I cannot access your post from this location, but I will toss this out there…

What the T E Lawrence figured out, and the British figured out in Malaya, is to figure out how indigenous forces can contribute to their own security. That includes their reasons for wanting to, what they are capable of, how they operate, and how they can cooperate.

Treating the indigenous leaders as partners and their forces with respect is another challenge for our conventional forces, who have an inbred sense of superiority that is inculcated while instilling a sense of elite esprit d’ corps.

The challenge of developing that spirit within a unit while still having respect for other forces is something that separates the conventional forces from the “quiet professionals” of the special operations forces. Why can we not move towards that “quiet professional” mode as a model for Big Army?

Can it even be done? Can the average grunt survive if he can’t look down on the rest of the world?

There are so many benefits to having such esprit, but the downside was very apparent to me as I operated with my Afghans, who were not the least bit in doubt as to the feelings of the elite airborne troops that they were supposedly operating “with.” Disrespect is a language all its own.

Partnering with indigenous groups who have motivation and ability to counter the ACM in Afghanistan can be very beneficial. One must be careful, however, not to simply be used as a hammer that one group uses to get the upper hand on another so that they can simply take over the turf or get a fly out of their own ointment.

We must avoid partnering with groups whose overriding goal is to overthrow the IRoA and take it over for themselves.