RWE: Yes, there are countless facets to technostrategies in WW1/2. From August 1914 to August 1945, thirty one years of ‘if, if, if only, ‘. I regard those decades as one convulsion.

I believe it was in the UK where Bomber Command was not amused by shifting priority to submarine patrol. Bomber Harris was not a man easily amused anyway. He hardly had bombers to spare, wasn’t having much success in using them, and realized current bombers were not well suited to submarine patrol.

But imperfect patrol planes were better than none.

My usage may wrong. To me search and reconnaissance planes gather information but avoid engagement. A patrol planes task is to search and engage.

The great value of the radar patrol planes was not in directly guarding convoys but in hampering submarine movement anywhere, even far from convoys. Diesel/electric submarines were essentially static when submerged – slow and without range – and had little chance of acquiring a target.

In order to be effective far out into the Atlantic the submarines simply had to run on the surface for hours. Radar stopped them.

Churchill’s accounts contain a surprising amount of technostategic analysis about the late thirties and the earlier years of the war. Some readers know that. But others may harbor the vague idea that the old dinosaur just made inspiring speeches. Not so.