypage.com:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20071106.aspx

The Bored Skies Over Iraq

One F-16 squadron has been here for two months, and has made no (as in zero) attacks. The pilots have been busy, however, constantly using their targeting pods to act as aerial scouts for ground troops. But they have not come across any bad guys the G.I.s couldn’t handle. The infantry have plenty of guided missiles and “smart” artillery (GPS guided shells and rockets) available. The pilots are beginning to feel unneeded.

What matters to the other services is the Army’s non-notional statistic from Iraq:

Only 20% of validated requests for available combat aircraft satisfied (aircraft were actually sent and dropped bombs.)

Only 50% of Predator requests satisfied.

Only one time in five that the Army called for
a. aircraft,
b. aircraft that were in the air or available to scramble and
c. asked them to drop bombs did they actually do so.

Doing some math, if the AF had done two in five of requests that would be an eight hundred percent increase.

Point in fact, the inability of the USAF to field the small diameter bomb on its A-10 and F-16 aircraft lead the Army and USMC to largely cease using USAF strikes in urban areas for 2006 and most of 2007.

The following data is from a 20 Aug 2007 post on strategypage.com:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairw/articles/20070820.aspx

Note that the air force only dropped 177 smart bombs in Iraq last year (AKA 2006), and only fired 52 Hellfire (from Predators) or Maverick missiles. Activity is up this year, but still minuscule compared to past wars. So every smart bomb or missile counts, and accuracy is very important. Meanwhile, army and marine helicopters fired ten times as many missiles, as well as over 10,000 70mm unguided rockets and over 10 million rounds of cannon and machine-gun ammunition. This year, the air force is using a lot more Maverick missiles, and is borrowing laser guided versions from the navy.

The USAF’s inability to expedite SDB development to support the troops in contact lead to the service being embarrassed by the US Navy and Marine Corps via their deploying a reduced 30lbs of explosive fill in a 500lb JDAM bomb, see:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htart/articles/20071022.aspx

Add to that list, pre-surge, the following developments that infuriated ground troops and that didn’t even register with USAF leadership:

1) The post 27 Nov 2006 ban on 20mm strafing in Iraq due to the loss of an F-16C, piloted by Major Troy Gilbert

See:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20070404.aspx

and

2) The attempt to seize control of all UAV’s over Iraq through air traffic control issues

see:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20070328.aspx?comments=Y

to the point that the USAF insistence that Iraqi based Raven UAV’s file flight plans one day before the ground troops used them — effectively making their UAV’s useless to troops in hot contact who needed over head imagery right now.

This was discussed in Defense Industry Daily here:

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/field-report-on-raven-shadow-uavs-from-the-101st-01487/

With the following observation:

Crowded skies and lack of collision avoidance systems create serious issues for the RQ-11 Raven as well. Standard operating procedure mandates that Raven operators submit a flight plan 24 hours prior to desired departure, removing the UAV’s natural quick-launch role to respond to immediate questions or potential threats. These limitations will create serious issues for airborne UAVs unless they are addressed, with UGVs like “throwbots” et. al. as the likely beneficiaries at UAVs’ expense.

I strongly suspect that in addition to changing the ROA for artillery strikes, Gen Petraeus also changed those Air orce flight plan rules for hand thrown UAV’s during the surge.

So yes, the other services see the USAF as not being a team player, to the point of being a hindrance to the ground soldier in fighting and winning the war.