“the key problem is how to clean up the Pakistani side of the border without a) escalating the level of operations severalfold; and b) driving the Taliban down into Swat and other points east until they impinge on the heartland of Pakistan. So far the approach has been to work through Pakistan, and maybe that’s like trying to push a wet noodle. In other words, the attack on the border post is a reminder of the shortcomings of the current levers that can be safely pulled. Something’s got to change. The question is what?”
Historically, most of Pakistan’s populace is not willing nor able to take on the denizens of the NW Frontier. these very able fighters are the backbone of the Pakistani Military and also the membership of the Frontier Corps (as well as their leading officers). The division in the various tribes along pro and anti Taliban sentiments sounds to me to be a fight in the making, one with the potential to eliminate the Hard line Islamists. But the Government, Herf=http:”//www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2008/07/ap_pakistanfighters_071008/”>appears cowed or at least it is unable to determine how to take advantage of the split. I do not think the members of Bhutto’s party nor most of their coalition have much sympathy for either the Taliban or Al Qaeda, both of which figure in the death of Benazir Bhutto. So why the reluctance to take the NW radicals to task?
Recently, (herf=”http://www.topix.net/content/ap/2008/07/ap-impact-pakistan-militants-focus-on-afghanistan”>according to the AP both the NE Islamists, and the NW Islamists got together forChai, (HT to Cannoneer No. 4)the result appears to be the resurgence of Pakistani generated trouble for Afghanistan. Add to the increase of Foreign Al Qaeda fighters in the frontier regions that is quite a cocktail to be had.
But as Mullen subtly understated, the Pakistani government is still new and wrestling with the problem. I don’t completely buy it. They know the problem, they’ve been there before. I just cannot reconcile Bhutto’s sacrifice to the lack luster performance of her party thus far. If their hands are tied by ISI It seems to me the government response would be something different. At least until they could plot a way around that very much all ensnaring obstacle.
In my mind it raises the question of who really Governs Pakistan, the Military, the ISI, or the Civilian government. Did Musharrif have that much say or was it really just the ISI?
