We went to Afghanistan almost 7 years ago because Mullah Omar wouldn’t turn over Osama bin Laden. We put a tiny number of our best young men in the mud alongside of the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance and together indigs, SF and airpower brought down the Taliban regime. That was a great victory. Tora Bora and the escape of Osama bin Laden dimmed that victory so much that few remember it now.
We stayed after the fall of the Taliban for a number of good reasons, including strategic position on Iran’s eastern border, China’s western border, and Russia’s sphere of influence. Afghanistan was a basket case, and the brave Northern Alliance fighters seemed worthy of our assistance. A case can be made that America used Afghans as pawns in a proxy war with the Soviet Union, then turned its back on them while they sank into chaos, so massive American assistance was a way to make amends. And Afghanistan provided a great arena for a multi-national Special Forces Olympics.
America couldn’t declare victory in Afghanistan without the head of Osama bin Laden, so we rationalized reasons to stay. Overthrowing the Taliban and installing a friendly regime in Kabul was a good start, but that wasn’t payback enough for 9/11. Osama was supposed to be in Pakistan, a country we were calling an ally, so he was safe from us.
Saddam wasn’t safe from us. Going after him didn’t “distract” us from anything in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, by virtue of its land-locked, railroadless isolation, was always destined to be an economy of force operation. McCain and Obama can talk about sending thousands of additional troops, but neither of them can shorten the mileage from Karachi to Kandahar or Rawalpindi to Jalalabad, or escort those trucks through the war lord, mafia, and tribal roadblocks.
ISAF has a finite head count end strength cap based on the capacity of the Line of Communications to bring the beans, bullets and fuel forward. Everybody on that cracker line who is caveated to limited duty may as well go home, or move north and draw rations from the German base in Uzbekistan.
Only so many boots on the ground can be sustained through the Port of Karachi. How many of those boots should be worn by riflemen kinetically engaging the Taliban, and how many should be worn by Embedded Training Teams and Police Mentoring Teams teaching Afghans to kinetically engage the Taliban? We need no caveat troops on the head count, fewer shooters, more trainers.
The Surge in Afghanistan should come from Afghans. Somebody is going to have to twist Karzai’s arm into mobilizing turned Taliban and Pashtun irregulars and anti-Taliban lashkars. A Pashtun version of the Anbar Awakening, Sons of Afghanistan or something along those lines is what we need.
