Thank you, Tony. It was an honor and a privilege.

Excellent point about Pakistan. If you were to put together a “recipe” for a successful insurgency, the Afghan insurgency has all the makings of a successful one, including a safe haven in which to rest and reorganize, and outside support/funding.

My ANP used to get a big kick out of my reaction when they asked about Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“Afghanistan hoobus? (Is Afghanistan good?/Do you like Afghanistan?)”

“Bali, (Yes,)” I would reply, “Afghanistan bisyar hoobus. (Afghanistan is very good.)”

They beamed, then posed another query in the form of a statement.

“Pakistan horrobus. (Pakistan is bad.)”

“Pakistan horrobus. Musharraf ‘yak yak yak’” (making talking hands in two different directions… he’s talking out of both sides of his mouth.)

Laughter all around.

They got a huge kick out of that, because to them it was obvious; yet they see us pandering to the Paki’s while the ISI plays silly games with Afghanistan’s future.

Again, I disagree with the likelihood of American troops being engaged from behind. I’ve worked with the ANA and found them to be enthusiastic soldiers with a warrior ethos, improving tactical capability, and an intense dislike for the Taliban.

Mentors are embedded within the Afghan units. I was a mentor. ISAF units like the 173rd operate as a unit, not mixed in with Afghans, but often in conjunction with them.

The current TTP is to cause casualties to 1) coalition forces and 2) ANSF in that order according to the capability of the attacking unit. Often the ANSF are the softer target, as when they are vehicle-mounted. The ANP are always softest. Most likely, the American ISAF element was the element isolated in the kill zone, perhaps by design, and therefore bore the brunt of the fight. This isolation is not impossible in such terrain (it’s SCARY ambush terrain!) Also, the ambush was most assuredly initiated with the highest casualty-producing weapon, possibly even an IED, if not massed RPG and machine gun fire.

Having worked with the Afghans, I feel qualified to say that they are the least likely source of the American casualties. It is so unlikely, in my frame of reference, as to be a waste of analytical energy.

Because of poor muzzle discipline, the Afghans are somewhat more likely to shoot each other by accident. They are getting better about that, though.