The Brits lost in Afghanistan; more than once. The British didn’t learn to effectively fight a counterinsurgency until Malaya in the 1940′s and ’50′s. The Germans and Russians used brutalization tactics against insurgents and neither one found it successful.

I could empathize with the troops in Kunar. I’ve had those same types of conversations with local elders and villagers, with much the same results. I’ve written about that; about sitting in shuras where the lies were told, debunked, and then self-excused, only to find that some of those elders had sons who were Taliban.

While I am not the commander on the ground, the worst thing to my mind is abandoning an outpost following an attack. What was a costly tactical victory is now a strategic defeat on many levels.

The message is that if you punch us hard enough in the face and make our nose bleed, we will acquiesce to your wishes and leave that area.

Periodic patrols and visits just don’t have the same impact on the ability of the ACM to infiltrate along that route as the establishment of a permanent presence and an ongoing relationship with both the local population and the local governmental entities, such as the ANP.